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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific

**STAFF STUDY
OPERATIONS**

“CORONET”

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

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AFO 500
15 August 1945

STAFF STUDY

"CORONET"

OPERATIONS IN THE KANTO PLAIN OF HONSHU

1. The attached Staff Study for Operation "CORONET" is furnished as a matter of interest only and for completion of files of all concerned. It sets forth the first draft of the plan of CINCPAC formulated prior to the cessation of hostilities for joint operations in the KANTO PLAIN area of HONSHU. No effort has been made to extend the study. It is published in its present incomplete form.

2. Estimated commitments of means are in accordance with redeployment and logistic capabilities existing as of the date of the Japanese surrender.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

S. J. Chamberlin
S. J. CHAMBERLIN,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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

U.S. Army, Forces in the Pacific
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

STAFF STUDY

"CORONET"

OPERATIONS IN THE KANTO PLAIN OF HONSHU

15 August 1945



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

STAFF STUDY

"CORONET"

Operations in the KANTO PLAIN of HONSHU

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

STAFF STUDY

OPERATION

"CORONET"

AGO 500
15 August 1945

1. DIRECTIVE (See Chart, Annex 1, The Operation Directed).

a. This Staff Study is derived from "DOWNFALL", Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, 28 May 1945. It covers operations of United States Army Forces, acting jointly with the United States Pacific Fleet, to occupy the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA and KANTO PLAINS areas and effect the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

Target Date: ("Y" - Day), 1 March 1946.

b. The following basic command relationships are established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for operations of United States Army and Navy Forces against JAPAN:

- (1) Command of all United States Army resources in the Pacific (less the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, Alaskan Department and Southeast Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
 - (2) Command of all United States Naval resources in the Pacific (less Southeast Pacific) is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
 - (3) The U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, for the present, continues operations under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.
 - (4) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific is charged with making plans and preparations for
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the campaign in JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN.

- (5) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet is charged with making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, on the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN.
- (6) The Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Air Force cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific and with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the preparation of plans connected with the invasion of JAPAN.

c. Tasks

The following tasks for Operation "CORONET" are assigned:

- (1) By joint overseas expeditionary operations destroy hostile forces and occupy the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA area.
- (2) Complete occupation of the KANTO PLAIN area; establish air forces, naval and logistic facilities for support of subsequent operations in Central and Northern JAPAN.
- (3) Conduct such subsequent operations in Central and Northern HONSHU and Japanese Islands to the northward as may be directed to terminate hostile resistance in these areas.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

- a. Hostile (See Annex 2 a, G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation, the TOKYO (KANTO) Plain of HONSHU, 31 May 1945).

- (1) That the Japanese will continue the war to the utmost extent of their capabilities and will prepare to defend the home island of HONSHU utilizing all available means. That the operation will be opposed not only by the available organized

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military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population.

- (2) That by "Y"-Day, the total ground strength in the general TOKYO area will not exceed the following:

6 Mobile Combat Infantry Divisions

2 Depot Divisions

1-1/3 Armored Divisions

40,000 Naval Base Troops

60,000 Air-Ground Personnel

60,000 Base and Service Troops

Large number of Citizens Volunteer Units

- (3) That the initial assaults will be opposed at time of landing by not more than 4 Mobile Combat Infantry Divisions, with appropriate supporting troops, and reinforced by local garrisons and home defense units.
- (4) That the enemy will attempt prompt reinforcement of the TOKYO area to the limit of their capabilities immediately following the initial landings. That due to interdiction of main road and railroad routes, however, this rate of reinforcement will not exceed 4 divisions per week thereafter, reaching an optimum total by "Y" / 30 of 22 Infantry and 2 Armored Divisions within the entire area.
- (5) That by "Y"-Day, our expanded air and sea control will preclude further major reinforcement from the Asiatic Mainland.
- (6) That prior to initiation of the operation, the enemy will have been forced to withdraw the bulk of his remaining land-based air force to the Asiatic Mainland, but that this force will be capable of operating against our landings by staging through homeland fields and will emphasize execution of suicide-type missions.

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- (7) That prior to initiation of the operation, hostile naval capabilities will have been reduced to possible suicide sorties by remnants of the Japanese Fleet and harassing or suicide attacks by submarines and light craft.
- (8) That prior to "Y"-Day, as a result of sustained air bombardment, the industrial productive capacity of the entire Japanese Empire, including MANCHURIA, North CHINA and KOREA will have been seriously disrupted and shipping lanes within Empire waters effectively interdicted.
- (9) That the hostile logistic position will be such as to permit determined defensive military action initially, but due to serious potential shortages, particularly food for civilian consumption, this position will rapidly deteriorate under pressure and will eventually handicap enemy military operations.

b. Own Forces

- (1) That the entire resources available to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet will be available for support of the operation.
- (2) That the flow of redeployed United States Army Forces to the Pacific will be maintained generally in accordance with existing schedules.
- (3) That diversion of "CORONET" resources as a result of RUSSIA's entry into the war will be limited to logistic and naval assistance on a temporary basis at such times that they can be spared without prejudice to "CORONET".
- (4) That prior to initiation of the operation, United States Forces are successfully established in Southern KYUSHU as a result of "MAJESTIC" operations.
- (5) That prior to initiation of the operation, United States

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action completely to destroy hostile air forces in the Japanese home islands and the Asiatic Mainland, shatter land communications, isolate the TOKYO-YOKOHAMA and the KANTO PLAIN areas, and reduce defensive installations in the objective area. All air attacks are intensified as the date of landing approaches, culminating in an all-out effort of all air forces, coordinated with Naval bombardment, from "Y"-15 to "Y"-Day to destroy hostile air forces in HONSHU and closely supporting areas, isolate the objective area, complete the reduction of the harbor defenses of SAGAMI-WAN, and cover preliminary operations and minesweeping.

About "Y"-20, naval surface bombardment of the harbor defenses of SAGAMI-WAN and of landing areas is instituted.

About "Y"-4, minesweeping operations are initiated.

The Attack Force is launched from the PHILIPPINES and CENTRAL PACIFIC bases, proceeding to the objective area under cover of the Pacific Fleet and carrier and land-based aviation. It effects, on "Y"-Day, a landing of the Eighth and First Armies in the SAGAMI and KUJIKURI BEACH areas, respectively.

The First Army, supported by air and naval elements, advances rapidly to secure the eastern shore of SAGAMI-WAN and TOKYO BAY, and to destroy hostile forces and seize TOKYO from the east.

The Eighth Army, supported by air and naval elements, advances rapidly to secure the western shore of TOKYO BAY, to destroy hostile forces and seize TOKYO from the west. It effects the debouchment of its armored divisions into the KUMAGAYA-KOGA area at the earliest practicable date with the object of thereafter isolating the KANTO PLAIN area and disrupting the enemy's rear.

On "Y" / 30, each Army is reinforced by a corps of three divisions. On "Y" / 35, an AFPAC Reserve Corps of three divisions, and the 11th A/B Division, are available. A corps of three divisions, located in the PHILIPPINES, and divisions necessary to permit reinforcement at the rate of 4 divisions per month, located in the U.S., constitute the strategic reserve.

Service troops are promptly brought forward, land-based aviation is installed progressively and at the earliest practicable date, logistic

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facilities are developed and the area consolidated. Military Government is instituted.

The China Theater conducts neutralizing attacks against hostile air forces on the Asiatic Mainland and executes diversionary attacks by ground forces. The South East Asia Command conducts air and ground operations within its assigned areas of responsibility. The efforts of these two theaters are directed towards holding Japanese air and ground forces in position. Air and Naval elements based in the ALEUTIANS provide general support as practicable.

b. Employment of Forces

(1) Organization

For organization of United States Army Forces in the Pacific, including major corresponding elements of the United States Pacific Fleet as prescribed by CINCPAC, see Chart, Annex, 3b(1)(a).

(2) Forces

(a) UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC - Command of United States Army resources in the Pacific, except Alaskan Department, Southeast Pacific, and United States Army Strategic Air Force.
Inter-theater coordination.
Theater Command, SWPA.
Coordination of land-based air and ground operations.

ADVON, GHQ, AFPAC

- Landing Force.
Operations of Ground Forces.
Conduct of Military Government.
Preparation of AFPAC reserve elements.
Mounting of elements transported into CORONET area under AFPAC control.

EIGHTH ARMY

- Preparation of Eighth Army elements.
Mounting of elements transported into CORONET area under Eighth Army control.

FIRST ARMY

- Preparation of First Army elements.
Mounting of elements transported into CORONET area under First Army control.

FAR EAST AIR FORCES

- Preparation of AFPAC Air Forces for CORONET. Preliminary air bombardment. General air support. Air convoy cover as requested by United States Pacific Fleet. Direct air support of ground operations in conjunction with United States Pacific Fleet.

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC

- Preparation and mounting of Army elements from Middle Pacific (for CINCPAC). Logistic support for Army elements in the Middle Pacific.

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC

- Logistic support for Army elements in the Western Pacific.

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "C"

- Preparation of Army Service Command "C" elements for the operation. Mounting of elements transported to objective area under Army Service Command "C" control. Base development and logistic support in the objective area.

NAVAL FORCES SWPA (for CINCPAC)

- Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine units from SWPA.

(b) UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

- Naval and amphibious operations, including strategic and general support. Inter-theater coordination. Theater Command, POA. Preparation and mounting of Marine and Naval units from POA. Establishment of naval facilities in the objective area.

(c) UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE

- VHB strategic and general air support.

(3) Forces Required

- (a) Major ground combat elements allocated for the operation are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MOUNTED FROM</u>
<u>EIGHTH ARMY</u>	LEYTE
<u>X CORPS</u>	MINDANAO

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MOUNTED FROM</u>
24th Inf Div	MINDANAO
31st Inf Div	MINDANAO
37th Inf Div	LUZON
<u>XIV CORPS</u>	LUZON
6th Inf Div	LUZON
32nd Inf Div	LUZON
38th Inf Div	LUZON
<u>XIII CORPS</u>	U. S.
13th Armored Div	U. S.
20th Armored Div	U. S.
<u>"D" CORPS</u>	LUZON
4th Inf Div	LUZON
87th Inf Div	LUZON
8th Inf Div	MINDORO
<u>FIRST ARMY</u>	LUZON
<u>XXIV CORPS</u>	RYUKYUS
7th Inf Div	RYUKYUS
27th Inf Div	RYUKYUS
96th Inf Div	MINDORO
<u>III AMPHIB CORPS</u>	GUAM
1st Mar Div	RYUKYUS
4th Mar Div	HAWAII
6th Mar Div	GUAM
<u>"B" CORPS</u>	CEBU
86th Inf Div	LEYTE
44th Inf Div	CEBU
5th Inf Div	PANAY
<u>AFFAC RESERVE</u>	
<u>"Y"-DAY</u>	
97th Inf Div (mounted and transported by Eighth Army)	CEBU
<u>"Y" / 35</u>	
<u>"C" CORPS</u>	LEYTE
2nd Inf Div	LEYTE
28th Inf Div	LUZON
35th Inf Div	LUZON
11th A/B Div	KYUSHU

UNIT

MOUNTED FROM

STRATEGIC (P.I.)

"E" CORPS

95th Inf Div	LUZON
104th Inf Div	LUZON
91st Inf Div	LUZON

STRATEGIC (U.S.)

Divisions as required to permit a build-up of four divisions per month beginning in May 1946.

(b) Commitment

Total commitment, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, with attachments, is estimated as follows:

(See Annex 3b(3)(b), Estimate of Troop Requirements).

"Y"-DAY

<u>EASTERN FORCE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>D.W.T.</u>
Ground Combat	153,782	16,786	173,086
Service	73,177	13,994	120,135
Air	<u>14,367</u>	<u>3,485</u>	<u>24,102</u>
	241,326	34,265	317,323
<u>WESTERN FORCE</u>			
Ground Combat	203,434	23,141	275,143
Service	88,656	13,661	110,196
Air	<u>8,914</u>	<u>2,248</u>	<u>14,446</u>
	301,004	39,050	399,785
TOTAL "Y"-DAY COMMITMENT	542,330	74,315	717,108

"Y"/30

<u>EASTERN FORCE</u>			
Ground Combat	72,698	17,498	121,069
Service	89,385	14,440	130,503
Air	<u>6,955</u>	<u>1,157</u>	<u>9,378</u>
	169,038	33,095	260,950

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<u>WESTERN FORCE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>D. W. T.</u>
Ground Combat	74,528	20,761	129,158
Service	141,145	20,809	203,765
Air	<u>13,106</u>	<u>2,899</u>	<u>21,539</u>
	228,779	44,469	354,462
<u>TOTAL "Y"/30 COMMITMENT</u>	397,817	77,564	615,412

"Y"/35

<u>AFPAC RESERVE</u>			
Ground Combat	56,797	7,478	63,485
Service	<u>17,389</u>	<u>2,606</u>	<u>22,421</u>
<u>TOTAL "Y"/35 COMMITMENT</u>	74,186	10,084	85,906

("Y"/15) to ("Y"/60)

(SHORT TURN-AROUND - KYUSHU)

Service	22,657	6,527	51,577
Air	<u>58,345</u>	<u>14,939</u>	<u>87,543</u>
<u>TOTAL ("Y"/15) to ("Y"/60) COMMITMENT</u>	81,002	21,466	139,120

"Y"/60

(REAR ECHELONS)

Combat	76,311	21,401	127,499
Service	-	16,381	48,699
Air	<u>-</u>	<u>2,303</u>	<u>7,543</u>
<u>TOTAL "Y"/60 COMMITMENT</u>	76,311	40,085	183,741

TOTAL COMMITMENT WATER BORNE 1,158,128 222,514 1,741,023

TOTAL COMMITMENT AIRBORNE 13,518 - -

TOTAL TROOP COMMITMENT 1,171,646 222,514 1,741,023

(c) Naval Assault Lift

CINCPAC has estimated the following naval assault lift as available for the operation:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>D. W. T.</u>
210 AFA	273,000	10,500	105,000
85 AKA	21,250	10,200	85,000

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>D. W. T.</u>
6 XAP	8,400	300	6,000
120 APD	18,000	-	600
6 LSV	4,800	300	1,500
22 LSD	5,280	1,100	15,400
675 LST	202,500	40,500	342,500
480 LSM	24,000	4,800	72,000
16 AP	<u>32,000</u>	<u>800</u>	<u>11,200</u>
TOTAL ASSAULT LIFT	589,230	68,500	639,200
Plus 21 XAK	<u> </u>	<u>4,410</u>	<u>79,800</u>
TOTAL	589,230	72,910	719,000

(d) Air Deployment

For deployment of air units, see Charts, Annex 3b(3)(d)I and Annex 3b(3)(d)II.

(4) Operations Required (See Chart, Annex 3b(4), The Operations Required).

(a) U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific are assigned tasks for the operations as follows:

1. Advance Echelon, United States Army Forces, Pacific

- a. Command Landing Force.
- b. Conduct ground operations.
- c. Prepare AFPAC Reserve elements for the operation.
- d. Mount elements transported to the objective area under AFPAC control.
- e. Commit reserve elements as dictated by developments.
- f. Direct occupation and defense of radar and aircraft warning installations as arranged with Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.
- g. Institute Military Government in occupied areas.
- h. Prepare to conduct further operations to force Japanese unconditional surrender, as directed.

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2. Eighth Army

- a. Prepare Eighth Army elements for the operation.
- b. Mount elements transported to the objective area under Eighth Army control.
- c. On "Y"-Day, seize and occupy beachheads at the head of SAGAMI BAY.
- d. Destroy hostile forces wherever encountered.
- e. Seize and secure the western shore of TOKYO BAY from the southern tip of the YOKOSUKA PENINSULA to YOKOHAMA (exclusive).
- f. Protect the west flank of the Landing Force.
- g. Seize and secure the crossings of the TAMA GAWA. Drive armored elements vigorously inland to seize the KUMAGAYA-KOGA area. Block movement of hostile reinforcements into the KANTO PLAIN and disrupt the enemy's rear. Be prepared to turn armor south against TOKYO.
- h. Advance northward and eastward to seize YOKOHAMA, to assist in the seizure of TOKYO, and to complete the destruction of hostile forces.
- i. Initiate construction of air, naval and logistic facilities within the Eighth Army area at the earliest practicable date.

3. First Army

- a. Prepare First Army elements for the operation.
- b. Mount elements transported to the objective area under first Army control.
- c. On "Y"-Day, seize and occupy beachheads in the KUJIKURI BEACH area.
- d. Destroy hostile forces wherever encountered.
- e. Turn necessary force westward and southward to

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clear the eastern shore of TOKYO BAY - SAGAMI BAY.

- f. Seize and secure the mouth of the TONE GAWA at the earliest practicable date for use as an unloading point and small craft harbor. Protect the north flank of the Landing Force.
- g. Seize and secure the terrain corridor lying between CHIMBA and IMBA-NUMA.
- h. Continue the advance westward to seize TOKYO and complete the destruction of hostile forces.
- i. Initiate construction of air, naval and logistic facilities within the First Army area at the earliest practicable date.

4. Far East Air Forces (See Annex 3b(4)(a)5, Land-based Air Support)

- a. Provide aerial photography and reconnaissance as required.
- b. In conjunction with other air forces, destroy or neutralize hostile air, sea and ground elements capable of interfering with or limiting the success of the operation.
- c. In coordination with Naval Air Forces, execute preliminary air bombardment missions within the objective area, reaching maximum intensity of this bombardment during the period "Y"-15 Day to "Y"-Day.
- d. By air attack against critical points along hostile routes of communication between the TOKYO area and the remainder of HONSHU, limit to the greatest extent practicable hostile reinforcement capabilities into the objective area.
- e. Provide land-based air protection for naval forces as arranged with the Commander-in-Chief,

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United States Pacific Fleet.

f. Be prepared to execute emergency air resupply missions as requested by the Landing Force Commander.

g. Promptly install required air garrisons in the objective area.

6. United States Army Forces Middle Pacific

a. Prepare and mount United States Army elements from the Middle Pacific, as directed, for CINCPAC.

b. Provide logistic support for United States Army Forces in the Middle Pacific.

7. United States Army Forces Western Pacific

Provide logistic support for United States Army Forces in the Western Pacific.

8. Army Service Command "C"

a. Prepare Army Service Command "C" elements for the operation.

b. Mount elements transported to the objective area under Army Service Command "C" control.

c. Develop CORONET bases.

d. Provide logistic support in the objective area.

9. Naval Forces SWPA (for CINCPAC)

Prepare and mount, Naval and Marine elements from SWPA for the operation.

(b) United States Pacific Fleet (See Annex 3b(4)(b)).

(c) United States Strategic Air Force

Provide VHB strategic and general support for the operation.

(5) Coordination

Operations of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific,

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the United States Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force are coordinated as follows:

(a) Command of Air Forces

Army Air Forces and Navy land-based air forces operate under the command of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, respectively, except that:

1. The United States Army Strategic Air Force operates as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Marine air units, when assigned to operate with major ground elements of the Fleet Marine Force under Army control, pass to the operational control of the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.
3. When Army Air Forces are responsible for the air defense of an area or position, Marine units participating in such air defense pass to the operational control of the appropriate Army Air Task Force Commander.

(b) Coordination of Air Forces

1. The following principles govern the general coordination of air forces under control of CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and CG USASTAF prior to and during the conduct of "CORONET":
 - a. Prior to "Y"-8 and when the carriers of the U.S. Fleet are in position to attack objectives in JAPAN
 - i. The principal tasks of fast carrier task forces during this period are to destroy enemy naval and air forces, shipping and coastal objectives, protect sea communications in the Western Pacific, and to support other forces. These forces will

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assume the primary responsibility for the destruction of enemy aircraft and airdrome installations north and east of the following line, hereafter referred to as the coordinating line (see Annex 3b(5)(b)):
Railroad through NIIGATA-KITAKANTA-KORIYAMA-TAIRA-HIRAKATA; with particular reference to those which cannot be reached effectively by the Far East Air Forces or by the fighters of USASTAF. When the fast carrier task forces are operating south and west of the coordinating line to accomplish their assigned naval tasks, they will operate against enemy air forces and airdrome installations in such a manner as to inflict maximum damage thereon and to ensure their own safety.

- ii. The principal tasks of FEAF and Navy Air Forces, KYUSHU and RYUKYUS, during this period are to destroy hostile air forces within range, ground forces and installations in the Southern Japanese Archipelago, naval forces and shipping within range, and lines of communication contributing to maintenance of reinforcement of hostile forces in the KANTO PLAIN area of HONSHU. FEAF and Navy Air Forces, KYUSHU and RYUKYUS, will assume the primary responsibility for attack of hostile enemy aircraft and airdrome installations south and west of the coordinating line. Local coordination of FEAF, USASTAF

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and Navy Air Forces in their operations and selection of objectives to be attacked will be effected by local arrangement between the commanders of the three forces represented.

- iii. The primary task of the USASTAF is the destruction of hostile strategic targets. The forces of USASTAF will assume the primary responsibility for the destruction of strategic targets both east and west of the coordinating line.
- iv. The Commander, _____ Fleet, or his Task Force Commanders; the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, or his Air Force Commanders; the Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Air Force, or his Air Force Commanders; and the Senior Naval Air Commander at OKINAWA and on KYUSHU, will notify each other, CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and COMGEN USASTAF of their strike intents as far in advance as is practicable. This is particularly important when elements of the Fleet Carrier Task Forces strike south or west of the coordinating line, when FEAF or Navy air elements in KYUSHU and the RYUKYUS strike north or east of the coordinating line and when USASTAF strikes in either area.
- v. In emergency, the air commanders indicated above may strike any hostile target. In this case or in case of change of plans of air attack on hostile objectives, these commanders shall inform all air commanders

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concerned as promptly as possible.

b. From "Y"-8 inclusive to an indefinite date
later to be agreed upon by dispatch

- i. The _____ Fleet will assume the primary responsibility for the destruction of enemy aircraft and airdrome installations north and east of the coordinating line.
 - ii. In addition to its planned operations within the objective area, FEAF will assume the primary responsibility for the destruction of enemy aircraft and airdrome installations outside the objective area and south and west of the coordinating line. Coordination of FEAF and Navy Air Forces, KYUSHU and RYUKYUS, in attacks on hostile objectives set forth will be as in sub-paragraph a above. CG FEAF will notify Commander Fifth Fleet when, because of weather or other reason, its counter air force mission cannot be performed.
 - iii. The Fleet will assume primary responsibility for air defense in the objective area, but will take such action as is required to cover targets outside the objective area in event that FEAF, because of weather or other reason, cannot perform its mission.
2. Operations of the Far East Air Forces within the boundaries of the China Theater are coordinated by CINCAFPAC with the Commanding General, China Theater.
 3. Coordination within the Objective Area
 - a. During the amphibious phase of an operation,

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while CINCPAC is charged with responsibility for air operations within the objective area, land-based air elements operating in the objective area are controlled by CINCPAC through a commander designated by him. The instructions of this commander, wherever practicable, are transmitted to the appropriate land-based air echelon through an Army Air Controller who accompanies the naval air commander designated.

- b. Similarly, after land-based air forces are established in the objective area and responsibility for air operations within the objective area passes to CINCAFPAC, control of carrier-based air elements operating in the objective area is exercised by the Army Air Task Force Commander, HONSHU, wherever practicable through a Navy Air Controller at the objective area.
- c. For initial delimitation of the objective area and tentative assignment, for planning, of responsibility for coordination of air operations within the objective area, see Annex 3b(5)(b). Details of availability of land-based and carrier-based air and of the duration of their respective operations within the objective area will be set forth in the coordinated plans of the Commander _____ Fleet and the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces.

(c) Control of Landing Forces Ashore

- 1. The Commander _____ Fleet controls the amphibious movement and landing through the Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet, who, in turn,

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controls the Amphibious Force, Attack Force, and Group Commanders who are responsible for the amphibious operations at their respective objectives.

2. Control of forces ashore passes to the Commander of each assault division (or separate Landing Force) after his arrival and establishment ashore, and upon his notification to the Commander of the corresponding Naval Attack Group that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. The Commander of each assault division (or separate Landing Force) and the Commander of each Naval Attack Group promptly reports to his next senior ground or naval commander, respectively, the time he assumes or relinquishes control of forces ashore.
3. Control of forces ashore passes to each Corps Commander within his respective area of operation after his arrival and establishment ashore and upon notification to the Commander of the corresponding Naval Attack Force that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. Each Corps Commander and corresponding Naval Attack Force Commander promptly reports to the appropriate Army Commander and Amphibious Force Commander, respectively:

 - a. The time each division and separate Landing Force and its corresponding Naval Attack Group Commander assumes or relinquishes control of the forces ashore.
 - b. The time he, himself, assumes or relinquishes control of forces ashore.
4. Control of forces ashore passes to each Army Commander within his respective area of operations after his arrival and establishment ashore and upon

[REDACTED]

notification to the Commander of the corresponding Amphibious Force that he is ready to assume control of his forces ashore. Each Army Commander and the corresponding Amphibious Force Commander promptly reports to Commanding General ADVON AFPAC and COMPHIBSPAC, respectively:

- a. The time each division (or separate Landing Force) and Corps and its corresponding Naval Attack Group Commander and Naval Attack Force Commander assumes or relinquishes control of the forces ashore.
 - b. The time he, himself, assumes or relinquishes control of forces ashore.
5. Division (or separate Landing Force), Corps and Army Commanders who have assumed control of the forces ashore continue under control of the next senior Naval Commander until their next senior Army Commander assumes control of forces ashore.
 6. Immediate control of forces ashore passes to the Commanding General ADVON AFPAC upon his announcement to COMPHIBSPAC that he is ready to assume control of the forces ashore. The Commanding General ADVON AFPAC and COMPHIBSPAC promptly report to CINCPAC, CINCPAC and the Commander _____ Fleet the time of assumption of control of forces ashore by the Commanding General ADVON AFPAC.
 7. Nothing in this type procedure limits the two Commanders-in-Chief from exercising, under their general responsibilities, such controls as circumstances may necessitate.

(d) Control of United States Marine Corps Ground Forces
Control of U.S. Marine Ground Units forming parts of landing forces is exercised by the appropriate Army Commander in each instance.

(e) Coordination of Air Search
Responsibility for development and execution of the coordinated air search plan over water areas is vested in CINCPAC.

CINCAFPAC provides such fields and operating facilities in areas under his control as are required to permit complete air coverage of appropriate areas.

(f) Air and Naval Operating Zones
CINCPAC designates appropriate air and naval operating zones, informing CINCAFPAC of such designations.

- (g) Topographical Intelligence
1. Primary responsibility for provision of mapping photography for the operation, and preparation of maps for the use of ground forces in the objective area, is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.
 2. Primary responsibility for provision of necessary hydrographic surveys and mapping of beaches for use of amphibious forces, for the operation, is vested in the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
 3. CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC continue to prepare such maps as are required for their respective Air Forces.

4. LOGISTICS

a. General

- (1) United States Army, army units of Allied nations, Marine and associated Naval Forces assigned for the conduct of landing

operations under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, will be staged, equipped and mounted out with prescribed equipment and supplies from the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS, MARIANAS, and HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, KYUSHU, and the UNITED STATES.

- (2) Marine and Naval forces employed in support of this operation, not under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, will be supported as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
- (3) U.S. Army Strategic Air Force will be supported logistically in accordance with existing arrangements and directives.

b. Responsibility for Logistic Support

- (1) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, will be responsible for the logistic support of all U.S. Army Forces, army forces of Allied Nations and Marine and associated Naval forces placed under his operational control and employed in these operations (except the U.S. Strategic Air Force).
- (2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, is to be responsible for the logistic support of all Marine and Naval forces not placed under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, employed to support this operation. In addition, he is to be responsible for equipping and providing mounting-out supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces which are to operate under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, during the operation.
- (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, will employ U.S. Army Service Command "C" (USASCOMC) as a service command to render direct logistic support to field armies in the objective area.
- (4) The Commanding Generals of the Field Armies will be charged

initially with responsibility for logistic support of their respective commands. Appropriate elements of USASCOM-C will be attached to Field Armies for the purpose of providing direct logistic support during early phases of operations in each Army area. At a date to be determined by this Headquarters, the responsibility for rendering direct logistic support in each Army area will be assumed by this Headquarters. At such time, the elements of USASCOMC attached to Field Armies will revert to that command, which thereafter will be responsible to this Headquarters for the rendering of direct logistic support in the Army area concerned. Target dates for relief of Field Army commanders from this responsibility and its assumption by this Headquarters will be the landing date in each Army area plus 30 days.

- (5) The Commanding Generals, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific and Western Pacific will be responsible for reequipment of all units staging in and to be mounted from their respective areas of responsibility. They will further be responsible for making available to all units to be mounted from their respective areas accompanying equipment and supplies as prescribed by this Headquarters. By arrangement with the War Department that agency is responsible for equipping and providing accompanying supplies as prescribed by this Headquarters for units moving directly from the U.S. to the objective.

c. Resupply

Resupply, and the supply of the bulk of construction materials will be by direct shipment from the UNITED STATES, augmented as may be required from bases in the Pacific under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Evacuation and Hospitalization

- (1) Evacuation of casualties by all services from the objective

area initially will be by Naval assault shipping, followed at the earliest practicable date by the employment of aircraft and hospital ships. Evacuation will be to ports and bases where bed credits will be established. For patients requiring prolonged hospitalization, evacuation direct to the United States from the objective area will be initiated as early as practicable.

- (2) Fixed-bed hospital units will be established in objective areas at the earliest practicable date, functioning initially in existing buildings or under canvas. Fully prefabricated hospitals will be provided as rapidly as practicable for those hospital units functioning under canvas.

e. Transportation

- (1) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, is to provide Naval assault shipping for the transportation of assault and follow-up forces, with accompanying equipment and supplies from mounting areas to the objectives. Assault shipping is supplemented by heavy shipping as required.
- (2) Replenishment supplies, replacement equipment, and construction materials will be transported direct from the UNITED STATES or bases in heavy shipping as arranged for by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, respectively.

f. Construction

- (1) Construction in the objective area will be limited to provision of minimum essential operative facilities.
- (2) Imported materials and Engineer effort will not be expended for the construction of personnel housing except for hospitalization prior to "Y"/120 Days.
- (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, will each be responsible

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for the construction of Army and Naval Facilities and installations required for the support of the forces under their respective controls. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, is to provide to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, those construction materials and Engineer construction effort required to construct facilities necessary for the support of Marine and associated Naval forces placed under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific.

- (4) Construction materials and Engineer construction effort (except for that specifically excluded in the paragraph next above) required to construct facilities and installations necessary for the support of the forces operating under their control will be provided by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, respectively. Construction forces available to either of the above commanders for the operation, which are in excess of the requirements of either of the owning services, will be made available for employment on projects of the other service.
- (5) The commanding generals of Field Armies will initiate the construction and development of approved construction projects in their respective areas immediately following landing operations. They will continue construction on these projects until such time as the responsibility therefor is assumed by this Headquarters, or transferred to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for those Naval projects which may be initiated at his specific request.

g. Military Government

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, employing Military Government agencies placed at his disposal, will control the civilian population in JAPAN to the extent and in the manner necessary to prevent interference with

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the progress of military operations in the objective area; to obtain maximum exploitation of local means, including labor; and to implement, in areas under his control, the policy of the Government of the UNITED STATES with respect to the Japanese Population.

h. Local Resources

Maximum use will be made of available local resources, including existing installations and labor. Allocation of these resources will be made initially by the commanding generals of the Field Armies until this responsibility is assumed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces Pacific.

5. MISCELLANEOUS

- a. Communications (See Annex 5a)
- b. Military Government (See Annex 5b)



DISTRIBUTION LIST

STAFF STUDY

OPERATIONS

"CORONET"

Commander-in-Chief	1
Chief of Staff	1
G-1	1
G-2	1
G-3	4
G-4	1
Chief Signal Officer	1
Chief Engineer	1
Antiaircraft Officer	1
War Department	8
CINCPAC	4
CG, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific	1
CG, Sixth Army	1
CG, Eighth Army	1
CG, Far East Air Forces	1
CG, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific	1
CG, U.S. Army Strategic Air Force	1

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STAFF STUDY

OPERATIONS


"CORONET"

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- 1 The Operations Directed.
 - 2a G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation, Terrain and Weather.
 - 3b(1)(a) Organization of Forces.
 - 3b(3)(b) Estimate of Troop Requirements.
 - 3b(3)(d)I Air Garrison ("Y" / 15).
 - 3b(3)(d)II Air Garrison ("Y" / 60).
 - 3b(4) The Operations Required.
 - 3b(4)(a)5 Land-based Air Support.
 - 3b(4)(b) Pertinent Portions of CINCPOA, Preliminary Staff Study "CORONET". (To be furnished later).
 - 3b(5)(b) The objective Area and Coordination Line.
 - 4 Basic Logistic Plan
 - 5a Communications Plan.
 - 5b Military Government. (To be furnished later).
- [REDACTED]

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ANNEX I
STAFF STUDY
"CORONET"
THE OPERATION
DIRECTED



EIGHTH ARMY	FIRST ARMY	FLEET
ADVANCE ECHELON		
US ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC		U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
US ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC		

HOME ISLANDS - CHINA COAST

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

0 50 100 200 300 400 500 MILES

SEMI-MERCATOR, EQUIDISTANT PROJECTION (DISTORTED ON TROPICS)

NUMBER SQUARES TO TROPIC FROM ANY POINT ON THE MAP FOLLOWS A STRAIGHT LINE.

TIME IS DISTANCE AND DISTANCE.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
WITH RESPECT TO AN OPERATION AGAINST
THE TOKYO (KWANTO) PLAIN OF HONSHU

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UNCLASSIFIED

31 MAY 1945

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2. Weather

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
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CENTRAL JAPAN: CENTRAL AND NORTHERN HONSHU

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
ORIENTATION MAP
OF THE CRITICAL AREA



Bibliography: See "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation (Abbreviated) With Respect to Operations Against Kyushu-Honshu, 24 March 1945"; "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation With Respect to an Operation Against Southern Kyushu, 25 April 1945"; "Monthly Summary of Enemy Dispositions No. 31, 31 May 1945", and subsequent issues; current "Daily Intelligence Summaries", this Headquarters; A.G.S. Terrain Studies Nos. 132, 134, (to follow); A.G.S. Terrain Handbooks on the Tokyo Plain (to follow).

I. TERRAIN AND WEATHER:

1. Terrain:

a. General:

The Tokyo (Kwanto) Plain is an irregularly shaped lowland centered on Tokyo, measuring approximately 90 miles east to west and from 45 to 65 miles north to south. The Pacific shoreline forms its eastern boundary; to the south it is bordered by the mountains of the Chiba Peninsula, and the waters of Tokyo-wan (Bay) and Sagami-wan to the west and north it juts against the foothills of the mountain masses of central and Northern Honshu. One sixth of the entire Japanese population lives within the Plain; Tokyo and Yokohama are the principal cities but there are over 80 other cities of 10,000 or more population in the area (see Map Encl. 1).

b. Drainage: (see Map Encls. 1 and 3)

An understanding of the drainage system within the Plain is important due to the decisive influence it exerts on movement and hence on the planning of operations.

The Tone-gawa (river) flows southeast across the full width of the Plain to the center of the Pacific shoreline. Depths vary from a minimum of 5 feet in the western regions to 15 feet in the lower valley. 8 to 18 miles south of the Tone, the Ara-Kawa also flows southeast across the western half of the Plain, thence through Tokyo City into Tokyo-wan.

From the mountains about 20 miles west of Tokyo the Tama-gawa flows south-of-east across the southwestern portion of the Plain and into Tokyo-wan between Tokyo and Yokohama; the Sagami-gawa southward along the bordering western foothills to Sagami-wan. Depths of these rivers are

5 to 10 feet for distances of 8 to 15 miles upstream but decrease rapidly nearer the mountains.

Branching from the Tone in the center of the Plain, the Edo-gawa flows south and empties into Tokyo-wan just east of the city. Depth is approximately 15 feet throughout most of its course. The Kinu-gawa flowing south through the center of the Plain from its northern extremity, joins the Tone 20 miles northeast of Tokyo.

Two large lakes spread across the northeastern portion of the Plain. Kita-ura (lake), 1/2 to 2 miles wide, parallels the northeast coast for approximately 20 miles northward from the Tone-gawa at a distance of 2 to 3 miles inland. Approximately 5 miles farther inland Kasumiga-ura, 2 to 4 miles wide, spreads from the Tone to within 4 miles of the Abukuma Spur (southernmost spur of the northern mountains). In the eastern central area (northeast of Tokyo) is a cluster of 4 smaller lakes, each several hundred yards wide and from 2 to 10 miles long. All are close to the river except Imba-Numa (lake) which spreads across roughly half of the 15 mile wide east-west corridor between the Tone and Tokyo Bay.

c. Topography: (see Maps Encls. 1 and 3)

The floor of the Tokyo Plain falls generally into 2 terrain categories, i.e. river plains and terraces:

(1) River Plains:

These are usually wide, level and often poorly drained. In addition to the river channel proper, they are cut by many canals and ditches and contain numerous ponds. The rivers are subject to floods during wet season (June-November); at such times the larger rivers may widen from several hundred yards to a mile on either side. Flooding is controlled by dykes; by destruction of these dykes broad additional areas may be artificially flooded to depths of 1 foot or more during periods of high water. By this means the flooded zones can be temporarily expanded to widths of 5 to 10 miles in the lower and central portions of the Tone Valley; 5 to 15 miles throughout the entire Edo-gawa Valley; and 2 to 5 miles in the valleys of several of the smaller streams north of the Tone or southwest of Tokyo. Little natural flooding occurs in

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the area south of the Tone and east of the Edo-gawa, and the terrain does not lend itself to artificial flooding except that necessary to irrigate the ricefields.

River plains are practically uniformly planted in wet rice. River channels, canals and roads are frequently bordered by rows of trees and scattered patches of evergreen forest are found, particularly in the south. Fields are dotted with houses. Numerous roads traverse the river plains, often on embankments or fills.

Many of the road fills, dykes, and buildings provide extensive local observation over the low areas. Fills, dykes and canals are practically the only features providing cover. In most river plains concealment is limited to rows of trees along the roads and river channels, occasional patches of forest and buildings.

Soil in the river plains is normally plastic clay, silt, and sand, except in the Tone Valley which is principally sand and gravel.

In dry season, particularly during the winter months, some cross-country movement is practicable but may be hindered by canals, ponds, and intersecting streams. During late Spring, summer and early Fall movement is in general restricted to roads, dykes and embankments by floods and wet rice fields.

(2) Terraces:

These constitute over half of the plain's surface. They are extensive level or rolling areas rising 50 to 200 feet above the river plains and are normally well drained. The edges are formed by low escarpments which are usually gashed by closely spaced shallow valleys and gullies. In some areas, particularly the eastern regions, terraces rise sharply so as to approximate flat-topped hills.

In general, terraces are planted in dry crops interspersed with patches of wasteland; only small scattered ricefields are found on terraces. Narrow belts of woodland frequently follow the margins and in the eastern half of the plain, particularly south of the Tone river, there are considerable areas of woodland interspersed with cultivated and wasteland areas.

Although there are no commanding heights the higher

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terraces provide some local observation. Cover is provided chiefly by the ravines and valleys which gash the margins; limited concealment by houses, rows of trees, and in some places (particularly in the eastern half) by intermittent wooded areas.

Soils of terraced areas are principally clay loams and sandy loams.

In general the terraced terrain lends itself to easy cross-country movement on or off roads at all seasons.

(3) Abukuma Spur:

From the Abukuma Highlands bordering the northern mountains, a spur projects southward into the plain to within 4 miles of Kasumiga-ura. The spur varies from 4 to 10 miles in width; elevations range generally from 600 to 1700 feet with a few peaks rising above 2500 feet. The hills are generally forested but contain numerous small patches of grassy pasture land.

(4) Chiba Peninsula:

The major portion of this area is a rugged hill mass. In the northern half hills are low, usually not higher than 300 to 400 feet; in the southern half, elevations increase up to 1300 feet. Hills are generally forested; with broadleaf in areas adjacent to the plain, with evergreen oak in the southerly regions.

d. Road Net: (see Map Encl. 2)

(1) General:

Japanese roads are classified as shown in the following table:

TABLE XI

Classification	Minimum Width	Ruling Grade	Bridge Capacity
National Highways	24 feet	1 in 30	12 ton vehicles
Prefectural Roads	18 feet	1 in 25	6 ton vehicles
Municipal Roads	18 feet	- - - -	Automobiles
Village Roads	12 feet	- - - -	- - - -

In general, Japanese roads are below American standards; there is little uniformity and a low proportion of hard surfacing. However, within the Tokyo Plain density of population, concentration of industry, and military needs have brought about extensive improvement

and above-average maintenance. The National Highways and many of the roads in lower classifications have been widened to 3 or more lanes, and there is a larger proportion of hard surfacing, usually concrete; other important roads are surfaced with well-graded gravel. Practically all roads are of long standing and rest on firm, well-packed foundations; their weakness lies in the countless bridges (there are over 5000 in Tokyo alone) on which they cross the numerous rivers, small streams and canals, and the long embankments and fills on which they traverse the river plains. These defiles by their very nature are difficult to widen, easily destroyed, and once blocked would be very difficult if not impossible for vehicles to by-pass.

(2) Description:

Tokyo is the focal point of a converging road net which spreads throughout the plain like a gigantic spider web. Threelane, concrete surfaced National Highways, radiating from the city to Mito (northeast corner of the plain), Utsonomiya (central northern border), Takasaki (northwestern extremity), Hachioji (central western border), Odowara (southwestern extremity) and Chiba (Chiba Peninsula) provide main lines of road communication across the plain to every outer region, except the central east coast which is served by two graded gravel prefectural roads and a similar extension of the Chiba Highway. Between each pair of National Highways, prefectural roads provide 1 to 3 alternate routes to the borders of the plain and numerous lateral connections. There is no area within the plain as much as 10 miles in diameter and very few over 5 miles that cannot be entered via two or more roads of at least secondary quality. In addition to the roads, all areas have numerous narrow lanes primarily for foot or bicycle traffic; some of these can probably be traversed by jeeps.

Beyond the borders of the plain, 5 of the National Highways continue on outward to provide road communication between the plain and northern, central, and southwestern Honshu and with the west coast; however, once the mountains are entered, alternate and lateral routes become few in number and widely spaced.

(3) Main Highways:

Details of certain main highways are included in this discussion because of their important bearing on reinforcement capabilities from other parts of Honshu and indirectly, from other islands:

Nagoya-Tokyo (Tokkaido) Highway: National Highway. From Nagoya to Odawara, two-lane, graded gravel, closely following southern coast. Two-lane concrete across southwestern plain to Yokohama; widens to four-lane concrete, Yokohama to Tokyo. Most direct route of reinforcement from Nagoya area or via that point from southwestern Honshu. Crosses numerous rivers near their mouths on long bridges. A beachhead on the shores of Sagami-wan would cut this route; however, there are alternate routes farther north.

Kofu-Tokyo (Koshu) Highway: National Highway. Two-lane, gravel through mountain passes, Kofu to Hachioji. Enters plain at Hachioji, then continues 20 miles eastward to Tokyo via 2 parallel routes: Three-lane concrete and three-lane gravel. Direct route of reinforcement into western half of plain or Tokyo area from Kofu. Via lateral prefectural roads provides alternate or by-pass route from Nagoya and/or the southwest coast.

West Coast-Takasaki (Nakasenda) Highway: From the west coast and Nagoya a widely spaced net including several National Highways and prefectural roads converges on Takasaki at the extreme northwest corner of the plain; from Takasaki a three-lane, concrete surfaced National Highway runs southeast to Tokyo through level well-drained terrain. By this route and branching prefectural roads reinforcements from the west coast and/or Nagoya can be fed into the northern, central or southwest areas of the plain or into the immediate Tokyo area.

North Honshu-Utsonomiya-Tokyo (Rikuu) Highway: The north Honshu road net converges on Shirakawa. From there a two-lane, gravel National Highway runs southward into the plain at its northernmost extremity (Yaita), then via Utsonomiya and Koga to Tokyo. At Koga it widens to three-lane concrete and crosses the Tone on a critical bridge 800 yards long. Provides a well covered inland route by which reinforcements from Northern Honshu, the Sendai Plain or the northwest coast can be fed into the northern, central or western portions of the plain.

Sendai-Mito-Tokyo (Rikuzen Hama) Highway: National Highway. From Sendai to Mito, two-lane, graded gravel, closely following east coast Mitoto Tokyo; three-lane concrete via Ishioka, the narrow corridor between Kasumiga-urs and the Abukuma Spur and Tsuchiura. Reinforcements from the Sendai area and other parts of Northern Honshu can follow this route into the northeastern portion of the plain and, if not interrupted, into its central regions. A short advance inland from the northeastern coast will cut this route; however, the alternate inland route through Utsonomiya is equally accessible from Northern Honshu. Within the plain, use of this highway can be restricted by destruction of one or more of 3 important bridges, i.e. those over the Sakura-gawa, the Tone-gawa and the Edo-gawa.

Tokyo Choshi Highway: Two-lane gravel prefectural road. Follows levees and embankments along south bank of the Tone to Choshi. Important as a possible route of reinforcement of eastern plain region between the Tone and the Chiba Peninsula; however, can be interrupted through destruction of bridges and fills by aerial bombing.

Tokyo-Chiba Highway: National Highway, four-lane concrete. 2 prefectural roads (gravel) branch off into the eastern coastal area. Gravel extensions also fan out from Chiba to the east coast to the southeast coast of the Peninsula and southward along the Tokyo-wan coast. These roads are likewise important as routes of reinforcement via Tokyo and Chiba to the eastern and southeastern regions, or as axes of inland advance from the east or southeast coasts.

e. Railroad Net: (see Map Encl. 2)

(1) General:

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Like the roads, the railroad net of Honshu radiates from Tokyo. Within 25 miles of the city the net is an exceedingly dense web of radial lines, with some transverse connections; outward to the limits of the plain it gradually thins out. Beyond the plain the main lines continue outward following almost identically the same routes as the National Highways, and either directly, or through junction with local nets, provide through rail connection with all important areas of Honshu. These routes thus constitute important factors in the reinforcement potential; however, from the military viewpoint the railroad net is characterized by the same inherent weakness as the roads; i.e. the numerous critical (and often very long) bridges, both within and without the plain. In addition, beyond the plain the main lines pass through many tunnels. Most of the lines in the western half of the plain are electrified, and it is possible that destruction of power sources may hamper their employment to some extent.

Main lines are double tracked within the plain but with the exception of a few short stretches are all single tracked beyond its borders. Lateral and transverse lines are single track. Track gauge is 3 feet 6 inches except on the main line around the head of Tokyo-wan from Tokyo to Chiba which is 4 feet 6 inches.

(2) Main Lines:

Tokaido (southeast Honshu)-Tokyo Route: At Kobe, the railroad net of southwestern Kysuhu converges into this line which runs via Nagoya and along the southern coast to Tokyo. Enters plain at Odawara (southwest corner). Power: Steam except last 65 miles into Tokyo which is electric. Most direct rail route of reinforcement from Nagoya and/or Southwest Honshu.

Southwest Honshu-Nagoya-Kofu-Tokyo Route: From the important rail center of Nagoya, this line follows inland valleys to Kofu in the central mountains, thence due east 70 miles to Tokyo. Enters plain at Hachioji about 30 miles west of Tokyo. Power: Steam, Nagoya to Kofu; Kofu to Tokyo, electric. Alternate inland route of reinforcement from Nagoya and/or Southwest Honshu area; direct route from Kofu area and via cross-island connecting routes, from central west coast.

West Coast-Takasaki-Tokyo Route: From a rail system which parallels the entire west coast of Honshu, a line cuts south from Nagaoka through island valleys to Takasaki at the extreme northwest corner of the plain, thence 65 miles southeast across the west half of the plain to Tokyo. Power: Steam, except the last 20 miles into Tokyo which is electric. Route of reinforcement from west coast and/or direct from Takasaki area into western half of plain and Tokyo area.

North Honshu-Fukushima-Utsonomiya-Tokyo Route: Rail lines from Aomori, northwest coast cities, Sendai converge into this line. Enters plain at Yaita near its northern extremity. Runs south across west half of plain via Utsonomiya and Koga to Tokyo. Power: Steam,

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except last 40 miles from Koga to Tokyo which is electric. Inland route of reinforcement from Northern Honshu and northwest coast into northern or western portion of plain.

North Honshu-Sendai-Mito-Tokyo Route: From Aomori near the northern end of Honshu, line runs south through an inland valley to Sendai. From Sendai, it closely parallels the east coast to Mito at the northeast corner of the plain; thence southeast 65 miles across the plain to Tokyo. Power: Steam, except for a short stretch entering Tokyo.

(3) Lateral Lines Across the Tokyo Plain: It will be noted that with the exception of the Sendai-Mito-Tokyo route, all the incoming rail lines from distant areas of Honshu feed into the western half of the plain. The lateral and transverse lines thus achieve importance both as routes of supply to troops defending the coastal areas and as routes of deployment for reinforcements arriving in the western plain or the Tokyo area.

Northern Area: From Takasaki a transverse, steam-powered line runs eastward along the northern foothills to Oyama, thence across the Abukuma Spur to Mito. It thus joins the west coast Takasaki, the north Honshu-Utsonomiya-Tokyo and the Sendai-Mito-Tokyo main routes.

Eastern Area: From Omiya (20 miles northwest of Tokyo), a steam line runs eastward via Datsukabe, crosses the Edo-gawa and thence to Abiko in the Tone valley. It then follows the south bank of the Tone to Choshi on the east coast. This line provides lateral connection across the central plain between the West Coast-Takasaki, the North Honshu-Utsonomiya, (as well as its parallel alternate Tokyo-Nikko line), and the Sendai-Mito-Tokyo lines.

From Tokyo a main electric line runs along the head of Tokyo-wan to Chiba. 2 Steam-powered extensions reach the eastern coastal region; other extensions extend south, southeast, and southwest into the Chiba Peninsula.

Southwestern Area: Although the net generally converges on Tokyo through this region there are a few north-south laterals. One steam line skirts the entire western border of foothills from the shores of Sagami-wan to Takasaki and thus provides connection between the Nagoya-Tokyo, Kofu-Tokyo, and West Coast-Takasaki lines.

f. Landing Beaches:

See Map and Chart Encl. 4.

g. Influence of Terrain on Operations:

(1) Kashima (North) Beach Inland: (see Maps Encls. 1,2,3,4)

If a deep inland advance be contemplated, landing must be made in the northern 12 miles of this beach. Inland movement from landings farther south would be limited to a depth of 3 to 5 miles by Kita-ura and the Tone-gawa; however, 2 airfields could be secured by a landing about 15 miles north of Choshi (mouth of the Tone) and advance across this narrow area.

Troops landing on the northern 15 miles of Kashima Beach would be obliged to immediately climb steep bluffs 100 to 130 feet high which command the beach at a distance generally 200 feet or less from the water line. However, once established on the high ground a westward advance toward the Abukuma Spur or the eastern entrance of the Ishioka-

Tsuchiura corridor would enjoy the advantages of level well-drained, terraced terrain, an ample net of axial and lateral secondary roads and easy cross-country movement. Rice areas are relatively small and scattered; in 2 stream valleys approximately 6 and 12 miles inland they form intermittent belts generally across the front, but the fields composing these belts are very narrow, from 50 to 300 yards wide. One airfield would be captured by an inland advance of only 2 to 3 miles and 2 more by an advance direct to Ishioka. Advance to any point on the line, Mito-Ishioka would cut the main Sendai-Mito-Tokyo (Rikuzen Hama) highway and railroad. Maneuver to the north would be restricted for the first 5 miles inland by Lake Henuma, but would be free thereafter.

Movement through the Ishioka-Tsuchiura corridor would encounter similar level dry terrain and except in the immediate vicinity of Ishioka a minimum of very small scattered ricefields. Approach to, and passage through, the 4 mile wide corridor would be effectively dominated from the north by the high ground of the Abukuma Spur. However, if the Spur, or at least its southern portion, be captured, good observation would be secured over areas of subsequent advances, either southwest into the heart of the plain or to westward into its northern regions. Exit from the corridor is across the unfordable Sakura-gawa and a fairly broad belt of ricefields that cover its valley, and maneuver to the south is restricted by the northwest arm of Kasumigaura; however, passage of the corridor presumes possession of at least the southern portion of the Abukuma Spur, which would also dominate any defensive position along the Sakura-gawa.

Emerging from the corridor, a movement southwest toward Tokyo would enjoy relatively easy going for approximately 10 miles and could be made on a broad front. The three-lane concrete surfaced Mito-Tokyo highway forms the axis of an ample net of forward and lateral secondary roads. Ricefields generally form 4 intermittent belts across the front but the belts are narrow, mostly 100 to 200 yards wide, and broken by more numerous and wider intervals than those east of the corridor. To the east, maneuver is relatively free; however, to the west

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it is progressively restricted by the Kinu-gawa. This area contains 4 airfields, including 2 main bases.

For the next 4 miles of advance into the valley of the Tone-gawa, ricefields, though still small, increase in density and maneuver to both flanks becomes more restricted by streams.

The Tone-gawa would be a definitely major obstacle at any season of the year. It is always unfordable. In wet season its width expands to 2 to 3 miles by natural flooding; by breaking dykes the area from 6 to 8 miles north of the river can also be submerged to depths of 1 foot or more.

South of the Tone both forward movement and lateral maneuver would encounter increasing difficulty. 2 to 3 miles south of the Tone the mile-wide lake, Tega-numa, parallels the Tone on a front of 8 miles and there are several smaller lakes in the area. Units maneuvering to the west would enter the narrow angle between the Tone and the unfordable and even deeper Edo-gawa; their movement would be further restricted by a canal joining the two rivers. To the east, the W-shaped lake, Imba-numa, sprawls across half the area between the Tone and the head of Tokyo-wan. The Edo-gawa valley contains extensive ricefields; in wet season its width increases to 2 miles by natural floods, to nearly 10 miles if artificially flooded.

Advance to the Tone would deprive the Jap of its use as a possible route of reinforcement and/or supply for his forces in the Kujukuri Beach or Chiba areas. Extension south of the Tone would progressively deprive him of several, and eventually of all land routes to the same areas. However, as previously pointed out, he might then resort to overwater communication across Tokyo-wan. There are 3 airfields, including 1 main base between Tega-numa and the Edo-gawa, and 1 in the angle of Imba-numa.

It is estimated that after a beachhead five miles deep has been established the road net through the zone discussed above has the necessary capacity to maintain approximately 9 divisions until the advance enters the Ishilka Corridor; thereafter the capacity is sufficient to maintain only 3 divisions.

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(2) Kujukuri (Center) Beach Inland: (see Maps Encls. 1,2,3,4)

If the landing be made in the central third of Kujukuri Beach, the first 8 miles of inland advance would be across a flat coastal plain, a large proportion of which is covered with ricefields. The area from 6 to 8 miles inland is practically a continuous broad belt of rice land, 1 to 3 miles wide. However, many roads lead inland through the rice area and routes through the fields are available if some bridging is accepted; also movement across this rice land will be less difficult than normally, due to the sandy condition of the soil. A 5 mile advance through this area would secure 2 to 4 airfields, dependent on the frontage of advance.

Behind the rice belt, the terrain rises to a high terraced area which extends nearly 30 miles to the Edo-gawa. In the first four miles of advance over this high ground troops and vehicles would encounter numerous steep slopes. These would be difficult in wet weather; in dry weather, although they would tend to channelize cross-country movement into the valleys and the gashes and gulleys leading on to the terraces, it is not believed they would present extreme difficulty.

From 12 miles inland the advance would enjoy flat to gently rolling terraced terrain. Rice fields are sufficiently narrow and scattered to present no great problem. At least 3 gravel surfaced prefectural roads traverse the area in the direction of Tokyo, and there are numerous other roads, both axial and lateral. Maneuver to the south would be relatively free; however, wide movements would be dominated by the Chiba Hills, and if directed into the hills would find rugged going cross-country. To the north maneuver would encounter relatively dense rice coverage, but would be aided by a dense road net. About 20 miles inland the lake, Imba-numa would either force movements through the northern area to converge to the south, or channelize them into the very narrow corridor between the Lake and the Tone-gawa; however a gravel road and railroad traverse this corridor. 3 additional airfields lie in the path of advance from Central Kujukuri Beach to Chiba. Extension of the advance to the southwest along the west coast of the Chiba Peninsula

would encounter dense rice land, and if directed farther inland the rugged Chiba Hills. There are numerous prefectural roads in this area but in general the most extensive net runs perpendicular to the direction of advance. However, an advance into the western half of the Peninsula would tend to restrict the enemy's capability to reinforce and supply his forces in the Chiba area via Tokyo-wan.

West of the line Chiba-Imba-numa, the advance toward Tokyo would traverse level to gently rolling terraced terrain until it entered the valley of the Edo-gawa. An excellent road net, including concrete and gravel surfaced highways would be available; in this area; the main net tends to converge on Tokyo, but there are many laterals. Only a few very small scattered rice fields would be encountered. However, except in its final approach to the Edo-gawa, the advance would be restricted to a front of approximately 15 miles between Imba-numa and the head of Tokyo-wan.

The final approach to the Edo-gawa from this direction would be subject to the same difficulties discussed with respect to the southwest advance from Kashima Beach in par. 11 g. (1) above. It is noteworthy, however, that the Edo-gawa would be the only stream over 5 feet deep encountered throughout the full depth of advance, and no part of the zone considered is subject to either natural or artificial flooding.

The road net from Kujukuri Beach has sufficient capacity for five miles inland to maintain 10 to 12 divisions, and 9 divisions beyond that depth. After the port of Chiba is captured and placed in operation, maintenance capacity would be considerably increased.

(3) Chigasaki (South) Beach Inland: (see Maps Encls. 1,2,3,4)

A northward movement from the shore of Sagami-wan would traverse a north-south corridor approximately 22 miles wide between the bordering western mountains and the west shore of Tokyo Bay.

The western half of the corridor is dominated by the foothills along the base of which flows the Sagami-gawa. In its southern valley this river is deep and in wet season floods to 1 mile width. Adjacent areas, 1 to 3 miles wide, can be artificially flooded to shallow

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depth. This river thus forms a barrier to maneuver through or against the western foothills; on the other hand it also offers some protection to the west flank of a northward movement.

Movement toward Tokyo and/or the western plain region would have the use of an excellent road net of any number of axial and lateral roads and would be made largely over terraced terrain. For approximately 16 miles inland only small scattered rice fields would be encountered.

Farther north, cross-country movement in the eastern half would face some difficulties; however, none are believed insurmountable. West of Yokohama the advance would enter a belt of high, gashed, terraces, often heavily wooded and edged by steep escarpments which become cliffs in the Tokyo area. However, there are 2 or 3 level valley corridors leading into the Tokyo-Yokohama area. West of Kawasaki there is a 5 to 6 mile belt of large ricefields; however, the rice is of the terrace variety and roads and routes through the fields are numerous.

Rivers across the front of advance are generally under 5 feet deep. However, the Tama-gawa which flows into Tokyo-wan just south of Tokyo is deep and unfordable, particularly in its lower valley. In wet season it widens to 1 mile by natural flooding and for a distance of approximately 10 miles from its mouth a shallow flooded area 1 to 5 miles wide can be artificially added to its width. This river and 2 or 3 others farther south afford the enemy successive potential lines of river defense.

Maneuver along the east flank of the corridor would be obliged to traverse the dense urban area of Yokohama-Kawasaki-Tokyo. The principal obstacle to a northward movement to the west of Tokyo would be the upper Tama-gawa, but once it is crossed movement becomes relatively free as far north as Kawagoe, where it would encounter the unfordable Ara-Kawa.

An advance of only 3 miles from the head of Sagami-wan would cut the main Tokkaido railroad and highway from Nagoya, however, a deep advance of approximately 25 miles would have to be made to cut all

the various alternate routes. Even then reinforcement from Nagoya is still possible by extremely long routes via Takasaki.

Two airfields, one of which is a main airbase, would be secured by an advance of only 3 miles from the beaches, another main base in the center of the corridor by extension to 8 miles, and there are 5 or 6 other fields scattered through the area west of Tokyo.

It is estimated that the road net inland from Chigasaki Beach has sufficient capacity to maintain a force of 15 divisions.

2. Weather:

See Chart Encl. 5.

II. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

1. Forward Areas:

a. Ground Forces:

(1) Trends:

The Japanese clearly understand that an amphibious assault on their home islands will be launched in the near future, as yet they are uncertain as to either time or direction of attack; their will to fight remains strong and they are exploiting whatever time remains available to prepare for an all-out sustained defense of their final Battle Position. Current plans and movements clearly emphasize their intention to strengthen the Empire garrison to formidable proportions without delay, irrespective of what becomes of their outer perimeter conquests.

Consequently all ground reinforcement of outlying areas from Empire sources is believed to have ceased. Formation of new Divisions and Independent Mixed Brigades within the Empire is being expedited. Although Manchuria has already been severely drained of first line troops, 4 more divisions have recently been withdrawn to the Empire. This latter action provides a measure of the urgency the Japanese attach to rapid completion of their plans; faced with potential entry into the war of the U.S.S.R. they realize that Manchuria also is likely to become a critical sector at any time, yet they have not hesitated to drain it, on the chance that they will be able to restore its strength by withdrawals from China. Meanwhile, remnants of their forces in the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and the Bonins continue to fight bitter last-man delaying actions in the hope of gaining additional time.

High command structure is being re-aligned and strengthened. Empire forces have recently been regrouped under two General Army (Army Group) Commanders, each controlling three Area Armies. Tactical organization for battle is being improved by grouping Divisions and Brigades into Armies (Corps). Experienced field commanders are being assigned to Depot Divisions, both as a means of speeding their training and in order to facilitate their rapid activation into combat units.

Vigorous measures are being taken to implement the Japs' vast manpower reserve. The male civilian population over and above

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requirements of the actual armed forces is being formed into "Special Guard Units" and "Citizen Volunteer Units". It is significant that the rank of commanders in recruiting districts corresponding to commands of given size has been stepped-up one grade. This is probably pursuant to both intensified procurement for the actual armed forces, and the broad program of mobilization for at least limited service of all males able to bear arms.

Likely objective areas are being cleared for action. Non-combatants are being evacuated from critical areas. It is believed that efforts are being made to disperse war industries, where practicable, to the Asiatic mainland; and there have even been unconfirmed suggestions of preparations to move the Imperial family to Korea.

The Japanese have correctly estimated the Tokyo Plain to be an ultimate, if not an initial invasion objective. Known activities there reflect the general trends noted above; it is evident that the defense plans now being placed in execution materially strengthen the area both in combat troops and defensive installations.

(2) Command Structure:

The Tokyo Plain is a part of the area of responsibility of the Twelfth Area Army, Headquarters at Tokyo. Immediate tactical control of the mobile combat formations disposed in the Plain is vested in the Commander XXXVI Army (Corps), Headquarters at Chiba. By target date, it is probable that the increased number of divisions then disposed in the area will have resulted in the formation of at least one additional Army (Corps).

(3) Current Strength:

Overall ground strength in the Tokyo Plain is currently estimated at approximately 366,000 troops of all classes. Of these approximately 177,000 are classified as mobile combat, including:

- 4 Infantry Divisions
- 1 Armored Division plus 1 Tank Regiment
- 2 Depot Divisions
- 1 Unassigned Infantry Regiment
- 2 Corps Artillery Regiments
- Fortress troops
- 2 Special Naval Landing Forces
- Miscellaneous u/i combat units and partially trained Infantry and Artillery Regiments.

The remainder include Air-Ground personnel, Naval Base Forces, and Army Base and Service Troops.

Mobile combat units, estimated strength and the proportion of troops in each classification are listed in the following table:

TABLE I
ESTIMATED ENEMY TROOP STRENGTH, TOKYO PLAIN

CLASSIFICATION	ESTIMATED STRENGTH	PRESENT LOCATION	DATE
<u>MOBILE COMBAT:</u>			
Field Units:			
1st Guards Division	16,000	Tokyo	6/44
3rd Guards Division	16,000	Tokyo	1/45
81st Division	16,000	Utsunomiya	7/44
93rd Division	16,000	Chiba ?	4/45
1st Armored Div (a)	14,500	Tochigi Prov ?	5/45
2nd Tank Regiment	650	Tsudanuma	9/44
7th Guards Inf Reg't	3,500	Tokyo	8/44
25th Med Arty Reg't	1,200	Tokyo	4/43
1st Inf Mortar Reg't	1,500	Numata	3/44
Tokyo Bay Fortress	3,200	Yokosuka	3/45
Yokosuka Hvy Arty Reg't	1,550	Yokosuka	3/44
Kure No. 101 SNLF	1,000	Tateyama	4/44
Sasebo No. 102 SNLF	1,000	Tateyama	4/44
Units in Training:			
2nd Guards Depot Division	20,000	Tokyo	1/45
51st Depot Division	20,000	Utsunomiya	6/44
1st Inf Repl Unit	3,100	Kawasaki	4/44
2nd Inf Repl Unit	3,100	Chiba	4/44
8th Med Arty Repl Reg't	750	Tokyo	3/45
18th Med Arty Repl Reg't	750	Chiba	8/43
Yokosuka Hvy Arty Repl Reg't	850	Yokosuka	3/44
U/i Combat Units (b)	36,850		
Total, Mobile Combat	177,500		
<u>NAVAL BASE TROOPS:</u>			
Yokosuka Guard Force	800	Tokyo Bay	11/44
Tateyama Guard Force	800	Tateyama	
Tokyo Guard Force	1,000	Tokyo Bay	
Yokohama Guard Force	1,000	Tokyo Bay	
Yokosuka Guard Force	800	Tokyo Bay	11/44
Yokosuka-Tokyo A/A Def Cmd	10,000	Tokyo Bay	
U/i Naval Ground Units	25,600		
Total, Naval Ground Units	40,000		
<u>AIR-GROUND PERSONNEL:</u>			
Army	49,000 (c)		
Navy	55,000 (c)		
Total, Air-Ground Personnel	104,000 (c)		
<u>BASE AND SERVICE TROOPS:</u>			
	45,000		
<u>AGGREGATE</u>			
	366,500 (c)		
Recapitulation:			
Mobile Combat		177,500	
Naval Ground Troops		40,000	
Total Air-Ground Personnel		104,000 (c)	
Base and Service		45,000	
Aggregate		366,500 (c)	

(Table I, cont'd)

- (a) Indicated moving from Manchuria
- (b) Computed on a pro-rata basis of units known to be on Honshu but whose exact location is unknown.
- (c) Does not include flying personnel of Aviation Units

(4) Current Dispositions:

See Map Encl. 7.

(5) Estimated Strength as of Y-Day.

(a) Army and Navy Troops:

It is probable that overall strength in actual Army and Navy ground troops disposed in the Tokyo Plain in the Spring of 1946 may not greatly exceed current figures. This is due to the fact that the reinforcement program in this area is already far advanced, and to the anticipated withdrawal of a number of air tactical units now based in the Plain to more distant fields which will cause a considerable reduction in air-ground personnel. Greater significance however, attaches to changes in composition; it is expected that the proportion of mobile combat troops will be substantially greater.

Probable overall strength in full-fledged members of the military and naval services is estimated at approximately 370,000 to 390,000 troops of all classes. Probable mobile combat strength is estimated at 198,000 to 215,000.

The number of infantry divisions will have been increased from four to at least five and probably to six. The new divisions may be activated by the two Divisional Depots in the area during the intervening period; one or both may be brought in from Manchuria or elsewhere. In the event they are newly activated divisions, the depots will have begun the organization and training of 2 additional divisions. Some increase in Corps and Army Artillery is also expected.

There is no reason to anticipate an increase in overall naval ground strength; however, it is probable that the currently large proportion of u/i Naval ground units includes additional SNLFs, and that the naval component of estimated mobile combat strength will also have been increased by their subsequent identification.

Base and service troops may also be expected to

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increase somewhat, in proportion to the combat echelons they serve.

(b) Citizen Volunteer Units and Special Guards Units.

It must be remembered that the foregoing analysis treats only of organic units of the Army and Navy. However, in evaluating total Japanese power to resist invasion, some consideration must also be given to the large number of volunteer defense units which are already being formed throughout Japan. These units will be largely composed of partially trained reservists and by the Spring of 1946 should have developed limited defensive combat value of a purely local nature. It is possible that overall strength in this category in the Tokyo Plain might exceed 500,000 men by Y-Day. However, this figure is not to be taken as a true index to combat power; these men will be only lightly armed, widely dispersed in small groups and relatively immobile. Effectiveness against well-trained organized troops will be relatively low in defense; offensive capabilities practically nil. However their elimination will require expenditure of time and means and they will have considerable nuisance value. They will enable the Japanese to fight short local delaying actions without sacrificing trained troops; and they will require us to commit additional forces to guarding lines of communications and to security missions. Also, being partially trained and equipped, they will furnish the Japanese with a widely distributed and readily available source of replacements by which the deterioration of combat divisions from wastage may be retarded.

(c) Estimated Strength, All Combatant Personnel:

It is therefore estimated that by Y-Day, overall enemy ground strength including all classes of combatant personnel will be approximately as listed in the following table:

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TABLE II

Classification	Probable Strength	Included Units
Mobile Combat	198,000 to 213,000	Infantry Divisions: 1st Gds; 3rd Gds; 81st; 93rd; 2 u/i Divs; 2nd Gds Depot Div; 51st Depot Div. Armored Units: 1st Arm'd Div; 2nd Tk Reg't. Corps and Army Artillery: 25th Med Reg't; 1st Inf Mortar Reg't; Tokyo Hvy Arty Reg't; u/i Arty. Naval Ground Units: Kure 101 SNLF; Sasebo 102 SNLF; u/i SNLFs. Miscellaneous: 7th Gds Inf Reg't; 2 Inf Repl Reg'ts; 3 Arty Repl. Reg'ts; u/i combat units.
Naval Base Troops (a)	37,000 to 38,000	Base Forces, Guard Forces, Barrack Units. and Miscellaneous.
Air-Ground Personnel (b)	60,000	Ground crews, overhead, and Service Echelons of tactical units; Airdrome Bns; Avn. Constr. Bns.
Base and Service Troops (c)	55,000 to 60,000	A/A; Engr; Med; Sig; Port and Shipping Units; Q.M.; M.P.: etc.
Aggregate, Army and Navy:	350,000 to 371,000	
Civilian Volunteer Units (d)	500,000 to 600,000	"Citizens' Volunteer Units"; "Special Defense Units".
Aggregate:	850,000 to 971,000	All classes of men under arms.

- (a) Experience has shown that troops in this classification while, relatively immobile, usually have considerable combat value, particularly in defense.
- (b) May be employed in close-in defense of airfields and/or in combat units as replacements.
- (c) Normally of low combat value; however will usually fight when cornered and are often employed as replacements in combat units.
- (d) Of limited combat value for local defense, particularly suicidal delay and harassing missions. See Sec II, par. 1.g.(5)(6) above.

(6) Probable Dispositions as of Y-Day (See Map Encl 8):

(a) General:

Japanese dispositions in recent defensive actions cannot be accepted as a guide to their deployment in the Tokyo Plain; rather, the mission and the terrain suggest the probable pattern. On the basis of current information, it is estimated that as of Y-Day, enemy dispositions in the Plain will be approximately as shown on Map Encl 8.

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(b) Beach Groups:

In the battles on the approaches to the Empire, the Japs have in general avoided the shorelines and organized their most forward positions well inland; however, these actions have been fought by limited forces striving for maximum delay and attrition on Allied forces. Therefore they have found it expedient to avoid the heavy initial losses which our heavy preparatory bombardments inflict on troops occupying the beaches, and to prolong resistance by forcing us to hunt them down and then to engage in costly attacks against positions of their own choosing.

On the other hand, in the Tokyo Plain the Jap will be conducting sustained defense on his main battle position and manpower will be exceedingly cheap. Although he will strive to conserve his best troops for employment in less costly inland defense and (he hopes) ultimately in counter-offensive action, he will be loath to relinquish the casualty producing capabilities of a strongly organized beach defense. For this suicidal yet potentially productive mission he will have available large numbers of his partially trained and equipped volunteer defense units. He will be quite willing to pay a large bonus in these inferior troops for whatever casualties they may be able to inflict on our assault waves during their period of maximum exposure.

In view of the great number of these units that will be available and their distribution through all parts of the Plain, it is probable that practically all the 190 miles of the plain's coast line except the shores of Tokyo Bay will be occupied by at least a line of observation. Density will of course vary widely; critical beaches, e.g. Kashima, Kujukuri, and Sagami will be defended by substantial concentrations of reservists stiffened by a leavening of regular troops; beaches of lesser importance by relatively thinner garrisons, and unlikely landing areas, e.g. the Southeastern Chiba coast, only by scattered observation posts.

If the Japanese fully exploit the time at their disposal, beach groups, particularly those occupying critical beaches, will enjoy every advantage field fortification can provide to increase and prolong their casualty producing powers. They will be well supplied

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with automatic weapons and mortars, with ammunition for prolonged periods dumped on position. They will be well dug in, and pillboxes, blockhouses and other intrenchments will be carefully sited to enable them to cover the water approaches, the beaches, and routes leading inland with a heavy volume of closely integrated fires. Obstacles will be placed to channelize our advance into the best fields of fire and both beach areas and inland routes will be extensively sewn with land mines.

The shores of Tokyo Bay, including those of Uraga Strait and the southwestern coast of the Chiba Peninsula, will probably be defended by naval base defense troops and by the Army Yokosuka Fortress Unit.

(c) Holding Garrisons:

It is expected that the Japanese will have disposed 3 to 4 infantry divisions (depending on the total number available) in strongly organized defensive positions behind the critical beaches and blocking the main routes into the heart of the Plain. Positions will be selected so as to place main lines of resistance as close to the beaches as practicable without exposure to our preparatory fires and with due regard for maximum exploitation of strong terrain.

Terrain factors, relative desirability of landing beaches, and geographical location of important objectives suggest the following as the most likely deployment of forward divisions:

1 reinforced division in the Ahukuma Hills-Mito-Kasumiga-Ura (northeast) area, blocking the entrance to the Isioka-Tsuchiura corridor.

At least 1 reinforced division between the Tonegawa and the Chiba Hills (central eastern area) blocking the routes of advance from Kujukuri Beach toward the head of Tokyo Bay and the Tokyo City area.

At least 1 reinforced division behind the shoreline of Sagami-wan, between the west coast of Tokyo-wan and the western bordering mountains (southwest area), blocking the shortest corridor into the heart of the Plain.

(d) Reserves:

It is expected that in the initial deployment a major portion of the mobile combat strength within the Plain will be held in mobile reserve. Forces thus employed will probably include:

2 to 3 infantry divisions
2 depot divisions

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Part or all of the Armor
Miscellaneous smaller and/or u/i combat units

A portion of the reserve divisions may have been released to Armies (Corps) by the time of our assault; the remainder will be held in General Reserve under Area Army control.

Prior to our advance, the bulk of divisions and other units in reserve will probably be located west and north of the line Abakuma Spur-Mito Highway-Tokyo-Kofu highway. Within this area the larger units will probably be well dispersed to avoid bombing losses and for the same reason will avoid important urban areas, but will be located with easy access to the roadnets leading to possible areas of employment. In this connection, inland waterways must not be overlooked as possible routes of forward movement. The Tone, the Edo-gawa and several smaller rivers are navigable deep into the northern-central-western regions of the Plain and the Japanese are traditionally adept at movement by barges and river craft. This same factor may influence the degree of immobility which can be imposed upon the Japs by destruction of critical bridges over these wide streams. They will probably have foreseen this contingency and made provision to offset it by utilization of improvised ferries. Tokyo Bay, easily crossed in one night must also be considered a feasible route by which reserves may be shifted from the Chiba Peninsula and the area south of the Tone to the area west of Tokyo and vice versa.

Disposition of the Armor will depend on whether or not the Japanese have drawn any lessons from its abortive misuse on Luzon. If they have, they will probably hold the bulk in general reserve for concentrated employment; however, there may be a tendency to disperse it, at least partly, to Corps or even to smaller commands for use in local counter-attacks. If they again depart from the principle of mass, it is believed likely that at least one Tank Regiment may be disposed in the area south of the Tone and east of the Edo-gawa; this area eastward to Kujukuri Beach provides good tank terrain and getting it across the Tone and/or the Edo-gawa would cease to be a problem.

The two partially trained Depot Divisions will probably continue training as long as possible, but their equipment will

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be rushed to completion so as to render their activation a mere formality.

The SNLFs will probably be disposed in the Chiba Peninsula for mobile employment.

(7) Fixed Coastal Defenses:

Insofar as known, only the head of Sagami-wan (south-west area), both shores of Uraga Strait (entrance to Tokyo Bay) and a small area near the extreme northeast corner of the Plain are defended by heavy seacoast batteries. The heaviest concentration of fixed defenses lies astride the entrance to Tokyo Bay; approximately 40 guns of 9 to 16 caliber are believed to flank the 10-mile wide Uraga Straits, and a large proportion of these can probably cover the northeast portion of Sagami-wan with their fire.

A considerable number of A/A guns are located at intervals on or close behind practically all important beaches, usually in the vicinity of airfields; it is probable that these weapons are sited to permit them to fire alternate beach defense missions.

Locations of currently known seacoast and coastal A/A guns are shown on Map Encl 12.

b. Air Forces:

(1) Trends:

Current trends suggest that the Japanese are fully alive to the disastrous implications of their unenviable air situation. The heavy losses suffered during their vigorous initial reaction to our advance into the Ryukyus have reduced overall strength in first-line combat aircraft assigned to tactical units and based in the Empire to approximately 2,400. The Japs realize that reconstitution of their air strength will be a race against time if it is to become an appreciable factor in the defense of the home islands.

Recent developments suggest that they have reverted to their former policy of conservation, insofar as combat aircraft and trained crews are concerned. Although they continue to support their delaying ground action in the Ryukyus with relatively heavy air attacks, the quality of these attacks has been sharply reduced. Attacking formations are now composed principally of obsolescent and training type planes

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manned by relatively inexperienced pilots. By this means they hope to conserve their dwindling reserve of first-line planes and pilots for last ditch defense of the Empire while maintaining a show of vigorous air activity and, since these inferior aircraft are quite suitable for suicide missions, purchase occasional successes at minimum cost.

Despite conservation of their best aircraft and pilots and the assignment of the highest priorities to new aircraft construction, their efforts to rebuild air strength face formidable obstacles. B-29 and carrier strikes have already cut production rates almost in half and further reductions are anticipated. Estimates of average monthly production of combat aircraft for the remainder of 1945 range from 500 to 1000 per month, against probable monthly losses of 1000 to 1500; a net reduction in overall strength of approximately 500 aircraft per month. Therefore it is conservatively estimated that by target date the overall number of aircraft of any combat effectiveness available to the Japanese will be approximately 2500. This estimate includes aircraft in the following categories: First-line combat aircraft, obsolete or obsolescent combat models and advanced trainers; it does not include the elementary trainers (of which there may be as many as 3000 in the Empire), whose effectiveness in combat would be practically nil. This figure also assumes that the all-out reaction to our assault on Kyushu will be short-live; should the Japs continue to make strong commitments beyond the time they realize their inability to prevent a landing, the overall figure may be correspondingly lower, and if their effort be greatly prolonged, their air capabilities against our Tokyo Plain operations may be reduced to guerrilla raiding.

The introduction of new and improved conventional aircraft types may be partly arrested by our strategic bombing. However, use of the suicide-piloted rocket-plane BAKA may increase. Employment of ground-launched V-type weapons, similar to the German jet-propelled V-1, has not occurred to date; however, it is known that the Japanese are interested in these, and they may be introduced by the time of our invasions of the Empire proper.

The Japanese air crew training program has been disrupted and curtailed with both training aircraft and trainees now being committed directly into combat. After establishment of our land-based aircraft on Kyushu, rear areas with the security necessary for a balanced air-crew training program will be virtually non-existent. Increasing difficulty is being experienced in replacing, maintaining and servicing aircraft, with all air facility installations in Japan subject to increasing neutralization.

(2) Command Structure:

Overall strategic control of current offensive air operations is being exercised by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet with tactical control under the First Mobile Base Air Force and SKY Air Forces in Kyushu. Some Army air elements are thus under temporary Naval tactical control. The bulk of the Army Air Force is under the command of the General Air Command with headquarters in Tokyo. It is probable that with a further shifting to the defensive, increasing control will be exercised by the Army over Empire Air defense.

(3) Current Strength and Dispositions:

Overall strength in combat aircraft in tactical air units based within forward areas of the home islands is currently estimated at 2,215 planes of all types. Distribution by types and areas are set forth in the following table:

TABLE III

Area	Bombers	Fighters	Recce	Total
Central Honshu (Kobe-Osaka area to Sendai area, both incl.):	425	700	300	1,425
Southwestern Honshu-Shikoku-Kyushu	<u>215</u>	<u>430</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>790</u>
Aggregate	640	1,130	445	2,215

In addition to the above, it is estimated that some 4,000 aircraft, including obsolete and obsolescent combat models in training units and advanced trainers are available within the Empire. In view of the fact that the enemy is now employing this class of materiel freely in suicide efforts, it is necessary to accord them limited consideration in any assessment of air combat power. The following table sets forth such an assessment:

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TABLE IV

Type of Aircraft	Bs	Fs	Rs	Total
First-line combat aircraft (unlimited employment)	640	1130	445	2,215
Aircraft of limited effectiveness, (principally suicide crash attacks)				<u>4,000</u>
Aggregate				6,215

(4) Estimated Strength and Dispositions, Y-Day:

It is estimated that by target date enemy air strength based within the forward areas of the home islands is unlikely to exceed 1,500 aircraft of all classes.

The principal mission of these aircraft will be to afford what protection they can to the vital Plain area; therefore the Japanese will desire to base them at maximum bombing range from our advanced bases insofar as compatible with employment on interception missions over Tokyo and adjacent areas. By this time our air forces operating from the Ryukyus and Kyushu should have rendered Kyushu, Southwestern Honshu and Shikoku fields untenable as main bases and the principal air centers within the Tokyo Plain will be under heavy neutralization; therefore it is expected that the bulk of aircraft in the forward area will probably be well dispersed and based on fields located in remote regions of the Plain, e.g. the Takasaki and Utsonomiya Valley along the central west coast and in other parts of central and north-central Honshu. (See Map Encl. 10).

(5) Airfields:

The number and distribution of airfields in the Empire proper is set forth in the following table:

TABLE V

Air Centers	Number of Fields
Southwestern Honshu	40
Kobe-Osaka	15
Nagoya	23
Tokyo Plain	70
Northern Honshu	<u>10</u>
Aggregate	158

It is expected that by Spring of 1946, our air forces operating from Ryukyus and Kyushu bases, together with very long range land-based bombers and carrier-based aircraft, will have established

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effective air neutralization over the western Honshu, Kobe-Osaka, and Nagoya air centers and to a large extent over the bases within the Tokyo Plain. Although experience has proven that it is extremely difficult to maintain complete and permanent neutralization of a large air center, it is probable that enemy use of most of the fields included in the above listed centers will be limited to intermittent employment as staging bases.

c. Naval Forces:

(1) Trends:

Enemy fleet units in the Empire have remained in a more or less quiescent state since the abortive sortie of the 1st Diversion Attack Force Suicide Attack Group (Yamato Group) on 6 April, and there is no evidence that further fleet operations are planned or impending. Recent photographs of Empire-based fleet units show a number of major units so elaborately camouflaged that they are not believed to be immediately available for combat.

(2) Naval Strength in the Empire:

Currently estimated enemy naval strength in Empire waters is set forth in the following table:

TABLE VI

Type:	Total Number:	Number Operational:
Battleships	2	1
Converted Battleships (XCV-BB)	2	2
Aircraft Carriers (CV)	4	4
Aircraft Carriers (CVL)	2	2
Aircraft Carriers (CVE)	2	2
Heavy Cruisers	3	3
Light Cruisers	2	2
Destroyers	40	37
Destroyer Escorts	8	8
Submarines	53	32

Of the ships listed above as operational, three of the CV's were recently shown by photographs to be heavily camouflaged and are not believed to be ready for immediate action. The majority of the operational fleet units are currently located either at Kure (Inland Sea) or at Sasebo (Western Kyushu). Prior to Y-Day, Allied air attacks on these areas, continued mining operations in the Inland Sea and the approaches thereto, and our invasion of Southern Kyushu, which may prompt the Jap Naval High Command to launch "all out" surface suicide attacks against

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the Kyushu Task Forces, will probably have resulted in either the destruction of these units or in their withdrawal to the upper reaches of the Yellow Sea or Sea of Japan. (See Map Encl 13).

(3) Construction:

Recent aerial reconnaissance of Jap shipbuilding yards indicate that much of the new carrier construction program has been at least temporarily suspended. However, conversion of one of the two remaining battleships to an XCV-BB (flight deck aft) apparently continues. Photographs on 28 April of this ship, believed to be the Haruna, show all turrets removed and the construction of a flight deck aft underway. Since it is generally believed that the short flight decks of the Ise and Hyuga have met with little success, conversion of the Haruna is hard to understand. It is possible, however, that the enemy has plans to use converted battleship carriers and also regular carriers as mobile bases from which to launch jet or rocket-propelled craft piloted by suicide personnel.

The status of the current carrier construction program is estimated to be as follows:

3 CV's - incomplete. Construction suspended.
Heavily camouflaged
2/3 CVE's - incomplete. Construction possibly
suspended.

In addition to the carrier construction it is estimated that two heavy cruisers are being built. Also, numerous destroyers, submarines, and various types of escort vessels and small craft are estimated to be under construction.

In view of the fact that Japanese shipyards will continue to be subjected to heavy air attacks, it is doubtful that all of the above-mentioned ships now under construction will ever be launched. However, even assuming that new construction is completed and that damaged vessels are repaired, Japan's over-all naval shipbuilding capabilities are still insufficient to enable her to alter the naval situation and her strength will still be totally inadequate for the defense of Honshu.

(4) Merchant Shipping Position:

As of 16 May, Japan was estimated to have 1,695,035 tons

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of steel vessels of 1,000 gross tons or over; with a reduction of 20 per cent for lay-ups and repairs, the total serviceable shipping amounted to 1,356,028. When compared with the seven to eight million tons available early in the war, the present total tonnage appears to be inadequate. However, at that time the enemy was conducting military operations throughout the vast Central and South Pacific, whereas currently as the result of the Allied advance, Japans merchant shipping requirements have been reduced to the maintenance of traffic between the homeland, Korea, Manchuria, China and the Kuriles. These are relatively modest requirements and it is probable that the remaining merchant fleet is at present adequate to meet them. However, stepped up Allied air and submarine operations along enemy Yellow Sea shipping routes have, and are expected to continue to exact a heavy toll of merchant shipping, and it is probable that the enemy merchant shipping position will soon become most critical.

Detailed analysis of the Japanese shipping position (in respect to steel vessels of 1000 grt or over) as of 16 May 1945 is set forth in the following table:

TABLE VII

	No. of ships	Average Tonnage	Total Tonnage
Total shipping available 7 Dec 41 plus all subsequent construction and acquisitions through 16 May 1945	2,246	4,073	9,148,974
Total sinkings to 16 May 1945	1,699	4,387	7,453,939
Total shipping afloat on 16 May 1945	547	3,099	1,695,035
Minus 20% repair factor			339,007
Tonnage Operable 16 May 1945			1,356,028

As of 1 February 1945 it was estimated that the Japanese had a total of approximately 3,170 ships of 100 to 1000 grt with an aggregate tonnage of 735,000.

The smallest ships, those below 100 grt (which are not included in the foregoing table), are chiefly engaged in fishing, picketing and general cargo traffic. An approximate break-down as of 1 February of vessels in this category follows:

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Full-powered	: About 2,500 ships	125,000 gross tons
Auxiliaries	: About <u>7,000</u> ships	<u>350,000</u> gross tons
Total	: About 9,500 ships	475,000 gross tons

Sailing vessels without engines are estimated as follows:

Over 100grt	: 750 ships	100,000 gross tons
20-99 gross tons:	6,000 ships	300,000 gross tons
5-19 gross tons:	<u>5,000</u> ships	<u>60,000</u> gross tons
Total	11,750 ships	460,000 gross tons

In addition, the Japanese, using native laborers, have built numbers of small wooden vessels in all the conquered southern territories. These, engaged chiefly in coastal and inter-island trade in those areas, are not included in the foregoing estimates.

2. Rear Areas: (See Map Encl 6).

a. Ground Forces:

(1) Command Structure:

Mobile combat units in the areas Nagoya-Sendai (both inclusive) may be considered sufficiently accessible to constitute sources of reasonably immediate reinforcement to the Tokyo Plain. These include: the remainder of the combat troops of the Twelfth Area Army; Combat Units of the Thirteenth Area Army (Headquarters, Nagoya); and that portion of the combat units of the Eleventh Area Army (Headquarters, Sendai) as are stationed in or south of the Sendai Plain.

(2) Current Strength and Dispositions:

Mobile combat strength in this included area is currently estimated at 120,000 to 125,000 troops including:

- 2 Infantry Divisions
- 4 Depot Divisions
- 3 Independent Infantry Battalions
- 1 Infantry Mortar Regiment
- 5 Artillery Replacement Regiments

Strength and dispositions of these units is listed in the following table:

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TABLE VIII

ESTIMATED ENEMY TROOP STRENGTH, CENTRAL HONSHU
(Less Tokyo Plain Area - TABLE I)

CLASSIFICATION	ESTIMATED STRENGTH	PRESENT LOCATION	DATE
MOBILE COMBAT:			
Field Units:			
72nd Division	16,000	Sendai	9/44
73rd Division	16,000	Nagoya	3/45
3rd Inf Mortar Reg't	1,500	Sabai City	9/44
162nd Spec Garrison Bn	800	Nagoya	3/44
163rd Spec Garrison Bn	800	Nagoya	3/44
164th Spec Garrison Bn	800	Nagoya	3/44
Unitssin Training:			
2nd Depot Division	20,000	Sendai	
3rd Depot Division	20,000	Nagoya	
52nd Depot Division	20,000	Kanazawa	
U/i Depot Division	20,000	Nagano	
1st Indep Mtn Arty Rp Unit	800	Takada	3/44
2nd Med Arty Rp Unit	875	Mishima	4/44
3rd Med Arty Rp Unit	1,200	Mishima	3/44
17th Med Arty Rp Unit	860	Ishikawa	3/44
18th Med Arty Rp Unit	875	Ishikawa	3/44
Total, Mobile Combat	120,510		

(3) Estimated Strength and Dispositions, Y-Day:

It is estimated that by Y-Day mobile combat strength in rear areas with respect to the Tokyo Plain will have increased to 188,000 to 205,000 troops and will include 6 to 7 infantry divisions, 5 Depot Divisions and additional artillery units. For general dispositions, see Map Encl. 9.

(4) Estimated Mobile Combat Strength and Dispositions in Distant Areas of the Empire Proper:

In addition to the mobile combat units readily available to reinforce the Tokyo Plain, it is estimated that by Y-Day the Japanese will have 13 to 15 active infantry divisions (or division equivalents), 5 Depot Divisions, at least 3 Tank Regiments, additional artillery and miscellaneous smaller combat units disposed in more remote parts of the Empire (exclusive of Kyushu). A major portion of these units will probably be made available for employment in the Tokyo Plain as the action progresses, and eventually nearly all may be. In addition to the above, there will be 6 to 8 infantry divisions and 2 Depot Divisions in Kyushu, but in view of our earlier invasion of that island these units are unlikely to be available for reinforcement of the Tokyo Plain.

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Probable dispositions of combat units as of Y-Day are shown on Map Encl. 9.

b.. Air Forces:

(1) Current Strength and Dispositions:

For purposes of this study and from an air viewpoint, rear areas are considered to include that portion of Honshu north of the Sendai area, Hokkaido, the Kuriles, Karafuto, Manchuria, the North China Coast and Korea.

Overall strength in combat aircraft, based in rear areas with respect to the Tokyo Plain, is currently estimated at 763 planes. Distribution by types and areas in which based are set forth in the following table:

TABLE IX

Area	Bombers	Fighters	Recce	Total
Northern Honshu (north of Sendai):	10	15	20	45
Hokkaido-Kuriles-Karafuto :	36	52	54	142
Manchuria-Korea :	50	122	95	267
China Coast (north of Shanghai, incl)	30	160	119	309
Aggregate first-line planes :	126	349	288	763

(2) Estimated Strength, Spring of 1946:

It is expected that before Y-Day, and particularly following our invasion of Kyushu, the enemy will have reduced his aircraft commitment in all areas distant from the Empire to mere token forces and will have drawn in all available aircraft; practically the entire remaining strength of the Japanese airforces will then be concentrated within his inner perimeter. However, by that time overall air strength will probably have been reduced by losses to approximately 2,000 to 2,500 aircraft of all classes, it is therefore estimated that after deducting the 1500 planes which will probably be based in forward areas total rear area strength will not exceed 1000 planes of all classes.

It is expected that the bulk of these aircraft will be based in Manchuria, in the vicinity of Shanghai, and possibly in Northern Korea. Due to the severe winter weather conditions of Northern Japan, it is unlikely that any appreciable number will be based in Hokkaido or more northerly areas (see Map Encl. 10).

(3) Airfields:

The airfield net is entirely adequate for basing and staging the maximum number of aircraft likely to be disposed in rear areas. Number and disposition of fields is shown in the following table:

TABLE X

Air Centers	No. of Fields
Northern Honshu (north of Sendai)	10
Hokkaido-Kuriles-Karafuto	50
Manchuria-Korea	100
North China Coast (including Shanghai)	30
Aggregate	190

c. Naval Forces:

(1) Naval Strength Southwestern Area:

Currently the only major fleet units operating outside of Empire waters are located in the Singapore-N.E.I. area where they are engaged in repair and in urgent troop transportation between Singapore and other Malayan or N.E.I. ports. The Southwestern Area Force is estimated to be composed of the following units:

Heavy Cruisers - 3 (2 damaged, 1 possibly to complete repairs in May)

It is possible that before the proposed operation the enemy will attempt to return these now more or less isolated fleet units to the Empire to bolster his strength there. However, there is no evidence that such a withdrawal is imminent, and the above ships may be retained in the Southwestern area to aid in troop movements incident to regrouping.

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III. CONCLUSIONS:

1. Enemy Capabilities:

- a. Ground Defense and Reinforcement
- b. Air Interception and Attack
- c. Airborne Harassment
- d. Naval Capabilities

a. Ground Defense and Reinforcement:

(1) Plan of Defense:

The Japanese probably accept that they cannot prevent our landing; therefore, it is expected that they will attempt to conduct an active defense within the plain.

Initially, they will strive to soften our assaulting forces by inflicting as many casualties as possible during our overwater approach, our landing, and our advance through the beach zone. They will plan to check our inland advance through strongly organized defensive positions in depth blocking the inland approaches to the heart of the plain. Finally, if they succeed in halting our advance they will then attempt to destroy our forces ashore by powerful counter-offensives utilizing those defensive positions which are still intact as lines of departure or pivots of maneuver.

(2) Initial Resistance:

During approach and landing our assault waves will be opposed by the fires of such coastal guns and beach groups as have escaped destruction during our preliminary bombardment, and by long range fires from artillery and mortars emplaced behind the beach defense zone. The effectiveness of these fires will depend upon the extent to which the enemy's fire plans have been disrupted; however, it is probable that some groups particularly those in the rear part of the beach defense zone will survive our bombardment and will continue to offer isolated resistance as our troops advance inland. These groups will be well dug in and will act principally by fire; in general, counter-attacks during the early phases will probably be limited to occasional small-scale "banzai" charges by very small units, principally at night. (See Map Encl. 8).

(3) Defense of Inland Approaches:

As our advance clears the beach areas and approaches

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the higher ground (terraced areas) in rear, organized defensive positions occupied by the forward Infantry Divisions will be encountered. Resistance will be determined and bitter and any penetration into the organized area will be met by prompt counter-attacks by local reserves of battalions and regiments. Division Reserves will counter-attack against larger penetrations or against attacking forces whose advance has been locally checked. If the Jap has disposed a portion of his tanks forward, small tank elements may be employed in conjunction with these counter-attacks, particularly those delivered by division reserves.

In addition to the divisions disposed on these defensive positions, the garrisons will probably include large numbers of volunteer defense units. It is quite possible that the number employed in any division defense sector may be as great or greater than that of organic divisional troops. Volunteer Units will probably be disposed in the less critical sectors of the position; e.g. on extensions to flanks and rear and on fronts protected by formidable obstacles. A portion may be held available to promptly replace losses in divisional units.

It is therefore estimated that by the time forwardmost battle positions are fully developed our forces will be opposed by enemy strength as follows:

In the northeastern area by 35,000 to 45,000 troops of all classes, including one (1) infantry division.

In the eastern area between the Tone-gawa and the Chiba Hills; by 40,000 to 50,000 troops of all classes including at least one (1) infantry division, and possibly by some additional smaller combat units including up to 1 tank regiment;

In the southwestern area by 45,000 to 60,000 troops of all classes including one (1) to two (2) infantry divisions, Fortress units, and possibly by additional smaller combat units including up to 1 tank regiment. (See Map Encl. 8).

(4) Reinforcement by Reserve Divisions:

Although the Japanese will plan to employ their large reserve in counter-offensive action, they will reinforce the forward defense areas with divisions initially held in Corps and General Reserve to the limit of available strength in order to halt our advances. At the same time, and possibly even earlier, they will move additional divisions from adjacent areas into the plan; throughout the action they will exert extreme efforts to constantly maintain their general reserve at initial

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and, if possible, at greater levels in the hope of passing to the offensive at the earliest opportunity.

The number of reserve divisions committed in any one defense area will depend on several contingencies, i.e., the number and relative importance of areas under attack or threatened with attack; the weight and rapidity of our advance; and the terrain. Thus the northeastern area, most distant from the heart of the plain and backed by the strong terrain of the Abukuma Spur-Ishioka Corridor-Lake region, will receive a much lower priority for reinforcement than the area south of the Tone-gawa. Retention of the southwestern area which affords the shortest route to Tokyo, possesses few formidable natural obstacles, and contains the most highly developed air centers, may be considered paramount to denying us access to the good tank terrain north of Tokyo-wan which is backed by the unfordable and easily flooded Edo-gawa.

Rates of arrival of reinforcing divisions will likewise vary with the degree of interdiction of land and water routes from the heart of the plain to the forward defenses. In view of the dense road-net and the adeptness of the Japanese at employing water communications, it is doubtful that anything approaching 75% interdiction can be achieved.

Based on the assumption that a limited number of routes of communication remain available to the enemy, it is likely that the pattern of reinforcement by reserve divisions might be approximately as follows:

Northeast Area:

1 division within 24 to 48 hours after development of main position.

Central Eastern Area:

1 division within 24 to 48 hours after contact with main position. Additional divisions at an approximate rate of one each 2 to 3 days thereafter until a total of 3 to 4 divisions plus non-divisional troops are deployed in the area.

Southwestern Area:

1 division within 24 to 48 hours after landing additional divisions at an approximate rate of one each 24 to 48 hours thereafter until 4 to 5 plus non-divisional troops are deployed in the area.

It is probable that the Japanese will desire to retain the bulk of their armor in general reserve as long as possible in the hope of ultimately employing it to spearhead their planned decisive counter-offensive. However, our superiority in this arm will probably force its

early commitment, particularly on the southwestern front. (see Map Encl 8).

(5) Reinforcement from Other Areas:

The Japanese may begin reinforcing the Tokyo Plain with divisions from adjacent areas as soon as they are convinced of our destination; they will certainly do so no later than the time of our initial landing. As divisions initially in reserve within the plain are committed the reinforcement rate from sources outside the plain will be stepped-up to the limit of their capabilities. As the Nagoya-Sendai area is drained, divisions from more distant areas of Honshu and Hokkaido will probably be wholly or partially side-slipped to replace them; however, as the situation becomes more critical these replacing divisions and eventually those still garrisoning more distant areas will also be brought in to reinforce the plain. Thus approximately 15 to 24 divisions (including previously active divisions and divisions called out of depots, regardless of their state of training) could be brought in while still continuing to garrison other important areas with minimum forces, and if all areas outside the plain be totally stripped of mobile combat troops, the number would be approximately 27 to 30.

The rate at which these divisions could arrive will be limited by the capacity of the relatively thin net of main roads and railroads leading into the plain and by our success in interdicting or destroying these routes. Capacities of reinforcement routes are set forth in the following table:

TABLE XII

Route	Capacity
Tokaido RR and Hwy)	2/3 Div per day
Nagoya-Kofu RR and Hwy)	
West Coast-Takasaki RR and Hwy	1/4 Div per day
North Honshu-Utsonomiya RR and Hwy	1/4 Div per day
Sendai-Mito RR and Hwy	1/5 Div per day
Supplementary roads	1/3 Div per day
Aggregate	1-7/10 Div per day*

* Beginning 48 hours after first troops are dispatched.

It is expected that by target date all these routes will have suffered extensive damage including destruction of numerous critical bridges, tunnels and other defiles. The Tokkaido and Sendai-Mito routes are also subject to interdiction by naval gunfire. It is therefore estimated that overall reinforcement capacity will have fallen

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to not more than (1) division per day by target date and that as the campaign progresses it will be still further reduced, particularly after the enemy air forces cease to be an important factor. An advance of 25 miles into the southwestern area will further restrict movement from the Nagoya area.

It must also be noted that since these routes proceed from widely divergent areas of Honshu the overall capacity of (1) division per day is not in terms of complete divisions but in piecemeal fractions of (2) to (4) different divisions. Therefore on the assumption that the enemy initiates reinforcement of the plain by Y-Day and continues it to the extent of his capabilities until his available strength is exhausted, it is estimated that the optimum probable volume of reinforcement by complete divisions will be approximately 4 divisions per week for the first 3 weeks and about 2 divisions per week thereafter.

It is also believed that as soon as the enemy perceives our superiority in armor he will expedite reinforcement by the 2 to 3 tank regiments still disposed outside the plain and will promptly clear those routes necessary to their most expeditious movement.

On this basis it is estimated that the total number of divisions likely to become available for employment within the plain during the period Y-Day to Y + 30 inclusive, will be approximately as set forth in the following table:

TABLE XIII

During Period	Inf Divs	Armd Divs (or equivalent)
Y to Y + 2	9 to 10	1-1/3
Y + 3 to Y + 5	11 to 12	1-1/3
Y + 6 to Y + 9	12 to 13	1-2/3
Y + 10 to Y + 12	13 to 14	2
Y + 13 to Y + 16	15 to 16	2
Y + 17 to Y + 19	17 to 18	2
Y + 20 to Y + 23	19 to 20	2
Y + 24 to Y + 26	20 to 21	2
Y + 27 to Y + 30	21 to 22	2

After Y + 30, reinforcement could probably continue at the rate of about 2 divisions (or division equivalents) per week until a total of 36 to 40 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 2 to 2-1/3 armored divisions (in divisions and Independent Tank Regiments) had been employed piecemeal against our forces. However, it is believed that by

Y / 30, some of the divisions employed in the earlier phases will have been reduced by wastage to remnant status and others which have wholly or partially maintained their strength by volunteer replacements will be at very low fighting efficiency.

It is expected that prior to target date our air and sea control will be sufficiently effective to restrict further troop movement from the Asiatic Mainland to a negligible scale, and possibly to entirely prevent it. Therefore, interim entry into the war of the U.S.S.R. would not affect reinforcement capabilities. (see Maps Encls 2 and 9).

b. Air Interception and Attack:

There is little likelihood that the enemy will be in doubt as to the destination of our convoys once they are detected. It is to be expected that he will commit the full power of all his remaining air forces in a final, all-out effort which, though built up gradually, will continue with unremitting violence until practically his entire remaining air strength has been expended.

Prior to the time our convoys converging on Tokyo are discovered, the existing pattern of enemy air activity will probably be limited to attempted interception of strikes against the vital areas of Central Honshu, principally the Tokyo Plain, by aircraft based in forward areas; and to sporadic hit-and-run raids against our Kyushu installations and our shipping in northern waters. These latter attacks will be executed principally by small sorties composed of trainers and other second line aircraft, staged through Southwest Honshu, Shikoku, or Korea-Northern Kyushu fields, on suicide missions.

The initial result of discovery of our amphibious movement is likely to be an intensification of the last described activity and an increasing diversion of weight against the Tokyo-bound convoys. Sorties will probably increase in both strength and frequency as the objective is approached. During this period, some first-line planes may be committed; however, it is considered probable that suicide crash attacks by second-line aircraft will continue to be most habitual method of attack.

At this time, and particularly during the final stages of

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approach, the Japanese may attempt to open the way for their suicide fanatics by diversionary tactics. First-line aircraft may attempt to draw off portions of our air cover by demonstrations and feints with or without becoming seriously engaged, and thereby open gaps in our air cover through which the suicide planes may slip and approach our convoys closely enough to launch their crash attacks.

It is probable that air attacks will frequently be coordinated with surface attacks by assault demolition boats; and that both these craft and submarines may also be employed to divert air cover and expose our vessels to plane crashes.

If the suicide-piloted rocket plane (BAKA) proves effective, it will probably be extensively employed during these operations. Launching will probably be from medium bombers during all phases of approach and possibly from naval vessels (see par II 1. c.(3) above). It is believed that the Japanese are experimenting with launching these weapons from ground-launching stations, and this method may be used as our convoys arrive close-in. Maximum employment will probably be reached just prior to landing and continue at the then possible peak until the bulk of the enemy's forward area aircraft are destroyed and any shore launching stations within range have been destroyed or overrun.

At some time during the approach, most probably in its latter stages and after they have verified the direction and magnitude of our movement, it may be expected that the Japanese will abandon all conservatism and will commit everything they have in desperate efforts to prevent our landings.

All remaining aircraft of whatever classification based in forward areas will then be progressively committed in a bitter air counter-offensive which will probably include both mass attacks and frequent small sorties. In addition to conventional forms of air attack, suicide crashes will then be freely launched by any type of plane against favorable targets.

It is probable that the Japanese will already have initiated strenuous efforts to reinforce Honshu with aircraft from the rear areas, staging through Hokkaido-Northern Honshu or through Korea-Southwest Honshu

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(and/or Northern Kyushu). If not, they will probably do so as the main air attack begins. However, due to heavy Allied pressure on their forward area air facilities and to mounting combat and non-combat wastage as the reaction is intensified, it is doubtful that the number of aircraft available for immediate non-staged employment against our attacking forces will ever exceed the original forward area strength of approximately 1500. Of these a still lesser proportion, probably not more than 40% will be ready for combat any one time.

Following our landing, the enemy will continue his maximum air effort relentlessly; particularly against shipping and shore installations, replacing his losses progressively with aircraft from rear areas. However, as our beachheads are consolidated and he is convinced of his failure it is possible that he may temporarily reduce his scale of effort in order to concentrate his full remaining strength for a final desperate effort to be launched in conjunction with a major ground counter-offensive. In the event he adopts this course of action, pressure would be maintained during the lull; he would continue to commit considerable numbers of aircraft in frequent small sorties, but these would be predominantly second-line planes favoring suicide tactics against targets of opportunity.

Whether or not a lull occurs, the main air effort may be expected to be of short duration. As the rear areas are drained of their limited reserve of aircraft, attacks will necessarily diminish in both weight and frequency. It has been estimated that should the enemy continue to press strong attacks relentlessly, his entire air strength will be exhausted within 10 to 15 days after the maximum effort begins. However, it is more likely that after his main force is destroyed, he will still be able to maintain some minor scale of air activity for a prolonged period; delayed arrivals from rear areas, damaged planes repaired and returned to duty, and scrapings from remote areas may provide means for continued aerial reconnaissance, intermittent small harassing raids, (principally at night) and occasional suicide runs launched from remote fields.

It is also possible that when convinced of his ultimate failure, the enemy may discontinue his maximum effort somewhere short

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of complete destruction, and basing a few hundred planes on obscure fields and landing grounds resort to prolonged guerrilla harassment by small sorties against favorable and lightly protected targets, e.g. lightly escorted vessels and/or those carrying low A/A protection.

In the event that the U.S.S.R. has entered the war, the number of aircraft that may be available in rear areas will be considerably reduced, and the period of maximum effort correspondingly shortened.

c. Airborne Harassment:

Japanese airborne forces have recently been reduced to a single Raiding (Parachute) Brigade and this force may be further reduced by losses during interim operations. Attacks in strength will probably be limited to the earlier phases, due to the fact that thereafter the Jap airforces will be unable to mount any substantial effort; however, sporadic parachute attacks by small suicide groups with the principal mission of destroying parked aircraft, fuel dumps, communications centers, etc., may continue for a prolonged period.

d. Naval Capabilities:

It is believed that by target date the Jap fleet will have been largely destroyed or neutralized during previous operations. However, should the High Command, contrary to our expectations, decide upon a policy of extreme caution and withdraw the fleet to a safe area without opposing our previous landings, it is estimated that the fleet strength will be approximately as given in par 1.c.(3). If such a fleet exists at this time it will most probably be located in the vicinity of Northern Honshu, from which area surface suicide attacks could be launched against Allied forces operating off Southeastern Honshu. Such attacks would probably meet with little more success than did the recent attempt by the Yamato Suicide Group. Even though it is assumed that the Jap fleet will have been completely defeated or neutralized at the time of the Kyushu operation, there is a possibility that a few heavy units may have escaped destruction and be operational at this time. These units, however, will be of no sustained value and should be quickly eliminated if they attempt to engage the Allied forces.

The Jap Navy will probably depend primarily on its shore

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based aircraft, submarines, and small surface craft to protect the Tokyo area from amphibious attack. The enemy submarine force will remain a serious threat to Allied operations against Japan. Although to date the Japanese have achieved little success with their submarines, it is probable that offensive submarine activity will reach a high level when an invasion force approaches Japan proper. Currently, the enemy has approximately 60 submarines concentrated in the Empire-Nansei Shoto-Formosa waters and this number may be increased as the result of the recall to the Empire of those subs now on patrol in distant waters for the defense of the Empire. A new unit called "Kaiten" has been recently noted in connection with submarine activity. The "Kaiten" is a type of one-man suicide 24 inch torpedo with a 37 inch outer diameter housing for the operator between the air flask and war head. This weapon is known to have been used in the Iwo Jima area in March and also in the Nansei Shotos (results unknown). Midget submarine activity is also to be expected.

Regarded as a highly important "secret weapon" by the Jap Army is the so-called "Suicide Boat", better named an Assault Demolition boat. These craft have been used against the Allied surface vessels in the Philippines and in the Nansei Shotos and can be expected to play an important part in the Japanese strategy to repel Allied landings on Japan proper. The Navy will probably be able to muster some 750 to 1000 small combatant surface craft for the defense of the Tokyo area (650 were reported in the Okinawa area). These craft will attempt to launch attacks against Allied transports approaching the landing beaches, particularly during darkness and periods of low visibility.

The water approaches to the various landing beaches in the Tokyo area are not too readily mineable. Sagami Bay has an average depth of 500 to 600 fathoms. The straits between O Shima and Suno Saki are approximately 800 fathoms in depth, while the straits between O Shima and Tsumoki Saki have an average depth of about 350 fathoms. Tidal currents in Sagami Bay and through the straits are quite strong. Therefore it is probable that a task force entering the area would encounter no considerable minefields. The landing beaches between the mouth of the Sagami River and the town of Misaki, at the tip of the Uraga Peninsula, have

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suitable gradients for mining to an average distance of 4 miles from the shore. The sea approaches to the beaches along the Chiba Peninsula are variable in depth. The beaches along this coast from Tateyama to Katsuura Bay have mineable gradients to an average distance of about 5 miles from the shore. From Katsuura Bay northward the 100-fathom curve extends seaward for an average distance of some 20 miles offering a very favorable mineable shelf. Inshore currents in this area are irregular and not too strong. There are indications at the present time that Tokyo Bay and Uraga Straits are mined. The existence of mines in the remainder of the area is unknown; however, it is probable that inshore mines are planted along all favorable landing beaches of this entire area.

Entry into the war of the U.S.S.R. would not appreciably alter naval capabilities.

2. Relative Probabilities:

a. Ground Defense and Reinforcement: ✓

(1) Plan of Defense:

The Japanese will realize that they cannot prevent our landing and will plan to conduct an active defense within the plain.

(2) Static Defense During Approach and Landing:

The enemy will strive to soften our assaulting waves by the fire of dug-in beach groups composed principally of volunteer defense units, and by long-range fires of artillery and mortars emplaced in rear of the beaches.

(3) Defense of Inland Approaches:

After clearing the beach zones, our advancing forces will encounter strongly organized defensive positions blocking the approaches to the heart of the plain; the most important sectors will be occupied by Army divisions, the less critical areas by relatively immobile but numerous volunteer defense units. Resistance will be determined and bitter; any penetration of the organized areas will be met by prompt and vicious counterattacks by local reserves, possibly accompanied by small tank units. By the time these forward positions are fully developed, our attacking forces may be opposed: In the northeastern area by 35,000 to 45,000 troops of all classes including 1 infantry division; in the

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central eastern area by 40,000 to 50,000, including 1 to 2 infantry divisions (or division equivalents) and part or all of 1 tank regiment; in the southwestern area by 45,000 to 60,000, including 1 to 2 infantry divisions and part of all of 1 tank regiment.

(4) Reinforcement by Reserve Divisions:

Initially the major portion of mobile combat strength will be held in reserve in the hope of ultimately passing to the counter-offensive. However, forward defense areas will be reinforced with reserve divisions to the limit of available strength in order to halt our advance; these will be replaced in reserve by divisions brought in from other areas. Assuming considerable but not 100% interdiction of routes, forward defense areas might be reinforced as follows: Northeast Area, by 1 division within 24 to 48 hours after the battle position is fully developed; Central Eastern Area, by 1 division within 24 to 48 hours after contact with the battle position and by 1 division each 2 to 3 days thereafter until 3 to 4 divisions (plus non-divisional troops) are deployed on the position; Southwestern Area, by 1 division each 24 to 48 hours after landing, until 4 to 5 (plus non-divisional troops) are deployed in the area.

(5) Employment of Armored Units:

The enemy will desire to hold the bulk of his armor in reserve to spearhead his planned counter-offensive; however, our superiority may force its early and possibly its piecemeal, commitment.

(6) Reinforcement from Other Areas:

Reinforcement from extra-plain sources may begin prior to landing; it will certainly begin no later than landing. For this purpose 6 to 7 active divisions and 5 partially trained divisions still in depots will be available within 140 miles, and 11 to 13 active divisions and 5 depot divisions in more distant parts of the Empire. Assuming reasonable success in interdiction of 5 main road and railroad routes, the probable rate of arrival should not exceed approximately 4 divisions per week for the first 3 weeks following landing and 2 divisions per week thereafter. If this rate be maintained, 21 to 22 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 2 armored divisions could be employed piecemeal within

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30 days; however, by that time some of the original divisions would be reduced to remnant status or to very low combat efficiency. Assuming that the enemy is willing to totally strip all other areas of the Empire except Kyushu of combat troops, 36 to 40 infantry divisions and the equivalent of 2-1/3 armored divisions could be eventually employed. By Y-Day our expanded air and sea control will preclude further reinforcement from the Asiatic mainland.

b. Air Interception and Attack:

(1) Suicide Attacks Against Our Convoys:

Suicide attacks against our approaching convoys will begin as soon as the enemy is convinced of their destination and will increase in frequency and violence as they converge on the Tokyo Plain. Attacks will be executed principally by second-line aircraft; however, formations of first-line planes may attempt to divert our air cover by demonstrations and feints in order to open gaps through which the suicide planes may approach our vessels. Air attacks may be coordinated with surface attacks by assault demolition boats, and with submarine activity. Extensive use of suicide-piloted rocket planes (BAKA) is anticipated.

(2) All-out Air Attack to Prevent Landing:

At some time during the approach, probably during its final stages, the enemy will commit his entire available forward area air strength in a desperate effort to prevent our landing. This effort will include massed air attacks and numerous small sorties flown by both first and second-line aircraft of all types. Planes in any category will attempt suicide crashes against any remunerative target. At this time if not sooner all available aircraft in rear areas will be called in to participate in the defense. Employment of suicide-piloted rocket planes will reach maximum intensity during final approach to our objectives.

(3) Continued Air Attacks Following Landing:

After our landing the enemy will continue his all-out air effort until his air strength is exhausted. A slight reduction in scale of air effort may occur as our beachheads are consolidated; however, pressure will be maintained by frequent small sorties favoring suicide tactics. In the event the enemy continues to press his attacks

relentlessly, it is unlikely that the period of maximum effort will exceed 10 to 15 days. Interim entry into the war by the U.S.S.R. would shorten this period. By the time the bulk of his air forces will have been destroyed and his air capabilities reduced to guerrilla raiding and sporadic suicide attacks; however these activities may continue for a prolonged period.

c. Airborne Harassment:

After landing, small-scale parachute attacks against our line of communications and installations ashore may occur. After destruction of the bulk of the Jap air forces, these attacks would be by very small groups, but might continue for a prolonged period.

d. Naval Capabilities:

(1) Possible Suicidal Surface Attacks:

In the event that any heavy units still remain afloat, they may be committed in suicidal sorties. They will be of no sustained value and should be quickly eliminated.

(2) Intensified Offensive Submarine Activity:


Offensive submarine activity, including attacks by large and midget subs and one-man suicide torpedoes may reach a high level at any stage of the operation.

(3) Maximum Employment of Assault Demolition Boats:

Extensive use of Assault Demolition Boats (suicide boats) particularly during hours of darkness and after our vessels arrive close inshore is expected.

(4) Extensive Mining of Water Approaches:

It is expected that waters of all favorable landing beaches will be extensively mined.




GLOSSARY

Japanese	English
gata	lagoon, inlet
gawa	river
jima	island
-kaiyo	strait
kawa	river
lake	lake
miseki	point, cape
nada	sea, open bay
numa	lagoon
saki	point, cape
san	mountain
shima	island
ura	lagoon
wan	bay
zaki	point, cape
zan	mountain, cape

CENTRAL HONSHU
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
TOPOGRAPHY
SEC I, PAR 1, G, b, and c, OF TEXT

Scale 1:1,000,000 at Latitude 35°



SERIES OF TUNNELS

CRITICAL BRIDGES

TUNNEL

CRITICAL BRIDGES

GLOSSARY

Japanese	English
-gata	lagoon, inlet
-gawa	river
-jima	island
-kaiyō	strait
-kawa	river
-ko	lake
-miaki	point, cape
-nada	sea, open bay
-numa	lagoon
-saki	point, cape
-san	mountain
-shima	island
-ura	lagoon
-wan	bay
-zaki	point, cape
-zan	mountain, cape

LEGEND

- ROADS
- +— SINGLE TRACK R.R.
- +—+— DOUBLE TRACK R.R.

CENTRAL HONSHU

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

ROAD AND RAILROAD NETS,
AND CRITICAL DEFILES

Scale 1:1,000,000 as Latitude 36°

139°

140°


141°

36°

36°

35°

35°



-  AREA SUBJECT TO NATURAL FLOODING IN WET SEASON
-  AREA CAN BE ARTIFICIALLY FLOODED FOR SHORT PERIODS
-  LAKES
-  RICE LAND OF KNOWN DENSITY AND EXTENT
-  RICE LAND DENSITY UNKNOWN
-  AREA CONTAINING NO RICE OR SCATTERED PATCHES TOO SMALL TO BE OBSTACLES

TOKYO PLAIN

Military Intelligence Section
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

EFFECT OF RICE LAND,
 NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL
 FLOODING ON CROSS-
 COUNTRY MOVEMENT

3

139°

140°

141°

TOP SECRET
CHARACTERISTICS OF LANDING BEACHES, TOKYO PLAIN AREA
(See Map Encl. 4, herewith)

Beach Area No.	Length	Description	Approaches	Surf, Swell and Tide	Terrain Inland
1.	Overall, 21 miles. Cut into segments by large streams: East, 1 mile E. Center, 6 miles W. Center, 11 miles W. 3 miles	150-200 feet wide. Sand and pebbles, small gravel areas. Firm except near stream mouths. Freshwater slope 1 on 10 in west, milder in east. Back shore relatively flat. Dividing streams and large stream on east boundary would obstruct lateral movement.	3 small islands and several sunken rocks obstruct east inlf. Bottom slope gentle to mild, steepening to westward. 30 foot line: 700-900 yds offshore in east half; 450-900 yds in west inlf; clearer in far short stretches. 18 foot line: Generally inlf way between 30 foot line and shore. 7 miles west from center suitable for large LC at all tides; remainder for small LC only.	Fairly wide surf belt. Heavy in summer, lighter in winter. Tidal range 4 1/2 feet.	East half; Pine clad belt of sand hills; cultivated plain beyond. West half: Low hills covered with orange groves, brush, and woods within 300 yds. Tokkaido RR and Hwy, telegraph and power lines parallel beach 1 to 2 miles inland. Road on embankment. Bridges over Sakawa-Gawa and Segami-gawa. Many roads lead inland from east half. Airfield 3 miles inland from east end. Coast defense guns emplaced near beach.
2.	Series of small beaches divided by rocky headlands.	Largely bathing beaches.	Restricted by rocks. Suitable for small LC only except at extreme west possibly suitable for large LC at high water only		Coastal road to Yokohama. Hilly area. Yokosuka Naval Base beyond hills. Coast defense gun emplacements to south.
3.	3 small beaches: Kaneda-wan, 6 miles Kurihama-wan, 1,100 yds. Otsu-wan, 2600 yds.	Kaneda-wan, sand; others sand and gravel.	Restricted by rocks and shoals. Kaneda-wan suitable for large LC at all tides; others for small LC only.		Yokosuka Naval Base at NW end of Otsu-wan. Roads to Yokohama. Many coast defense installations south of Kaneda-wan and behind Kurihama-wan.
4.	Numerous small beaches	Sand and pebble.	Bottom shelves gently to seaward. Generally suitable for small LC at high water only.		Coastal road and RR near shore. Northern half, slowly rising lowland for five miles inland. Southern half, lowland narrower and largely rice land.
5.	3 Beaches: North, 2.8 miles Center, 2.3 miles South, 3.7 miles	North: Sand, 80 ft wide; gentle slope; cut by 3 streams. Center: Gravel and rocks; up to 80 ft wide; firm; moderate slope. South: Firm sand; 150-200 ft wide; moderate slope; cut by fordable streams. Tidal strip dry at low tide and 200 to 300 feet wide borders each beach. Center and south beaches on opposite shores of peninsula 1 to 2 miles wide.	North: Clear; 30 ft line 1 mile offshore in north to 500 yds in south. Center: Clear to 18 foot line, many scattered rocks inshore. 30 ft line: 700-1000 yds offshore. South: Scattered rocks, reefs, and islets. 30 ft. line 500 (east) to 1000 yds (west) offshore. Generally suitable for small LC at high water only except NW end south beach for large LC at high water.	North: Moderate surf in winter, light in summer. Center: Surf generally light. South: Surf generally heavy. Tidal range, 3 feet.	North and south beaches border rice plains 1 to 2 miles deep. Rice and low hills behind center beach. 400 foot wooded hills behind rice area. Coastal RR from Chiba turns east from north beach. Coastal road from Chiba loops peninsula to connect all beaches. Naval seaplane station between north and center beaches.
6.	Series of small beaches,		In south shelf very gently. Suitable for small LC in spots. Otherwise poor for all LC.		Coastal road and RR near shore. Narrow coastal shelf. Rice fields in south half. Foot-hills behind shelf.
7.	Overall: 35 miles. Broken by streams into 9 segments 3 to 4 miles long except northernmost 7.2 miles long.	200 to 600 ft wide. Sand firm for shore throughout. Backshore soft near streams. Dividing streams are 75 to 150 ft wide and 5 to 10 ft deep.	Clear to 30-ft line. 30 ft line 3.5 miles offshore in north; 2000 yds in center; 2.4 miles in south. 18 ft line 1200 to 1400 yds offshore. Bottom slope 1 in 200. Small LC would probably ground offshore.	Surf fairly heavy in summer, lighter in winter. Outer line of breakers 200 to 300 ft offshore inner line close to shore. Tidal range, 3 to 4 feet.	Backed by broad low plain, approximately 8 miles wide and largely planted in rice. Swampy in south, numerous ponds to north. Many settlements and villages in plain. Extensive inland and lateral road net. Many roads through ricefields on embankments. 5 airfields at 6 to 8 mile intervals, 1 to 6 miles inland. Pine woods areas near streams, Behind plain, upland terraces rise 150 to 200 feet. Edge of terraces gashed by many ravines and gullies.

Beach Area No:	Length	Description:	Approaches:	Surf, Swell and Tide:	Terrain Inland:
8.	Overall: 45 miles.	Northern 15 miles, 200 ft. wide or less; center 200 to 300 ft wide; South, 400 ft wide. Entirely sand. Firm fore-shore; with mild slope back-shore soft near streams. Back shore level in south, ends against bluffs in north. Cut by small fordable streams only. - 1 canal 5 miles south of Koshimo would be an obstacle to lateral movement.	Clear to 30 ft line except for rocks 900 yds offshore at extreme north and south ends and wreck 4 miles from south end. 30 ft line 1200 to 2000 yds offshore; 18ft line 850 to 1100 yds offshore. Bottom slope 1 in 150. small LC would probably ground off-shore.	Surf generally heavy; heaviest in summer. Several lines of breakers. Tidal range 3 to 4 ft.	North 15 miles: Bluffs 100 to 130 feet high within 200 feet of beach. Dry crops on terraced land behind bluffs. 1 air-field on bluff at north end of Kita-ura. Few exits from beach onto bluffs in northern 12 miles; good lateral and inland road net on top of bluffs. Farther south, bluff bends away from beach; 1300 yds from beach in south. Area between beach and bluff partly in rice (in south) and pine woods. Airfields 2 and 4 miles inland south of Kashima. Numerous inland and lateral roads. Tone river and Kita-ura (lake) parallel southern 30 miles of beach at 1 to 5 miles inland. Road bridge across lake at Kashima. Lake Henuma 1 mile inland near north end.
9.	Overall: 7.8 miles. Cut into 2 nearly equal segments by small stream.	150 feet wide. Sand. Fore-shore generally firm; back-shore somewhat soft. Dividing stream believed fordable.	Small projecting rock islet 1100 yds offshore, 1 mile from south end. Reef extends 1 mile off south end. 30 ft line 1 mile offshore except for 1.5 miles south of dividing stream where it is relatively close in. Suitable for small LC at all tides.	Surf always present. Very heavy in summer. Waves break over wide belt. Tidal range, 3 to 4 feet.	North end: Kuji-gawa flows parallel to beach for 1 mile before emptying into sea. Sendai-Tokyo double track RR crosses bridge 1450 yds inland. Town of Kuji near north end. Except near its ends beach is backed by 350 yd wide strip of wind blown sand dunes. In northern half gentle wooded slopes alternating with rice fields rise inland to rolling wooded hills. Behind southern half sandy slopes rise to a gently rolling and partly marshy plateau. Behind southernmost half-mile a belt of ricefields 100 yds wide directly behind beach abuts against a 100 ft bluff. Air-field 1 mile inland from south end; City of Mito 6 miles inland. Except at north and south ends few structures in beach area. Roads and trails in all directions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF WEATHER CONDITIONS
TOKYO AREA - MARCH

1. GENERAL

March is the transitional period between the dry winter months and the wet summer months. The weather is particularly unpleasant; temperatures are around freezing and are frequently accompanied by rain or wet snow. Temperature normally rises from 35°-40° in the morning to 55°-60° in mid-afternoon. Frosts occur at inland places but are rare along the coast. Relative humidity is moderately high, averaging about 70%.

2. PRECIPITATION

In March most of the area has less than 14 rainy days, yielding a total of 4 - 5 inches of rainfall. Year to year variation in rainfall is normally slight but very dry or very wet conditions are possible in abnormal years. Snowfall can be expected once every week or two. The characteristically light snowfall melts quickly.

3. WINDS

Wind speeds are usually moderate. Northerly winds of gentle breeze or lighter forces (less than 13mph) prevail most of the time at the few locations for which data are available. However, at exposed places winds of moderate to strong breeze force (13 to 31 mph) are very frequent.

4. TYPHOONS AND GALES

In an average year, about one typhoon a year passes over or near Southern Honshu during the three months of February, March, or April. The possibility of winds approaching hurricane velocities this month are slight.

5. CLOUDINESS

Cloud coverage averages 8/10 or more on about 30% of the days in early March and about 50% of the days in late March and April. Diurnal variation is slight and irregular.

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6. VISIBILITY

Visibility is usually good throughout this region, with the exception of a few localities. Along most of the coast, fog which reduces visibility below 5/8 mile can be expected on two days or less in March.

7. SEA AND SWELL (Extract from JMC Report No. 6)

The influence of sea and surf in large scale landing operations has been defined as follows:

- Wave Heights
- 0-3 ft.-----favorable
- 3 ft. - 6 ft.-----possible
- 6 ft.-----unfavorable

These definitions are assumed to apply both to landing craft operations and to unloading from ships.

SUMMARY

The following summarizations of weather statistics indicate the monthly variation in wave conditions in the three costal areas:

AREA I
(Mito to Choshi)

	<u>J</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>D</u>
Favorable (waves 0-3')	43%	41%	46%	52%	67%	73%	79%	77%	61%	50%	48%	45%
Possible (waves 3'-6')	34%	31%	28%	20%	22%	18%	14%	15%	20%	26%	30%	34%
Unfavorable (waves 6')	23%	28%	26%	20%	11%	9%	7%	8%	19%	24%	22%	21%


AREA II
(Choshi to Katsuura)

	<u>J</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>D</u>
Favorable (waves 0-3')	49%	50%	51%	49%	63%	73%	79%	77%	61%	50%	48%	45%
Possible (waves 3'-6')	39%	41%	32%	29%	21%	18%	14%	15%	20%	26%	30%	34%
Unfavorable (waves 6')	12%	9%	17%	22%	16%	9%	7%	8%	19%	24%	22%	21%

AREA III
(Katsuura to Sagara)

	<u>J</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>D</u>
Favorable (waves 0-3')	54%	54%	53%	61%	65%	70%	70%	68%	66%	58%	60%	57%

~~SECRET~~



seriously hampered. Rate of unloading cargo over the beach is reduced about one-half.

4-6 feet

LCVP's and other smaller craft are seriously hampered. Many are broached and some are sunk. LCI's and LST's have difficulty. ARA's have difficulty handling men and cargo over the side.

6-7 feet

All amphibious operations are seriously hampered and there is considerable loss of smaller craft. ARA's are seriously hampered in handling men and cargo over the side.

Over 7 feet

Large scale amphibious operations are impracticable. Heavy losses occur in the surf area.

8. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATIC CONDITIONS. (See Chart Incl 5)


(a) Landing Operations and Subsequent Unloading Activity.

A period of 4 - 7 days of good sea conditions for an amphibious operation can be forecast by the Army and Navy Weather Services, and timing of the operation should be initiated on these forecasts.

Frequent periods of poor surf conditions lasting 2 - 3 days will occur during March and April and every advantage that can be gained from sheltered beaches or artificial harbors should be considered.

(b) General Effect of Climate on Ground Operations.

Weather will be extremely variable, temperatures varying from pleasant to quite unpleasant cold wet periods. Frequent periods of inclement weather (cool, rainy, low overcast clouds) will occur, but 48-hour forecasts in this area are quite reliable and forecasting service to tactical ground commanders should prove advantageous in planning the employment of the ground units, especially in regard to the expectancy of close air support and mobility of armored units.



TOKYO PLAIN
 Military Intelligence Section
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
 IN THE PACIFIC
 ENEMY GROUND DISPOSITIONS
 MOBILE COMBAT UNITS
 31 MAY 1945

LEGEND
 ——— ROADS
 + + + SINGLE TRACK R.R.
 = = = DOUBLE TRACK R.R.

136°

140°

36°


36°

35°

35°

139°

140°



ARMY
4/5000 MC
22000 AB+S
 26/27000
 VOLS = 10/12000
 AGG = 36/39000

ARMY
16000 MC
4/5000 B+S
 20/21000
 VOLS = 8/9000
 AGG = 28/30000

BEACH DEF:
 500/1000 ARMY
 8000/9000 VOLS

ARMY
17/18000 MC
8/9000 AB+S
 25/27000
 VOLS = 12/16000
 AGG = 37/43000

ARMY
60/70000 MC
10000 AB+S
 70/80000
 VOLS = ?

ARMY
19/20000 MC
5/6000 AB+S
 24/28000
 VOLS = 16/20000
 AGG = 40/46000

ARMY
19/20000 MC
24000 AB+S
 43/40000
 VOLS = 16/20000
 AGG = 59/64000

BEACH DEF:
 500/1000 ARMY
 7000/8000 VOLS
 7500/9000

ARMY
21/22000 MC
5/6000 AB+S
 26/28000
 VOLS = 16/20000
 AGG = 42/48000

ARMY, NAVY
19/20000 MC
4/5000 MC
19000 NGF
 33/35000
 VOLS = 20/23000
 AGG = 53/60000

ARMY
20/21000 MC
4/5000 AB+S
 24/26000
 VOLS = 16/20000
 AGG = 40/46000


BEACH DEF:
 500/1000 ARMY
 7000/8000 VOLS
 7500/9000

6/8000 MC
17/18000 NGF
1000 B+S
 24/27000

3/4000 MC
9/10000 NGF
 12/14000

TOKYO PLAIN
 Military Intelligence Section
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
 IN THE PACIFIC
 PROBABLE APPROXIMATE
 ENEMY GROUND DISPOSITIONS
 Y - DAY

ROADS
 SINGLE TRACK R.R.
 DOUBLE TRACK R.R.
 SPECIAL AND VOLUNTEER
 DEFENSE UNITS



██████████
 ENEMY AIRFIELDS
 TOKYO-NAGOYA AREA, HONSHU, JAPAN
 31 May 1945

Map Index No.	Name	Runways		Hardstanding Capacity	Type
		No. and Length of longest (ft)			
62	Atsugi	2	5600	Unlimited	AB
53	Chofu	2	3400	Unlimited	AD
71	Choja	L/A	3600	--	LG
52	Choshi	L/A	3100	Unlimited	AD
49	Edogawa	L/A	6100	--	LG
68	Fujisawa	2	3500	320	AD
60	Haneda	2	2720	Unlimited	AB
23	Hokoda	1	4500	Unlimited	AD
20	Hyakurigahara	L/A	4000	Unlimited	AD
5	Iida	L/A	6900	Unlimited	LG
38	Ikisu	2	3400	210	LG
1	Imaichi	1	3900	Unlimited	LG
43	Imba	L/A	3100	Unlimited	AD
39	Irumagawa	L/A	5000	Unlimited	AB
17	Ishioka	L/A	3300	Unlimited	AD
19	Ishioka East	L/A	4250	--	LG
31	Kashima	ample		--	SS
35	Kashiwa	2	6500	Unlimited	AD
26	Kasumigaura	L/A	6000	Unlimited	AB
27	Kasumigaura	ample		--	SS
51	Katori	2	5000	390	AD
9	Kiryu	L/A	5700	Unlimited	AD
65	Kisarazu	4	5500	Unlimited	AB
66	Kisarazu	ample		--	SS
30	Kitaura	ample		--	SS
15	Kodama	L/A	5600	Unlimited	LG
18	Koga	L/A	4000	Unlimited	LG
12	Koizumi	1	5000	Unlimited	AB
34	Konoiike	7	5500	Unlimited	AD
22	Kumagaya	L/A	5600	Unlimited	AD
7	Maebashi	L/A	6100	Unlimited	LG
24	Magechi	1	4800	200	AD
44	Matsudo	2	6600	Unlimited	AB
25	Matsuyama	L/A	5000	Unlimited	LG
4	Mibu	L/A	5000	Unlimited	LG
73	Misaki	1	3800	--	LG
6	Mito	L/A	6000	Unlimited	AD
8	Mito South	L/A	4700	Unlimited	AD
56	Miyakawa	L/A	3400	Unlimited	LG
63	Mobara	3	3900	Unlimited	AD
45	Narimasu	2	5000	Unlimited	AD
58	Naruto	L/A	6700	--	LG
36	Osawa	1	4900	Unlimited	AD
14	Ota	L/A	4600	Unlimited	LG
72	Otawa	2	3600	Unlimited	AD
54	Palace	L/A	3000	--	LG
33	Ryugasaki	2	4500	140	AD
32	Sakado	L/A	5500	Unlimited	AD
13	Sekimoto	L/A	6000	Unlimited	AD
28	Shimazu	ample		--	SS
61	Shimomizu	L/A	5750	Unlimited	AD
55	Shimoshizu	L/A	4600	Unlimited	AD
42	Shirei	L/A	6000	Unlimited	AD
47	Showa	1	3500	Unlimited	AD
48	Tachikawa	1	4500	Unlimited	AB
37	Takahagi	L/A	5500	Unlimited	AB
10	Takasaki	--	--	--	LG
16	Tatebayashi	L/A	4600	Unlimited	AD
74	Tateyama	2	3800	230	AB

Map Index No.	Name	Runways		Hardstanding Capacity	Type
		No. and Length of longest (ft)			
75	Tateyama		ample	---	SS
59	Toko	2	3800	Unlimited	LG
41	Tokorozawa	L/A	6000	Unlimited	AD
67	Tomiooka		ample	---	SS
40	Toyooka	L/A	5800	Unlimited	AD
11	Tsukuba	3	2200	Unlimited	AD
21	Tsukuba West	L/A	6000	Unlimited	AD
2	Utsunomiya	1	5000	Unlimited	AD
3	Utsunomiya So.	L/A	6100	Unlimited	AD
50	Yachimata	L/A	6000	Unlimited	AD
29	Yatabe	L/A	5600	Unlimited	AB
64	Yokohama		ample	---	SS
69	Yokosuka	2	3920	330	AB
70	Yokosuka		ample	---	SS
46	Yokota	2	6500	340	AB
57	Yomiuri	1	1640	---	*

AB AIRBASE -Major bases for combat and/or training units with hangars and permanent buildings; facilities for rear echelon maintenance and often with major supply Depot; includes aircraft plant fields.


AD AIRDROME-Permanent bases for combat and/or training units; facilities for 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance; may function as satellites of airbases, as forward combat bases or as staging fields.


LG LANDING GROUND-Operational but not used as permanent bases for combat units; limited facilities for fueling and minor repairs; function largely as staging fields or as satellites of airbases and airdromes.

SS SEAPLANE STATION-Fully equipped seaplane facility

* INACTIVE AIRFIELD-Airfields no longer tenable by the enemy or abandoned for any reason; includes decoy fields

L/A-Landing Area or entire airfield hard surfaced with no well defined runways. Length given for L/A runway is the dimension of the longest side of the airfield.





**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA**
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

ENEMY NAVAL DISPOSITIONS
31 MAY 1945

C-IN-C COMBINED FLEET
C-IN-C 1ST STRIKING FLEET (COMDR. 3RD FLEET)
COMDR. 2ND FLEET
COMDR. 5TH FLEET

NORTHEAST AREA FORCE
5TH FLEET, 12TH AIR FLEET
OMINATO - HQ N.E. AREA FORCE

- | | |
|----|--------|
| 1 | BB |
| 2 | XCV-BB |
| 2 | CV |
| 2 | CVL |
| 2 | CVE |
| 3 | CA |
| 2 | CL |
| 30 | DD (5) |
| 8 | DE |
| 53 | SS |

1 BB
5 DD

2 CV
4 DD

COMDR. 5TH AREA FORCE
3RD SO. EXP. FLEET

4TH FLEET, 14TH AIR FLEET

MARIANAS
2 SS

LEGEND

- BB - BATTLESHIP
- XCV-BB - A/C CARRIER (PARTIALLY CONVTD. BB)
- CV - A/C CARRIER, LARGE
- CVL - A/C CARRIER, LIGHT
- CVE - A/C CARRIER, ESCORT
- CA - HEAVY CRUISER, MARSHALL ISLANDS
- CL - LIGHT CRUISER
- DD - DESTROYER
- DE - DESTROYER ESCORT
- SS - SUBMARINE

() - SHIPS DAMAGED OR DOCKING
(I.E. TOTAL INCLUDING FIGURES
IN PARENS IS ON LEFT SIDE)

NOTE: DIVERSION ATTACK FORCES ARE TASK FORCES
FORMED FOR SPECIFIC TACTICAL MISSIONS AS REQUIRED
AND MAY COMPRISE ANY COMBINATION OF UNITS OF DESIRED
CLASSIFICATION AND DRAWN FROM ANY FLEET OR COMBINATION
OF FLEETS IN WHICH THEY ARE MOST READILY AVAILABLE.

1ST SO. EXP. FLEET
10TH AREA FLEET
13TH AIR FLEET

3 CA(2)
1 DD
1 SS


SOUTHWEST AREA FORCE

2ND SO. EXP. FLEET

SOUTHEAST AREA FORCE
8TH FLEET, 11TH AIR FLEET

2 SS

ANNEX 3b(1)(a)
STAFF STUDY
"CORONET"
ORGANIZATION
OF
FORCES



NOTE:
DIVISIONS ARE AVAILABLE IN U.S. TO PERMIT REINFORCEMENTS IN OBJECTIVE AREA AT RATE OF 4 PER MONTH ARRIVING IN MAY 1945.

INDEX

ESTIMATE OF TROOP REQUIREMENTS

"COROMET"

- PART I.....SUMMARY OF EASTERN FORCE - "Y"-DAY ASSAULT LIFT
- PART II.....SUMMARY OF WESTERN FORCE - "Y"-DAY ASSAULT LIFT
- PART III.....SUMMARY OF EASTERN FORCE - "Y"/30 LIFT
- PART IV.....SUMMARY OF WESTERN FORCE - "Y"/30 LIFT
- PART V.....SUMMARY OF AFPAC RESERVE - "Y"/35 LIFT
- PART VI.....SUMMARY OF "SHORT TURN-AROUND" (KYUSHU) - ("Y"/15) to ("Y"/60) LIFT
- PART VII.....SUMMARY OF REAR ECHELONS - "Y"/60 LIFT
- PART VIII.....RECAPITULATION OF TOTAL FORCES REQUIRED
- PART IX.....RECAPITULATION - AMPHIBIOUS LIFTS vs ASSAULT SHIPPING

~~RESTRICTED~~

SUMMARY

EASTERN FORCES

"Y"-DAY ASSAULT

GROUND COMBAT.....	153,782	16,786	173,086
GROUND SERVICE.....	73,177	13,994	120,135
AIR COMBAT.....	2,901	1,080	6,866
AIR SERVICE.....	<u>11,466</u>	<u>2,405</u>	<u>17,236</u>
TOTAL	241,326	34,265	317,323

~~RESTRICTED~~

EASTERN FORCE "Y" - Div ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Army Hq & Hq Co Sp Tps	1,330	78	600	12	730	66	492 *
1 Cav Gp Hq & Y Co	98	24	98	24	-	-	-
3 Cav Ron Sq	2,229	720	1,486	480	743	240	1,553 *
1 TD Co Fq & Hq Co	76	21	76	21	-	-	-
2 Amphib Tank Pl	1,496	248	1,452	224	44	24	80
4 Pa Gp Hq & Hq Btry	376	132	-	-	376	132	440 *
3 8" Gun Bn	1,461	399	-	-	1,461	399	5,556 *
3 8" How Bn	1,767	423	-	-	1,767	423	4,926 *
3 240 How Bn	1,461	399	-	-	1,461	399	5,520 *
3 105 How Bn (SP)	1,560	492	-	-	1,560	492	5,400 *
1 4.5 Rocket Bn	684	262	547	197	137	65	313 *
1 AAA Brig Hq	80	18	78	16	2	2	16
2 AAA Gp Hq	130	32	126	28	4	4	26
2 AAA Cos Det	84	12	84	12	-	-	-
1 Gun Bn SM	616	106	595	95	21	11	159
2 Gun Lt M Co	1,418	434	1,406	422	12	12	306
1 AW Bn SM	793	134	760	130	33	4	300

GROUND COMBAT

SECRET

UNIT NAME	TOTALS		ASSAULT ELEMENT		FOLLOW-UP ELEMENTS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
3 AW Bn SF	2,055	699	2,000	674	55	25	237
1 SL Bn	797	163	791	157	6	6	87
1 AAA Cpt Hq Btry (F)	150	15	148	13	2	2	6
4 AAA Bn (F)	5,040	1,064	5,000	1,050	40	14	316
2 Engr Comb Gp Hq & En Co	160	48	80	24	80	24	54
3 Engr Comb Lt	5,096	1,544	2,548	772	2,548	772	3,940 *
1 Engr Comb Gp Hq & En Co	80	24	80	24	-	-	-
2 Light Equip Co	236	172	118	86	118	86	695 *
2 Maint Jc	382	168	191	84	191	84	1,037 *
6 Rigid Boat Co	1,278	894	639	447	639	447	4,740 *
3 Panel Bridge Co	384	171	256	114	128	57	355 *
2 Water Supply Co	272	124	136	62	136	62	242 *
2 Depot Co	418	86	209	43	209	43	299 *
1 Camflw Co	67	22	60	20	7	2	6
1 Topo Bn	426	100	-	-	426	100	530 *
1 Tech Intel Team	9	4	9	4	-	-	-
1 Hq & Hq Co L&SB	292	53	283	46	9	7	30
2 Engr Comb Gp Hq & Hq Co (Shore)	160	48	160	48	-	-	-

~~RESTRICTED~~

EASTERN FORCE "W"-DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS			ASSAULT ECHELON			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
6 Engr Comb Bn (Core)	3,822	1,158	5,910	3,800	1,140	5,800	22	18	110
1 Sig Serv Co	73	-	19	73	-	19	-	-	-
1 Sig Gpns Co	547	151	440	439	142	390	108	9	50
1 Sig Mv Const Bn	193	133	279	193	133	279	-	-	-
1 Sig Photo Co	147	59	174	141	58	168	6	1	6
1 Sig A.I. Co	247	66	351	237	65	344	10	1	7
1 Sig Flgn Co	152	90	192	152	90	192	-	-	-
2 Fwd Aircraft Control Tn	8	6	6	8	6	6	-	-	-
Corps Hq & Svc Co	398	44	212	260	36	119	78	8	93
3 Inf Div	42,135	6,336	48,300	39,702	4,500	33,810	8,433	1,336	14,490
3 TD Bn	2,013	576	5,424	1,812	498	5,133	201	73	291
7 Amphib Trac Bn	3,514	994	15,589	1,972	564	8,884	1,542	430	6,705 *
3 Cal Mortar Bn	2,016	795	3,126	1,076	424	1,176	940	371	1,650 *
1 Engr Comb Hq & Hq Co	80	24	54	80	24	54	-	-	-
3 Engr Comb Lt	1,911	579	2,955	1,900	570	2,900	11	9	55
1 Light Engr Co	118	86	695	110	80	665	8	6	30
1 Tread Bridge Co	138	84	1,037	130	79	1,000	8	5	37
1 Paint Co	191	72	356	186	69	349	5	3	7

RESTRICTED

FORCE WITH-DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT BOHEION		FOLLOW-UP BOHEIONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
1 Topo Co Corps	118	29	197	-	-	-	118	29	197 *
1 Tech Intell Co	9	4	14	4	4	14	-	-	-
3 JASCOs	1,626	282	750	1,626	282	750	-	-	-
1 Sig In Corps	780	286	883	709	273	836	71	13	47
1 Corpi Arty Hq rtry	112	33	128	90	25	81	22	8	47
2 Bn 155 How	1,030	302	2,804	824	226	2,020	206	76	784
1 Bn 155 Gun	513	149	1,258	415	120	880	98	29	369
1 Obsn Bn	446	113	521	357	85	403	89	28	118
3 Tank Bn	2,337	654	9,852	2,121	546	9,276	216	108	576
9 Fwd Aircraft Conul Tr	36	18	18	36	18	18	-	-	-
Amphib Corps Lt & Hq Co (Lt)	1,180	52	933	1,062	47	850	118	5	83
3 Mar Div (M)	52,938	6,699	62,871	42,460	5,020	47,160	10,478	1,679	15,711
3 TD Bn	2,013	576	5,424	1,812	498	5,133	201	78	291
4 Amphib Trac Bn (Lt)	2,008	568	8,898	1,506	426	6,670	502	142	2,228 *
2 Armc Amphib Trac Bn (Lt)	1,496	248	5,042	1,486	240	4,800	10	8	242
3 Cal Mort In	2,016	795	3,126	1,076	424	1,476	940	371	1,650 *
1 Engr Comb Hq & H1 Co	80	24	54	80	24	54	-	-	-
1 Light Equip Co	118	86	695	110	80	665	8	6	30

EASTERN FORCE "YU-DA" ASSAULT	TOTALS			ASSAULT ECHELON			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
3 Engr Comb Bn	1,911	579	2,955	1,900	570	2,900	11	9	55
1 Maint Co	191	72	356	186	69	349	5	3	7
1 Tread Bridge Co	138	84	1,037	130	79	1,000	8	5	37
1 Tech Intell Tm	9	4	14	9	4	14	-	-	-
2 JASCOs (M)	1,004	168	644	1,004	168	644	-	-	-
1 Art'y Hq & Hc Btry (I)	151	27	132	146	23	120	5	4	12
2 Bn 155 How (M)	1,030	302	2,804	824	226	2,020	206	76	784
1 Bn 155 Gun (M)	513	149	1,258	415	120	889	98	29	369
1 Obs. Pt.	446	113	521	357	85	403	89	28	118
9 Fwd Aircraft (M)	36	18	18	36	18	18	-	-	-
1 Sig Bn Corps (M)	780	286	833	709	273	836	71	13	47
Military Govt Units (Estimated)	2,000	200	3,000	2,000	300	3,000	-	-	-
Initial Overstrength & Replacement	24,000	-	-	24,000	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL EASTERN COIDAT "YU-DA"	191,669	33,506	279,662	153,782	23,980	194,668	37,887	9,526	84,994

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

~~SECRET~~

ARMY FORCE	Y/30-DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
		Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
	GROUND COMBAT "Y"-DAY	191,669	33,506	279,662	153,782	25,980	194,668
	Less 30% vehicles, carried on Y/30 lift)					- 7,194	- 21,582
	GROUND COMBAT ASSAULT LIFT "Y"-DAY				153,782	16,786	173,066
	TOTAL ASSAULT ECHELON				37,887	9,526	64,994
	(less Total of "X" units, carried on "Y/30" lift)				- 16,672	5,210	48,466
	REAR ECHELON FOLLOW-UP FOR "Y/60"				21,215	4,316	36,526

EASTERN FORCE "YU-DAI ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELON				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ALIY									
Adjutant General									
1 MRU (Type Y)	48	14	69						
1 MRU (Type Z)	68	12	90						
Chemical									
1 Proc Co	140	7	163						
1 Decon Co	163	39	203						
1 Depot Co	155	14	121						
Engineer									
1 Hq & Hq Co Const Brig	109	34	90						
2 Hq & Hq Co Const Gr	188	48	220						
6 Const Bn	5,400	1,368	12,000						
2 Base Equip Co	346	302	2,252						
4 Dp Trk Co	524	228	1,668						
2 Maint Co	382	144	888						
2 Pet Dist Co	432	110	700						
1 Parts Sup Plat	57	15	137						
1 Map Dep Det	12	2	11						
1 Model Making Det.	19	-	10						

EASTERN FORCE 72-HOUR ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
Engineer (continued)						
4 S/L Maint Det			12	8		40
1 Surv In Det			15	2		15
1 Util Det (ED)			41	8		102
3 Naval CI (M)			3,415	726		7,550
Medical						
1 Hq & Hq Det Cn			34	7		28
1 Hq & Hq Jet Bn			28	8		32
3 Coll Co			303	60		273
3 Clrg Co			336	63		336
2 Amb Co			180	72		270
1 Depot Co			133	23		123
3 Mal Contl Unit			36	24		75
2 Mal Surv Unit			26	8		22
6 Port Sur J Hosp			222	24		150
6 Evac Hosp			1,716	282		1,824
1 Field Hosp (400)			222	23		187
1 Army Lab			53	15		82

SECRET

EASTERN FORCE UNIT-DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Medical (continued)									
1 Gen Disp (Type L)				38	5	30			
2 Evac Hosp (F)				500	80	540			
1 Med Bn (V)				337	73	774			
Military Police									
1 Esc Guard Co				135	8	126			
1 PW Proc Co				116	14	91			
2 Crim Inv Tm				30	8	24			
1 MP Bq (M)				355	41	375			
Miscellaneous									
9 CIC Det				144	81	153			
7 OCB Tm				21	14	21			
14 Photo Inter Tm				98	28	98			
Ordnance									
1 Hq & Hq Det Gp				51	12	38			
4 Hq & Hq Det Bn				132	16	104			
3 MM Co				486	138	654			
1 Hvy Maint Co (FA)				190	33	333			

EASTERN FORCE "Y"-DASH ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Ordnance (continued)									
6 Amm Co				1,074	84	666			
2 Hvy Maint Co (Trk)				404	66	676			
2 Depot Co				360	56	468			
3 Maint Co				348	108	498			
2 AAA Maint Co				314	76	382			
1 Evac Co				116	37	444			
5 Bomb Disp Sq				35	15	60			
1 Amm Renov Plat (M)				68	18	61			
3 Amm Co (M)				774	81	795			
Quartermaster									
3 Hq & Hq Det Bn (MFL)				60	3	36			
4 Hq & Hq Det Bn				60	3	36			
8 Trk Co (w/dir tm)				1,072	832	2,704			
2 Gas Sup Co				250	58	364			
3 Rhd Co				531	24	339			
1 Dep Sup Co				186	8	116			
4 Serv Co				848	16	532			

EASTERN FORCE "YU-DAY ASSAULT (Quartermaster (continued))	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons
2 Bkry Co			320	224	32	
1 Gr Reg Co			265	280	43	
1 Ldry Co			267	244	38	
6 Depot Co (in)			744	792	-	
1 Lt Bn (in)			624	2,000	397	
1 Serv Regt (in)			1,893	7,000	719	
4 Ldry Plat (in)			248	608	32	
2 Bkry Plat (in)			82	135	-	
Signal						
2 Hvy Const Bn			874	2,100	374	
1 Lt Const Bn			436	800	169	
2 Depot Co			286	320	42	
1 Repair Co			159	260	55	
1 Photo Bn (Det)			100	60	50	
6 Rad Maint Unit			30	60	24	
1 Photo Co			148	50	41	
1 RI Co			247	265	66	

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	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
EASTERN FORCE "YU-DAY ASSAULT						
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ARMY			30,671	7,808		
(less 20% vehicles delayed for "Y-60" lift)				(-1,562)		
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ARMY			30,671	6,246		
GROUND SERVICE ARMY						
Adjutant General						
3 APU (Type F)			36	3		21
1 MRU (Type Z)			68	12		90
1 Post Reg Caa			31	3		19
Engineer						
1 Hq & Hq Co Const Brig			109	34		90
1 Hq & Hq Co PG&R			272	68		960
1 Hq & Hq Co Base Rep			135	9		70
1 Eng Avn Regt (-3 Bns)			273	70		125
6 Gen Serv Regt			7,446	1,356		14,400
6 Avn Bn			4,662	1,620		12,690
1 Base Equip Co			173	151		1,126
2 Depot Co			418	86		780
3 Dp Trk Co (w/dr tra)			393	171		1,251

EASTERN FORCE WYNDAL ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHLON		FOLLOW-UP ECHLONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Medical (continued)						
1 Blood Trans Im	15	-	7			
Military Police						
2 MP En (Z/I)	1,298	160	1,084			
1 MP Co (Z/I)	156	17	135			
Ordnance						
1 Tire Ren Det (Mbl.)	16	9	35			
Quartermaster						
2 Hq & Hq Let Cmp	74	14	62			
4 Hq & Hq Det En (Mbl.)	80	4	48			
4 Hq & Hq Det Bn	80	4	48			
17 Trx Co (w/dr tm)	2,278	1,768	5,746			
1 Gas Sup Co	125	29	182			
21 Serv Co	4,452	84	2,793			
1 Bkry Co	160	16	112			
1 Refr Co (1bl)	103	70	400			
2 Pet Lab (Mbl.)	12	1	22			
1 Pet Trk Co	117	92	498			

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EASTERN FORCE "YU-DAL ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Signal									
4 Hvy Const Bn				1,748	748	4,200			
2 Serv Bn				1,800	300	1,000			
4 Hvy Const Co				772	296	1,880			
2 Serv Co				440	100	400			
2 Repair Co				318	110	520			
2 Base Dep Co				256	34	200			
1 Base Maint Co				317	11	210			
2 Oper Co				508	128	580			
1 RI Co				247	66	265			
Transportation									
2 Hq & Hq Co Ampl. Lrk Bn				56	10	40			
6 Hq & Hq Det Fort Bn				138	30	114			
9 Amph Trk Co				1,620	486	3,600			
25 Port Co				5,475	100	2,825			
1 Serv Harb Craft Co				314	6	185			
1 Traf Reg Co				325	50	625			
1 Amph Trk En (M)				667	205	3,964			

	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Total Tons
EASTERN FORCE "Y"-DAY ASSAULT			558	255		
Transportation (continue);						
3 Amph Trk Co (M)				3,870		
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ASSOCI			42,506	9,685		74,165
(less 2% vehicles delayed for "Y/60" lift)				1,937		5,811
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ASSOCI			42,506	7,748		68,354
TOTAL SERVICE ASSAULT LIFT "Y"-DAY			73,177	13,994		120,135

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EASTERN FORCE "YU-DAI ASSAULT"	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
AIR COMBAT			
2 Fiter Gps		424 2,162	2,946
2 Fiter Gps (M)		402 1,854	1,536
1 Mite Fiter Sq		59 288	343
2 Mite Fiter Sq (M)		134 536	512
3 Tac Recn Sq (A-6)		138 846	1,278
1 Air Sea Res Sq		12 421	214
1 Liaison Cp		32 420	400
TOTAL AIR COMBAT	(Air Lift)	1,201 2,901	7,229
(less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y/60"		121 363	
TOTAL AIR COMBAT		1,080 2,901	6,866
AIR SERVICE			
1 Combat Air Cmd Hq		50 340	115
1 Med Disp (Avn)		7 28	52
1 Port Surg Hosp		4 37	43
3 Crd Bomb Disp Sqd		9 21	36
1 Crd Ammo Co		66 - 179	282

EASTERN FORCE HUI-DAI ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT BATTALION		FOLLOW-UP OPERATIONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
5 Ord S&H Co			390	150		
2 CA Co (53)			162	32		
5 CA Truck Co			510	350		
1 Serv Gp Hq			205	54		
1 Air Cargo Cont Sgdn			246	34		
2 Air Cargo Resupply Sgdn			185	12		
2 Air Serv Sgdn			490	190		
3 Airdrome Sgdn			819	240		
1 Air Combat Cont Sgdn (Amph)			37	-		
1 Depot Unit Army			39	21		
1 Cent BALO Office			25	8		
1 LAIO Team			55	20		
1 Emerg Rescue Boat Sgdn			314	9		
1/3 Weather Det			200	40		
1/3 AACS Det			140	30		
6 MP Co			750	246		
1 SIG Bn CAC (Sep)			690	154		
1 Combat Air Comm Sgdn			219	43		
1 SIG Const Co (H)			193	55		
					Total Tons	Total Tons
					790	214
					1,360	241
					301	282
					1,234	1,392
					-	-
					116	40
					100	295
					150	150
					250	250
					1,326	814
					182	182
					252	252

EASTERN FORCE "Y"-DAL ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
1 Aircraft Cont & Warn Gp				2,050	753	3,955			
2 Radar Cal Det				70	AIRBORNE				
Sig Serv Aug Tms				150	-	-			
1 Sig Co (SG)				100	19	134			
1 Hq Marine Bde				781	135	1,371			
3 MAC Medrons				802	81	1,341			
3 MAC Hervons				1,239	195	2,814			
TOTAL AIR SERVICE				11,466	3,007	19,042			
(less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y60")									
TOTAL AIR SERVICE				11,466	2,405	17,236			

	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
EASTERN FORCE "YU-DAY ASSAULT						
TOTAL AIR COMBAT ASSAULT LIFT	2,901	1,080	6,866			
TOTAL AIR SERVICE ASSAULT LIFT	11,466	2,405	17,236			
TOTAL AIR FORCE ASSAULT LIFT "YU-DAY	14,367	3,493	24,102			

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SUMMARY

WESTERN FORCES

10th-DAY ASSAULT

GROUND COMBAT.....	203,434	23,141	275,143
GROUND SERVICE.....	88,656	13,661	110,196
AIR COMBAT.....	1,150	314	2,798
AIR SERVICE.....	<u>7,764</u>	<u>1,934</u>	<u>11,648</u>
TOTAL	301,004	38,550	399,785

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WESTERN FORCE "YU-DAY" ASSAULT	TOTALS			ASSAULT ECHELON			FOLLOW-UP ECHELON		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND COMBAT									
Army Hq & Hq Co Sp Tps	1,330	78	892	600	12	400	730	66	492
1 Cav Gp Hq & Hq Co	98	24	175	98	24	175	-	-	-
4 Cav Tol Sq	2,972	960	6,212	1,486	480	3,106	1,486	480	3,106
1 TD Gp Hq & Hq Co	76	21	91	76	21	91	-	-	-
1 Amph Tank Bn	748	124	2,521	726	112	2,481	22	12	40
5 FA Tp Hq & Hq Co	495	165	550	-	-	-	495	165	550
5 8" How Bn	2,945	705	8,210	-	-	-	2,945	705	8,210
4 240 How Bn	1,948	532	7,360	-	-	-	1,948	532	7,360
6 105 How Bn	2,940	924	8,236	-	-	-	2,940	924	8,236
1 4.5 Rocket Bn	684	262	1,414	547	197	1,101	137	65	313
1 AAA Brig Hq	80	18	67	78	16	51	2	2	16
3 AAA Gp Hq	195	48	150	189	42	111	6	6	39
1 AAA Gps Det	42	12	47	42	12	47	-	-	-
2 Gun En Sqr	1,232	212	1,958	1,191	190	1,640	41	22	318
2 Gun Bn Lot	1,418	434	2,729	1,406	422	2,423	12	12	306
6 AW Bn Sqr	4,758	804	7,140	4,560	780	5,340	198	24	1,800
2 AW Bn SP	1,370	466	2,558	1,334	450	2,400	36	16	158

WESTERN FORCE	TOTALS	TOTALS		ASSEMBLY DETACHMENT		FOLLOW-UP ELEMENTS			
		Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles
1 SL Bn	797	163	1,845	791	157	1,758	6	6	87
2 Engr Comb Gp Hq & Ig Co	160	48	108	80	24	54	60	24	54
3 Engr Comb Bn	5,096	1,544	7,860	2,548	772	3,940	2,548	772	3,940 *
1 Engr Comb Gp Hq	80	24	54	80	24	54	-	-	-
2 Light Equip Co	236	172	1,390	118	86	695	118	86	695 *
2 Light Co	362	168	2,074	191	84	1,037	191	84	1,037 *
6 Rapid Boat Co	1,278	894	9,480	639	447	4,740	639	447	4,740 *
3 Panel Bridge Co	304	171	1,065	256	114	710	128	57	355 *
2 Depot Co	418	86	598	209	43	299	209	43	299 *
2 Water Supply Co	272	124	484	136	62	242	136	62	242
1 Camflge Co	67	22	66	60	20	60	7	2	6
1 Topo Bn	426	100	530	-	-	-	426	100	530 *
1 Tech Intell Team	9	4	14	9	4	14	-	-	-
3 ESB	22,659	3,309	48,597	21,849	3,021	47,944	810	288	653
1 Sig Serv Co	73	-	19	73	-	19	-	-	-
1 Sig Opus Bn	547	151	440	439	142	390	108	9	50
1 Sig Nvy Const Bn	193	133	279	193	133	279	-	-	-
1 Sig Photo Co	147	59	174	141	58	168	6	1	6

TOTALS

WESTERN FORCE "WU-DAI" ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
1 Sig RI Co	247	66	351	237	65	344	10	1	7
1 Sig Pign Co	152	90	192	152	90	192	-	-	-
3 Fwd Aircraft Control Teams	12	6	6	12	6	6	-	-	-
Corps Hq & Hq Co	338	44	212	260	36	119	78	8	93
3 Inf Div	42,135	6,336	48,300	33,702	4,500	33,810	8,433	1,836	14,490
3 TD Bn	2,013	576	5,424	1,812	496	5,133	201	78	291
3 Amphib Trac Bn	1,506	426	6,681	1,004	284	4,454	502	142	2,227 *
3 Cml Bort Lt	2,016	795	3,126	1,076	424	1,476	940	371	1,650 *
1 Engr Comd Hq & Hq Co	80	24	54	80	24	54	-	-	-
3 Engr Comb Bn	1,911	579	7,955	1,900	570	2,900	11	9	55
1 Light Equip Co	118	66	695	110	80	665	8	6	30
1 Tread Bridge Co	138	84	1,037	130	79	1,000	8	5	37
1 Maint Co	191	72	356	186	69	349	5	3	7
1 Topo Co Corps	118	29	197	-	-	-	118	29	197 *
1 Tech Intell Bn	9	4	14	9	4	14	-	-	-
3 JASCOs	1,626	282	750	1,626	282	750	-	-	-
1 Sig Bn Corps	780	286	883	709	273	836	71	13	47
1 Corps Art Hq Btry	112	33	128	90	25	81	22	8	47

WESTERN FORCE UNITARY ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
3 JASCOs	1,626	282	750	1,626	282	750	--	--	--
1 Sig Bn Corps	780	286	883	709	273	836	71	13	47
1 Corps Art'y Hq & Hq Btry	112	33	128	90	25	81	22	8	47
2 Bn 155 How	1,030	302	2,804	824	226	2,020	206	76	784
1 Bn 155 Gun	513	149	1,258	415	120	889	98	29	369
1 Ctsn Bn	446	113	521	357	85	403	89	28	118
9 Fwd Aircraft Contl Teams	36	18	18	36	18	18	--	--	--
Corps Hq & Hq Co (Armd)	338	44	212	260	36	119	78	8	93
1 Inf Div	14,045	2,112	16,100	11,254	1,500	11,270	2,811	612	4,830
2 Armd Div	21,996	5,608	66,888	21,336	4,832	65,158	660	776	1,730
1 TD Bn	671	192	1,808	604	166	1,711	67	26	97
1 Cnl Fort En	672	265	1,042	642	255	1,002	30	10	40
2 Engr Conl Hq & Hq Co	160	48	108	80	24	54	80	24	54
6 Engr Comb Bn	3,822	1,158	5,910	1,911	579	2,955	1,911	579	2,955*
1 Light Equip Co	118	86	695	110	80	665	8	6	30
3 Tree' Pridge Jo	414	264	3,111	260	158	2,000	154	106	1,111*
1 Maint Co	191	72	356	186	69	349	5	3	7
1 Sig Bn Corps	780	286	883	709	273	836	71	13	47

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WESTERN FORCE "Y"-DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
1 Tech Intell Tn.	9	4	14	9	4	14	--	--	--
1 Corps Hq & Hq Lorry	112	33	128	90	25	81	22	8	47
3 Bn 155 Gnr (SF)	1,464	345	4,059	1,170	258	2,954	294	87	1,105
1 Cosn En	446	113	521	357	85	403	89	28	116
2 Fwd Aircraft Contl Tn	36	18	18	36	18	18	--	--	--
Military Govt (Estmac)	3,000	300	4,500	3,000	300	4,500	--	--	--
Initial Overstrength & Replacements	28,000	--	--	28,000	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL WESTERN COMBAT "Y"-DAY (less 30% vehicles, carried on "Y/30" lift)	248,146	45,855	402,839	203,434	33,058	304,894	44,712	12,797	97,945
TOTAL GROUND COMBAT ASSAULT LIFT "Y"-DAY				203,434	23,141	275,143			
TOTAL ASSAULT REAR ECHELON (less Total of "X" units, carried on "Y/30" lift)							44,712	12,797	97,945
REAR ECHELON FOLLOW-UP FOR "Y"/60"							18,502	5,750	48,658
							26,210	7,047	49,287

WESTERN FORCE UNIT - D.I. ASSAULT	DIVISION		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ARMY						
Adjutant General						
2 ARU (Type Y)	96		28	138		
1 ARU (Type Z)	68		12	90		
Chemical						
1 Proc Co	140		7	163		
2 Decon Co	326		78	406		
1 Depot Co	155		14	121		
Engineer						
1 Hq & Hq Co Const Bn	109		34	90		
2 Hq & Hq Co Const Co	188		48	220		
6 Const Bn	5,400		1,368	12,000		
2 Base Equip Co	346		302	2,252		
4 Dp Trk Co	524		228	1,668		
2 Maint Co	382		144	880		
2 Pet Dist Co	432		110	700		
1 Parts Sup Plat Sep	57		15	137		
1 Map Dep Det	12		2	11		
1 Model Making Det	19		--	10		

WESTERN FORCE "VI-D-1" ASSAULT	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
GROUND SERVICE ARTY	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
Engineer (continued)			
4 S/L Maint Det	12	8	40
1 Surv In Det	15	2	15
1 Util Det (ED)	41	3	102
Medical			
1 Hq & Hq Det Gp	34	7	28
2 Hq & Eq Det Bn	56	16	64
9 Coll Co	909	180	819
9 Cllrg Co	1,008	189	1,008
3 Amb Co	270	108	405
1 Depot Co	133	23	123
9 1st Contl Unit	108	72	225
2 Mal Surv Unit	26	8	22
9 Port Surg Hosp	333	36	225
9 Evac Hosp (ST)	2,574	423	2,736
3 Field Hosp (400)	666	69	561
1 Army Lab	53	15	82
1/2 Aug Surg Cp	189	--	84

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
WESTERN FORCE "Y"-LAV ASSAULT GROUND SERVICE ARMY Medical (continued)	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons
1 Gen Disp (Type Z)	38		5	30		
Military Police						
2 Esc Guard Co	270		16	253		
1 PW Prcc Co	116		14	91		
3 Crim Inv Tm	45		12	36		
Miscellaneous						
15 CIC Lets	240		135	255		
10 COB Tm	30		20	30		
20 Photo Inter M.	140		40	140		
Ordnance						
1 Hq & Hq Det Gr	51		12	38		
5 Hq & Hq Det Bn	165		20	130		
7 MM Co	1,134		322	1,526		
2 HV7 Maint Co (FA)	380		66	666		
9 Arml Co	1,611		126	999		
4 HV7 Maint Co (TK)	808		132	1,352		

WESTERN FORCE "VI-D" ASSAULT	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
PERSONNEL	VEHICLES	PERSONNEL	PERSONNEL
VEHICLES	TOTAL TONS	VEHICLES	TOTAL TONS
TOTAL TONS	TOTAL TONS	TOTAL TONS	TOTAL TONS
GROUND SERVICE ARMY			
Ordnance (continued)			
3 Depot Co	84	702	
4 MAM Co	144	664	
2 AAA Maint Co	76	382	
2 Evac Co	74	888	
12 Bomb Disp Sq	84	144	
Quartermaster			
3 Hq & Hq Let Bn (P-1)	60	36	
3 Hq & Hq Det L.	60	36	
13 Trk Co (w/dr tr),	1,742	1,352	4,394
3 Gas Sup Co	375	87	546
4 Rhd Co	708	32	452
1 Dep Sup Co	186	8	116
1 Salv Coll Jo	204	25	275
12 Serv Co	2,544	46	1,596
3 Entry Co	480	48	336
3 Cr Reg Co	795	129	840
3 Idry Co	801	114	732

WESTERN FORCE "YU-D" ASSAULT GROUND SERVICE ARMY	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Signal									
2 Hvy Const Bn				874	374	2,100			
1 Lt Const Bn				436	169	800			
1 Serv Co (RCM)				179	100	500			
2 Depot Co				286	42	320			
1 Repair Co				159	55	260			
2 Photo Pn (Det)				200	100	120			
9 Rad Maint Unit				45	36	90			
1 Photo Co				148	41	50			
1 RI Co				247	66	265			
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ARMY				31,242	7,720	47,614			
(less 20% vehicles, delayed until "Y-60")					1,544	4,632			
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ARMY				31,242	6,176	42,982			
GROUND SERVICE ARMY									
Adjutant General				108	9	63			
9 APU (Type I)				136	24	180			
2 MRU (Type Z)									

WESTERN FORCE "YU-DAY ASSAULT"	TOTALS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	ASSAULT ECHELON Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ASSOCIATION			
Adjutant General (continued)			
1 Post Reg Sta		31	19
Engineer			
1 Hq & Hq Co Const Bn		109	90
1 Hq & Hq Co Recon Gr		272	960
1 Hq & Hq Co Base Dep		135	70
1 Avn Regt (-3 Bns)		273	125
6 Gen Serv Regt		7,446	14,400
4 Avn Bn		3,108	8,460
1 Const Bn		900	2,000
1 Base Equip Co		173	1,126
4 Depot Co		836	1,560
4 Dp Trk Co		524	1,668
2 Lt Equip Co		236	1,500
2 Maint UC		382	880
1 Maint Co (Avn)		191	440
1 Parts Sup Co		174	310
1 Pet Dist Co		216	350

WESTERN FORCE WY-1-Y ASSAULT	TOTALS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	ASSAULT ECHELON Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ASCOM			
Engineer (continued)			
1 Water Sup Co		62	300
4 Fire Ftg Det		20	180
1 Gas Gen Det		5	55
1 Power Plt Oper Det		--	6
1 Power Line Maint Det		2	8
3 Port Pap Ship		--	--
1 Reprod Det		3	16
1 Well Drilling Det		5	50
Medical			
1 Gas Treat Bn		92	494
6 Field Hosp (400)		138	1,122
2 Sta Hosp (250)		20	352
2 Sta Hosp (500)		28	558
1 Blood Trans Bn		--	7
1 Gen Disp (Type Z)		5	30
Military Police			
2 MP Bn (Z/I)		160	1,084


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WESTERN FORCE "W" - MY ASSAULT GROUND SERVICE ASSCEN	TOTALS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	ASSAULT ECHELON Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	COLLOUP ECHELONS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
Military Police (continued)			
1 MP Co (Z/I)	156	17	135
Ordnance			
2 Tire Rep Det (Mbl)	32	18	70
Quartermaster *			
2 Hq & L4 Det Gp	74	14	62
4 Hq & H7 Det Lt (MPL)	80	4	48
4 Hq & L4 Det Bn	80	4	48
12 Trk Co (w/dh tm)	1,608	1,248	4,056
1 Dep Sup Co	186	8	116
13 Serv Co	2,756	52	1,729
1 Bkry Co	160	16	112
2 Pet Lab (Mbl)	12	4	22
2 Pet Trk Co	234	184	996
Signal			
4 Hvy Const Bn	1,748	748	4,200
3 Serv Bn	2,700	450	1,500
4 Hvy Const Co	772	296	1,880

WESTERN FORCE NYU-DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS Personnel · Vehicles · Total Tons	ASSAULT ECHELON Personnel · Vehicles · Total Tons	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS Personnel · Vehicles · Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ASCOM			
Signal (continued)			
2 Serv Co	440	100	400
1 Repair Co	159	55	260
3 Base Den Co	384	51	300
1 Base Maint Co	317	11	210
GHQ AFAC Oper	1,200	220	9,000
1 Wireless Unit (RAAF)	225	47	300
2 Oper Co	508	128	580
2 RI Co	494	132	530
Transportation			
1 Hq & Hq Co Major Port	520	6	239
2 Hq & Hq Det Amph Trk En	56	10	40
6 Hq & Hq Det Port En	138	30	114
9 Amph Trk Co	1,620	486	3,600
25 Port Co	5,475	100	2,825
2 Serv Herb Craft Co	628	12	370
1 Traf Reg Gp	325	50	625

WESTERN FORCE "Y"-DAY ASSAULT GROUND SERVICE ASCOM	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE 'SOCK (less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y/60")	57,414	9,357	72,830	57,414	9,357	72,830
		1,872	5,616		1,872	5,616
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ASCOM	57,414	7,485	67,214	57,414	7,485	67,214
TOTAL SERVICE ASSAULT LIFT "Y"-DAY	88,656	13,661	110,196	88,656	13,661	110,196

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WESTERN FORCE "W-D-Y ASSAULT"	TOTALS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	ASSAULT ECHELON Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
AIR COMBAT			
1 Fiter Gr		1,081 212 1,473	
1 Nite Fiter Sqdn		288 59 343	
1 Tac Recon Sq (F-6)		282 46 426	
1 Photo Recon Sqdn		338 45 316	
1 Liaison Gr		420 32 400	
TOTAL AIR COMBAT	(Air Lift)	(1,259) 394 2,958	
(less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y+60")			
TOTAL AIR COMBAT		80 160	
AIR STAFF			
1 Combat Air Comd Hq		1,150 314 2,798	
1 Chem Co (AO)		340 50 115	
1 Med Disp (Avn)		134 43 274	
1 Port Surg Hosp		28 7 53	
1 Malaria Surv Det		37 4 43	
2 Malaria Cont Det		13 2 12	
1 Ord Bomb Disp Squad		24 6 28	
1 Ord Ammo Co		7 3 12	
1 Ord Ammo Co		179 66 282	

WESTERN FORCE "W" DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
AIR SERVICE (Continued)			
1 QM Co		81 16 107	
4 QM Truck Co		408 280 1,088	
2 Hq & Base Serv Sq		574 224 1,406	
2 Engineering Sq		526 154 1,280	
1 Material Sq		284 80 806	
2 Airdrome Sq		546 160 928	
1 Supply Sq w/Int Dep		132 48 242	
1 BAIC Team		55 15 80	
1 Photo Tech Sq		285 43 469	
1/3 Weather Det		100 20 75	
1/3 AACCS Det		70 15 125	
2 MP Co		250 82 442	
1 Sig Bn CAC (Sep)		690 154 814	
1 Combat Air Comm Sq		219 43 182	
1 Sig Const Lia (H)		437 180 282	

WESTERN FORCE "Y"-DAY ASSAULT	TOTALS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	ASSAULT ECHELON Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
AIR SERVICE (Continued)			
1 A/C Cont & Warnng Gr		2,050 753 3,955	
2 Radar Cal Det		70 AIRBORNE	
Sig Serv Aug Tms		225	
TOTAL AIR SERVICE		7,764 2,418 13,100	
(Less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y+60")		484 1,452	
TOTAL AIR SERVICE		7,764 1,934 11,648	
TOTAL AIR FORCE ASSAULT LIFT "Y"-DAY		8,914 2,248 14,446	

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SUMMARY

EASTERN FORCE

"Y / 30" LIFT

GROUND COMBAT.....	72,698	17,498	121,069
GROUND SERVICE.....	89,385	14,440	130,503
AIR COMBAT.....	4,390	606	4,602
AIR SERVICE.....	<u>2,565</u>	<u>551</u>	<u>4,776</u>
TOTAL.....	169,038	33,095	260,950

EASTERN FORCE UNITS WY/50	TOTALS			ASSAULT ECHELON			FO-LOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND COMBAT									
Corps Hq & Hq Co	338	44	212	260	36	119	78	8	93
3 Inf Div	42,135	6,336	48,300	33,702	4,500	33,810	8,433	1,836	14,490
1 TD Bn	671	192	1,808	604	125	1,711	67	26	97
1 Amphib Trac Bn	502	142	2,227	460	132	2,167	42	10	67
1 Cml Mors Bn	672	265	1,042	533	215	736	139	50	306
1 Engr Comb Hq & Hq Co	80	24	54	80	24	54	-	-	-
3 Engr Comb Bn	1,911	579	2,955	1,900	570	2,900	11	9	55
1 Lt Equip cc	118	86	695	110	80	665	8	6	30
1 Tread Bridge Co	138	84	1,037	130	79	1,000	8	5	37
1 Maint. Co	191	72	356	186	69	349	5	3	7
1 Topo Co Corps	118	29	197	-	-	-	118	29	197
1 Tech Intell Tn	9	4	14	9	4	14	-	-	-
1 Sig Bn Corps	780	286	883	709	273	836	71	13	47
1 Corps Arty Hq & Lt Btry	112	33	128	90	25	81	22	8	47
2 Bn 155 How	1,030	302	2,804	824	226	2,020	206	76	784
1 Bn 155 Gun	513	149	1,258	415	120	889	98	29	369
1 Obsn Bn	446	113	521	357	85	403	89	28	118
3 Tank Bn	2,337	654	9,852	2,121	546	9,276	216	108	576

EASTERN FORCE UNITS "Y"/-30 ASSAULT	TOTALS			ASSAULT ECHELON			FOLLOW-UP		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUP COMBAT (Cont'd)									
9 Fwd Aircraft Contl Tm	36	18	18	36	18	18	-	-	-
Military Govt (Act)	1,500	150	2,250	1,500	150	2,250	-	-	-
Initial Overstrength & Replacement	12,000	-	-	12,000	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL EASTERN COMBAT "Y/-30" (Less 50% vehicles carried on "Y/-60" lift)	65,637	9,562	76,611	56,026	7,277	59,298	9,611	2,285	7,313
TOTAL GROUND COMBAT LIFT "Y/-50"				56,026	5,094	50,749			
Plus EASTERN FORCE "Y" DAY VEHICLES (30%)					7,194	21,852			
Plus EASTERN FORCE "L" "Y" UNITS				16,672	5,210	48,468			
TOTAL LIFT EASTERN COMBAT FORCE "Y/-30"	72,698	17,498	121,069						
REAR ECHELON FOLLOW-UP FOR "Y/ 60"							9,611	2,285	7,313

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EASTERN FORCE UNLIS #17450	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ARMT									
Adjutant General									
1 Spec Serv Co				114	15	102			
Medical									
1 Hq & Hq Rev Bn				28	8	32			
3 Coll Co				303	60	273			
3 Clrg Co				336	63	336			
1 Amb Co				90	36	135			
3 Mal Contl Unit				36	24	75			
1 Mal Surv Unit				13	4	11			
3 Port Surg Hosp				111	12	75			
3 Evac Hosp				858	141	912			
1 Field Hosp (400)				222	23	187			
Military Police									
1 Esc Guard Co				135	8	126			
1 Crim Inv Tr				15	4	12			
Miscellaneous									
3 CIC Dets				48	27	51			
3 AGF Berds				87	-	45			

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EASTERN FORCE. UNIT#	UNIT#	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELON	
			Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel
GROUND SERVICE ARMY						
Miscellaneous (continued)						
	9 Fin Disb Sec			18	117	
	2 OCB Tr		6	4	6	
	4 Photo Inter L		28	8	28	
	Ordnance					
	1 Hq & Hq Det Gp		51	12	38	
	3 Hq & Hq Det Bn		99	12	78	
	5 MM Co		810	230	1,090	
	2 Hvy Maint Co (FA)		380	66	666	
	3 4mm Co		537	42	333	
	2 Hvy Maint Co (Cmk)		404	66	676	
	1 Depot Co		180	28	234	
	1 MAM Co		116	36	166	
	1 Evac Co		116	37	444	
	3 Bomb Disb Sc		21	9	36	
	Quartermaster					
	1 Hq & Hq Det Bn (Mtl)		20	1	12	
	1 Hq & Hq Det Bn		20	1	12	


EASTERN FORCE Units "Y"/'30	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons
4 Trk Co (w/dr tan)			536	416	1,352	
1 Gas Sup Co			125	29	182	
1 Car Co			129	92	237	
2 Rhd Co			354	16	226	
1 Dep Sup Co			186	8	116	
3 Salv Coll Co			612	75	825	
4 Serv Co			848	16	532	
2 Bkry Co			320	32	224	
1 Gr Reg Co			265	43	280	
2 Fun & Bath Co			172	28	162	
3 Ldry Co			801	114	732	
1 Salv Rep Co (M)			204	21	312	
1 Sel Coll Co (M)			169	48	309	
1 Fun & Bath Co (M)			82	20	125	
Signal						
1 Rad Maint Unit			5	4	10	
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ARMY			10,322	1,957	11,932	
(Less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y"/'60)				392	1,176	
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ARMY			10,322	1,565	10,756	

EASTERN FORCE	Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
		Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ASGOM							
	Adjutant General						
	3 APU (Type F)				36	3	21
	2 APU (Type J)				40	4	30
	2 APU (Type M)				58	6	38
	2 Hq & Hq Co Repl spot				392	34	1,040
	7 Hq & Hq Co Repl Bn				217	56	1,995
	28 Repl Co				980	28	700
	1 Spec Serv Co				114	15	102
	Chemical						
	3 Proc Co				420	21	459
	1 Lab Co				58	4	36
	1 Base Dep Co				107	16	138
	1 Decon Co				163	39	203
	1 Maint Co				93	13	86
	Engineer						
	4 Hq & Hq Co Cons Gp				376	96	440
	1 Hq & Hq Co P&CR				272	68	960
	1 Hq & Hq Co Forestr Bn				89	20	93

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EASTERN FORCE	WY 4/30	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
		Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ASCOA										
Engineer (continued,										
	11 Gen Serv Rept				2,486		26,400			
	14 Avn Br				3,780		29,610			
	4 Avn Cc				192		1,420			
	1 Base Dep Co				5		170			
	2 Base Equip Cc				302		2,252			
	3 Dep Co (Avn)				129		1,170			
	9 Dp Trk Co (w/cr ton)				513		3,753			
	4 Forestry Cc				92		1,008			
	3 Lt Equip Co				258		2,250			
	5 Maint Co				360		2,200			
	3 Maint Co (Avn)				216		1,320			
	1 Part Sup Co				31		310			
	2 Hvy Shop Co				48		720			
	1 Serv Co				25		180			
	2 Water Sup Co				124		600			
	2 Fire Fighting Det				10		90			
	1 Foundry Det				-		55			

EASTERN FORCE	Units	"Y"430	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP		
			Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
GROUND SERVICE ABOVE									
Engineer (continued)									
	1 Gas Gen Det (COZ)					25	5		53
	1 Power Plant Maint Det					23	8		62
	3 Power Plant Over Det					24	-		18
	2 Power Line Maint Det					8	4		16
	8 Refr Maint Det (DG)					24	8		32
	2 Refr Maint Det (DH)					36	2		44
	1 Refr Det					12	3		16
	2 Rock Crusher Det					14	2		57
	3 S/L Maint Det					9	6		30
	6 Utilities Det (EE)					324	138		960
	1 Welding Det					10	3		35
	1 Well Drilling Det					14	5		50
Medical									
	1 Hq & Hq Det Bn					28	8		32
	3 Amb Co					270	108		405
	2 Depot Co					266	46		246
	2 Base Dep Co					88	10		54



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EASTERN FORCE	Units	Yr/30	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS			
			Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles
GROUND SERVICE										
Medical (continued)										
	4	Sau Co				448	36			256
	2	Field Hosp (400)				444	46			374
	15	Gen Hosp (1000)				8,835	420			7,920
	4	Sta Hosp (500)				1,312	56			1,116
	2	Hosp Center				556	-			250
	1	Serv Prof Plat				317	37			476
	2	Dental Pros Tm (Txd)				18	-			8
	2	Dental Pros Tm (Mbl)				8	4			6
	5	Food Insp Tm				25	-			20
	1	Gen Disp (Type Z)				38	5			30
	2	Disp (GC)				40	4			34
	2	Maint Det				18	2			16
Military Police										
	1	Hq & Hq Det Bn (Z/I)				39	10			50
	2	MP Bn (Z/I)				1,298	160			1,084
	1	Esc Guard Co				135	8			126
	2	PO&S Co				202	26			132

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EASTERN FORCE Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND SERVICE ASSOC.						
Military Police (continued)						
2 MP Co (Z/I)	312	34	270			
1 PW Proc Co	116	14	91			
1 Gate & Pat Plat	31	5	25			
23 Gate & Pat Sec (Type 1)	69	-	23			
4 Gate & Pat Sec (Type 4)	16	-	4			
1 Crim Inv Tm	15	4	12			
Miscellaneous						
11 Fin Disb Sec	220	22	143			
1 Mil Censor Tm	350	5	200			
1 Civ Censor Tm	45	2	30			
Ordnance						
5 Hq & P. Det. Bn	165	20	130			
3 MM Co	486	138	654			
1 Hvy Maint Co (FL)	190	33	333			
3 Ann Co	537	42	333			
2 Hvy Maint Co (TK)	404	66	676			
5 Depot Co	900	140	1,170			
6 MAM Co	696	216	996			

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EASTERN FORCE Units w/1/30	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
GROUND SERVICE ASSEMBLY						
Ordnance (continued)						
7 Hvy Auto Maint Co			1,414	273	1,862	
1 AAA Maint Co			157	38	191	
1 Hq & Hq Co P'se Gp			41	4	35	
1 Motor Veh Dist Co			164	17	131	
1 Tire Re. Co			145	4	77	
4 Base Den Co			828	16	440	
1 Amn Renov Co			107	6	69	
4 Bomb Disp Sq			28	12	48	
Quartermaster						
2 Hq & Hq Det Cp			74	14	62	
5 Hq & Hq Det Bn (Mbl)			100	5	60	
4 Hq & Hq Det Bn			80	4	48	
21 Trk Co (w/dr tm)			2,814	2,184	7,098	
4 Gas Sup Co			500	116	728	
1 Car Co			129	92	237	
3 Rhd Co			531	24	339	
5 Dep Sup Co			930	40	580	

TOTAL PERSONNEL
~~101,000~~
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EASTERN FORCE #17/50	TOTALS		ASSAULT BOMBELION		FOLLOW-UP BOMBELION	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons
1 Hq & Hq Co Iarn Depot			154	7	84	
13 Serv Co			2,756	52	1,729	
4 Entry Co			640	64	448	
1 Base Exp Co			75	1	45	
3 Fuel & Wash Co			258	42	243	
1 Sales Co (Mbl)			170	31	158	
4 Idry Co			1,066	152	976	
2 Refr Co (Mbl)			206	140	800	
5 Salv Rep Co (SP)			1,005	80	1,130	
6 Hvy Trk Co			702	552	3,588	
25 Ldr, Sec (Ea, EB)			525	50	525	
20 Idry Sec (EJ)			320	-	280	
1 Pet Lab (Mbl)			6	2	11	
1 Pet Lab (mast)			12	2	8	
Signal						
1 Hvy Const Bn			437	187	1,050	
1 Lt Const Pn			436	169	800	
1 Serv Bn			900	150	500	

ELEMENT FORCE "Y"430	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELON				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Signal (continued)									
2 Hvy Const Co				386	148	940			
1 Serv Co				220	50	200			
2 Depot Co				286	42	320			
1 Oper Co				254	64	290			
1 Oper Bn				552	149	650			
1 Hq & Hq Base Depot				115	10	30			
Transportation									
2 Hq & Hq Det Port Bn				46	10	38			
1 Rlwy Oper Bn				816	40	581			
17 Port Co				3,723	68	1,921			
2 Base Dep Co (TC)				232	12	190			
2 Port Mar Maint Co				394	60	702			
1 Serv Maint Creat Co				314	6	185			
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ASSOC				79,063	16,094	129,404			
(Less 2% vehicles delayed until "Y"460)					3,219	9,657			
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ASSOC				79,063	12,875	119,747			
TOTAL SERVICE ASSAULT LIFT "Y"430				89,385	14,440	130,503			

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EASTERN FORCE #1/50 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
AIR COMBAT						
(Long Turn-around)						
1 Filter Co			1,081	212		1,473
1 Light Bomb Co			1,324	363		1,933
1 Troop Carrier Co			1,985	163		1,642
			(Air Lift) (5,874)			
TOTAL AIR COMBAT (LONG T/A)			4,390	758		5,058
(less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y+60")				152		456
TOTAL AIR COMBAT (LONG T/A)			4,390	606		4,602
AIR SERVICE						
(Long Turn-around)						
ADVON, FEMF			500	100		1,000
1 Chem Co (AC)			134	43		274
1 Med Air Evac Sq			87	9		96
2 Port Surg Hosp			74	8		86
2 Ord S&A Co			156	60		316
1 QA Truck Co			102	70		272
1 Hq & Base Serv Sq			287	112		703
1 Engr Sq			243	77		640

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UNIT	TOTALS		ASSAULT BOHELOM		FOLLOW-UP BOHELOM'S	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Total Tons
AIR SERVICE (continued)						
(Long Turn-around)						
1 Materiel Sq			142	40		403
1/3 Weather Det			200	40		150
1/3 ACS Det			140	30		250
1 FEAF Sig En Det			500	100		1,000
TOTAL AIR SERVICE (LONG T/A)			2,565	689		5,190
(Less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y" 400)				138		414
TOTAL AIR SERVICE (LONG T/A)			2,565	551		4,776
TOTAL AIR FORCE ASSAULT UNIT "Y" 430 (Long turn-around)			6,955	1,157		9,378

FOR DEPOSIT
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SUMMARY

WESTERN FORCE

"Y" / 30 LEFT

GROUND COMBAT.....	74,528	20,761	129,158
GROUND SERVICE.....	141,145	20,809	203,765
AIR COMBAT.....	5,565	1,030	7,525
AIR SERVICE.....	<u>7,541</u>	<u>1,869</u>	<u>14,014</u>
TOTAL	228,779	44,469	354,462

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WESTERN FORCE "Y"/'30 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
3 Tank Bn	2,337	654	9,852	2,121	546	9,276	216	108	576
9 Fwd Aircraft Control Tm	36	18	18	36	18	18	-	-	-
Military Govt (Lst)	1,500	150	2,250	1,500	150	2,250	-	-	-
Initial Overstrength & Replacements	12,000	-	-	12,000	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL WESTERN COMBAT "Y"/'30	65,637	9,562	76,611	56,026	7,277	59,293	9,611	2,285	7,313
(less 30% vehicles carried on "Y"-'60 lift)					- 2,183	- 8,549			
TOTAL GROUND COMBAT LIFT "Y"/'30				56,026	5,094	50,749			
PLUS WESTERN FORCE "Y"-'L-N VEHICLES (30%)					9,917	29,751			
PLUS WESTERN FORCE "Y"-'D-AI "H" UNITS				<u>18,502</u>	<u>5,750</u>	<u>48,658</u>			
TOTAL LIFT, WESTERN COMBAT FORCE "Y"/'30				74,528	20,761	129,158			
REAR ECHELON FOLLOW-UP FOR "Y"/'60							9,611	2,285	7,313

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WESTERN FORCE 01/730 ASSAULT	TOTALS			ASSAULT ECHELON			FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
GROUND SERV. OF AIRCY									
Adjutant General									
1 Spec Serv Cc	114	15	102						
Medical									
1 Hq & Hq Det Gp	34	7	28						
1 Hq & Hq Det Bn	28	8	32						
3 Coll Co	303	60	273						
3 Clrg Cc	336	63	336						
1 Amb Co	90	36	135						
3 Mal Contl Unit	36	24	75						
2 Mal Surv Unit	26	8	22						
3 Port Surg Hosp	111	12	75						
3 Evac Hosp (S*)	858	141	912						
1 Field Hosp (ACC)	222	23	187						
1 Aug Surg Gp	189	-	85						
Military Police									
2 Esc Guard J Co	270	16	252						
1 Crim Inv Tn	15	4	12						

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WESTERN FORCE "Y" 430 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Miscellaneous						
3 CIC Det	48	27	51			
4 AGF Bands	116	-	60			
11 Fin Disb Sec	220	22	143			
2 COB Tr	6	4	6			
4 Photo Inter Tr	28	8	28			
Ordnance						
1 Hq & Hq Det Cp	51	12	38			
4 Hq & Hq Lt Bn	132	16	104			
5 MM Co	810	230	1,090			
2 Hvy Maint Co (FA)	380	66	666			
3 Amtr Co	537	42	333			
2 Hvy Maint Co (Tr)	404	66	676			
2 Depot Co	360	56	468			
1 MAM Co	116	36	166			
1 Evac Co	116	37	444			
2 Bomb Disp Sq	14	6	24			

SOUTHERN FORCE #11/30 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Quartermaster						
1 Hq & Hq Det Bn (incl)	20	1	12			
1 Hq & Hq Det In	20	1	12			
5 Trk Co (w/dr tn)	670	520	1,690			
1 Gas Sup Co	125	29	182			
1 Car Co	129	92	237			
2 Rhd Co	354	16	226			
1 Dep Sup Co	186	8	116			
2 Salv Coll Co	408	50	550			
4 Serv Co	648	16	532			
3 Btry Co	480	48	336			
1 Cr Reg Co	437	71	442			
3 Pns & Bath Co	86	14	81			
3 Ldry Co	801	114	732			
Signal						
1 Rad Maint Unit	5	4	10			
SUB-TOTAL GROUP SERVICE ARMY	10,539	2,029	11,881			
(less 20% vehicles delayed until #11/60)		406	1,218			
	10,539	1,623	10,663			

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WESTERN FORCE NY 430 ASSAULT GROUND SERVICE ACCOUNT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons
Adjutant General						
1 Base Post Officer (Type O)			855	460		
3 APU (Type F)			36	21		
3 APU (Type J)			60	45		
3 APU (Type K)			87	57		
2 Hq & Hq Co Repl Bn			392	1,040		
8 Hq & Hq Co Repl Bn			248	2,280		
32 Repl Co			1,120	800		
3 Spec Serv Co			342	306		
Chemical						
4 Proc Co			560	652		
1 Lab Co			58	36		
1 Base Dep Co			107	138		
1 Decon Co			163	203		
2 Maint Co			186	172		
Engineer						
1 Hq & Hq Co Const Brig			109	90		
5 Hq & Hq Co Const Co			470	550		

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ENGINEER FORCE 11/130 ASSAULT Engineer (continued)	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
3 Hq & Hq Co PCK. Cp			816	204			2,880
1 Hq & Hq Co Forestry Bn			89	20			93
2 Hq & Hq Co Base Dep			270	18			140
19 Gen Serv Regt			23,579	4,294			45,600
19 Avn Bn			14,763	5,130			40,185
2 Avn Co			352	96			710
3 Base Dep Co			714	15			510
5 Base Equip Co			865	755			5,630
6 Depot Co			1,254	258			2,340
4 Depot Co (Avn)			836	172			1,560
13 Dp Trk Co			1,703	741			5,421
4 Forestry Co			620	92			1,008
2 Lt Equip Co			236	172			1,500
7 Maint Co			1,337	504			3,080
2 Maint Co (Arm)			382	144			880
3 Parts St. Co			522	93			930
2 Pet Dist Co			432	110			700
6 Hvy Shop Co			4,026	144			2,160

DESIGN FORCE UNIT/30 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Engineer (continued)									
1 Serv Co				146	25	180			
1 Sp Const Co				222	30	200			
1 Util Co				112	23	150			
3 Water Su, Co				408	186	900			
1 Surv Plat				72	20	70			
8 Fire Ftp Det				216	40	360			
3 Foundry Jet				51	-	165			
2 Gas Gen Det				44	10	110			
1 Power Plt (Fltg)									
4 Power Plt Maint Det				92	32	248			
7 Power Plt Oper Det				56	-	42			
3 Gas Gen Det (Co ²)				75	15	159			
5 Power Line Maint Det				20	10	40			
4 Fort Rep Shop				280					
12 Refr Maint Det (DG)				36	12	48			
3 Refr Maint Det (DF)				54	3	66			
4 Rock Crusher Det				28	4	115			
4 S/L Maint Det				12	8	40			

ESSENN FORCE #1/30 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Engineer (continued)									
10 Util Det (EE)				540	230	1,600			
2 Welding Det				20	6	70			
2 Well Drilling Det				28	10	100			
Medical.									
2 Hq & Hq Det En				56	16	64			
4 Amb Co				360	144	540			
2 Depot Co				266	46	246			
3 Base Dep Co				132	15	81			
6 San Co				672	54	384			
2 Field Hosp (400)				444	46	374			
21 Gen Hosp (1000)				12,369	588	11,088			
4 Sta Hosp (500)				1,312	56	1,116			
3 Hosp Center				834	-	375			
1 Gen Lab				-	5	52			
1 Army Lab				53	15	82			
1 Serv Plaf Plat				387	37	511			
4 Dental Pros Tm (Fxd)				36	-	16			
4 Dental Pros Tm (Mnt)				16	8	12			

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WESTERN FORCE "Y/430 ASSAULT"	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Medical (continued)							
7 Food Insp Tn			35	-			28
2 Gen Disp (Type 2)			76	10			60
2 Disp (CC)			40	4			34
3 Maint Det			27	3			24
1 Museum Led Arty			7	1			6
1 Evac Hozn (750)			395	7			353
Military Police							
1 Hq & Hq Det Tn (Z/I)			39	10			50
4 MP Bn (Z/I)			2,596	320			2,168
2 Esc Guard Co			270	16			252
4 PC&S Co			404	52			264
2 MP Co (Z/I)			312	34			270
1 PW Proc Co			116	14			91
2 Gate & Pat Plat			62	10			50
30 Gate & Pat Sec (Type 1)			90	-			30
6 Gate & Pat Loc (Type 4)			30	-			6
2 Crim Inv Tn			30	8			24
1 Civ. Censor Tn			350	5			200

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WESTERN FORCE "M/30 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Miscellaneous									
17 Fin Disb Sec				340	34	221			
1 Civil Censor Tr				45	2	30			
Ordnance									
2 Hq & Hq Det Gp				102	24	76			
8 Hq & Hq Det Bn				264	32	208			
5 Mtn Co				810	230	1,090			
1 Hvy Maint Co (FA)				190	33	333			
10 Amn Co				1,790	140	1,110			
3 Hvy Maint Co (Trk)				606	99	1,014			
6 Depot Co				1,080	168	1,404			
8 MAM Co				928	288	1,328			
9 Hvy Auto Maint Co				1,818	351	2,394			
1 AAA Maint Co				157	38	191			
1 Hq & Hq Co Reas Depot				132	9	71			
1 Hq & Hq Det Base Gp				41	4	35			
1 Base Arm Maint Br				616	16	336			
1 Base Auto Maint Bn				804	13	415			
3 Motor Veh Dist Co				492	51	393			

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WESTERN FORCE #1/30 ASSAULT Ordnance (continued)	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons
2 Tire Rep Co			290	8	154	
3 Motor Veh Ass Co (port)			537	78	501	
6 Base Depot Co			1,242	24	660	
1 Amn Renvy Co			107	6	69	
3 Bomb LdJP Sq			21	9	36	
1 Mail & Calib Tm			13	4	12	
Quartermaster						
3 Hq & Hq Det Sp			111	21	93	
7 Hq & Hq Det Bn (Abt)			140	7	84	
7 Hq & Hq Det Bn			140	7	84	
25 Trk Co (w/air Tm)			3,350	2,600	8,450	
7 Gas Sup Co			875	203	1,274	
2 Car Co			258	184	474	
3 Fnd Co			531	24	339	
6 Dep Sup Co			1,116	48	696	
1 Hq & Hq Base Depot			154	7	84	
19 Serv Co			4,028	76	2,527	

WESTERN FORCE UNIT/30. ASSAULT Quartermaster (continued)	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		MCILLOW-JF ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons
4 Ldry Co			640	64	448	
2 Base Dep Co			150	2	90	
1 Gr Reg Co			265	43	280	
4 Fum & Bath Co			344	56	324	
5 Ldry Co			1,335	190	1,220	
2 Reir Co (Inbl)			206	140	800	
4 Reir Co (Fxd)			568	4	284	
1 Sales Co (Inbl)			178	31	158	
7 Salv Rep Co (TL)			1,407	112	1,582	
1 Salv Rep Co (Fxd)			206	7	120	
8 Hwy Trk Co			936	736	4,784	
25 Ldry Sec (EM/EF)			525	50	525	
20 Ldry Sec (EJ)			320	-	280	
1 Pet Lab (Inbl)			6	2	11	
1 Pet Lab (Base)			12	2	8	
Signal						
2 Divy Const Bn			874	374	2,100	
1 Lt Const Bn			436	169	800	

WESTERN FORCE "Y" 430 ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Signal (continued)							
1 Serv En			900	150			500
2 H 2 Hvy Const Co			386	148			940
1 Serv Co			220	50			200
2 Depot Co			286	42			320
1 Repair Co			159	55			260
1 Base Maint Co			317	11			210
GHQ APTAC Oper			1,800	250			10,000
1 Oper Co			254	64			290
1 Oper Bn			552	149			650
1 Hq & Hq Co Base Def			115	10			30
Transportation							
1 Hq & Hq Co Rlwy Grnd Lw			86	6			100
1 Hq & Hq Det Amph Trk Bn			28	5			20
4 Hq & Hq Det Port Ln			92	20			76
2 Rlwy Oper En			1,632	80			1,162
1 Rlwy Shop Bn			625	11			350
5 Amph Trk Co			900	270			2,000
2 Marine Strip Rep Co			306	4			202

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WESTERN FORCE "Y"/30 ASSAULT Transportation (continued)	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
23 Port Co		92		5,037		2,599			
3 Base Dep Co (TC)		18		348		285			
3 Port M _{or} Maint Co		90		591		1,053			
3 Serv Parb Craft		18		942		555			
SUB-TOTAL GROUND SERVICE ASSC.L.C				130,606	23,983	207,493			
(less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y"/20)					4,797	14,391			
				130,606	19,186	193,102			
TOTAL SERVICE ASSAULT LIFT "Y"/30				141,145	20,809	203,765			

WESTERN FORCE WY/30 ASSAULT	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
AIR COMBAT			
(Long Turn-Around)			
2 Fiter Gp		2,162 424	2,946
1 Light Bomb Gp		1,324 363	1,933
1 Medium Bomb Gp		1,827 363	1,278
3 Tac Recn Sq		846 138	2,142
TOTAL AIR COMBAT (Long T/..)	(Air Lift)	5,565 1,288	8,299
(Less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y/60")		(2,759)	774
TOTAL AIR COMBAT		5,565 1,030	7,525
AIR SERVICE			
(Long Turn-Around)			
1 ADVON, AF HQ - 7th AF		200 50	500
1 Air Serv Area Comd		295 72	193
1 Bomb Wing Sq		300 65	350
1 APC		12 1	12
1 AAF Band		29 --	12
1 SCU		117 6	118

WESTERN FORCE "Y/30" ASSAULT	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
AIR SERVICE (Cont'd)	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
2 Chem Co		268 86 548	
1 Chem Maint Co		100 16 90	
1 Chem Depot Co		77 22 302	
1 QM Truck Co		102 70 272	
4 Hq & Base Serv Sq		1,148 448 2,812	
1 Engrs Sq		1,052 308 2,560	
4 Materiel Sq		568 160 1,612	
1 Airborne Sq		273 80 464	
3 Hq & Hq Sq ADG		537 207 1,461	
3 Repair Sq ADG		1,107 381 2,010	
6 Supply Sq ADG		456 144 726	
2 Supply Sq w/Int Def		264 96 484	
1 Pet Lab (job)		6 2 10	
1 Photo Intel J Det		62 16 84	
1/3 Nea Det		100 20 75	
1/3 AACCS Det		70 15 125	
2 Sig Depot Co		398 72 598	

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	TOTALS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	ASSAULT ECHELON Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
WESTERN FORCE "Y/30" ASSAULT			
AIR SERVICE (Cont'd)			
TOTAL AIR SERVICE (LONG T/A)		7,541 Personnel 2,337 Vehicles 15,418 Total Tons	
(Less 20% vehicles delayed until "Y/60")		468 Vehicles 1,404 Total Tons	
TOTAL AIR SERVICE (LONG T/A)		7,541 Personnel 1,869 Vehicles 14,014 Total Tons	
TOTAL AIR FORCE ASSLT "Y/30" (LONG T/A)		13,106 Personnel 2,899 Vehicles 21,539 Total Tons	

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SUMMARY

APPAC RESERVE

"Y / 35" LIFT

GROUND COMBAT	56,797	7,478	63,485
GROUND SERVICE	<u>17,389</u>	<u>2,606</u>	<u>22,421</u>
TOTAL	74,186	10,084	85,906

PART V

C RESERVE "Y/35" ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
Ops Hq & Hq Co	338	44	212	260	36	119	78	8	93
3 Inf Div	42,135	6,336	48,300	33,702	4,500	33,810	8,433	1,836	14,490
1 Amphib Trac Bn	502	142	2,227	460	132	2,167	42	10	67
1 Engr Comb Hq & Hq Co	80	24	54	80	24	54	--	--	--
3 Engr Comb Bn	1,911	579	2,955	1,900	570	2,900	11	9	55
1 Light Equip Co	118	86	695	110	80	665	8	6	30
1 Tread Bridge Co	138	84	1,037	130	79	1,000	8	5	37
1 Maint Co	191	72	356	186	69	349	5	3	7
1 Topo Co Corps	118	29	197	--	--	--	118	29	197
1 Techn Intell Tn	9	4	14	9	4	14	--	--	--
1 Sig Bn Corps	780	286	863	709	273	836	71	13	47
1 Corps Hq & Hq Btry	112	33	128	90	25	81	22	8	47
2 Bn 155 How	1,030	302	2,804	824	226	2,020	206	76	784
1 Bn 155 Gun	513	149	1,258	415	120	889	98	29	369
1 Obsn Bn	446	113	521	357	85	403	89	28	118
9 Fwd Aircraft Contl Lst	36	18	18	36	18	18	--	--	--
11 A/E Div	8,556	1,413	9,451	8,556	1,413	9,451	--	--	--
1 Engr Comb Hq & Hq Co	80	24	54	80	24	54	--	--	--
4 Engr Comb Lst	2,548	772	3,940	2,544	736	3,720	44	36	220

AFPAC RESERVE "Y/35" ASSAULT	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
1 Engr Comb Hq & Hq Co	80 24 54	80 24 54	-- -- --
1 Light Equip Co	118 86 695	110 80 665	8 6 30
1 Maint Co	191 72 356	186 69 349	5 3 7
4 Rigid Boat Co	852 596 6,320	772 556 6,060	80 40 260
2 Panel Bridge Co	256 114 710	230 102 660	26 12 50
2 Depot Co	418 86 598	209 43 299	209 43 299
2 Water Supply Co	272 124 484	136 62 242	136 62 242
1 Camflge Co	67 22 66	60 20 60	7 2 6
2 Hq & Hq Co L&L	584 106 500	584 106 500	-- -- --
2 Engr Comb Hq & Hq Co (Shore)	160 48 108	160 48 108	-- -- --
6 Engr Comb Bn (Shore)	3,822 1,158 5,910	3,822 1,158 5,910	-- -- --
TOTAL AFPAC RESERVE ("Y/35")	66,461 12,946 90,905	56,797 10,682 73,457	9,664 2,264 17,448
(Less 30% vehicles)		- 3,204 - 9,612	+ 3,204 + 9,612
TOTAL AFPAC RESERVE ASSAULT IIFT ("Y/35")		56,797 7,478 63,845	
TOTAL AFPAC RESERVE FOLLOW-UP ("Y/60")			9,664 5,468 27,060

AFAPC RESERVE "Y-3" ASSAULT GROUND SERVICE	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles Total Tons
ADJUTANT GENERAL						
4 APU (Type F)	48		4	28		
2 APU (Type J)	40		4	30		
1 APU (Type M)	29		3	19		
1 MPU (Type Y)	48		14	69		
1 Post Reg Sta	31		3	19		
1 Hq & Hq Co Repl	196		17	520		
5 Hq & Hq Det Repl Dep	155		40	1,425		
20 Repl Co Bn	700		20	500		
CHEMICAL						
1 Proc Co	140		7	163		
1 Decon Co	163		39	203		
1 Maint Co	93		13	86		
ENGINEER						
1 Hq & Hq Cors & Gp	94		24	110		
3 Const Bn	2,700		684	6,000		

AFFAC RESERVE "V/35" ASS. JLI	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
1 Base Equip Co			173	151	1,126	
2 Dp Trk Co			262	114	834	
1 Maint Co			191	72	440	
1 Pet Dist Co			216	55	350	
1 Parts Sup Plat			57	15	137	
MEDICAL						
1 Hq & Eq Det Bn			28	8	32	
4 Coll Co			404	80	364	
4 CLrg Co			448	84	448	
2 Amb Co			180	72	270	
1 Depot Co			133	23	123	
2 Mal Contl Unit			24	16	50	
1 Mal Surv Unit			13	4	11	
2 Port Sur3 Hosp			74	8	50	
4 Evac Hosp (SM)			1,144	188	1,216	
4 Field Hosp			888	92	748	

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APPAC RESERVE "Y/31" ASSAULT	TOTALS	ASSAULT ECHELON	FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS
MISCELLANEOUS	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons	Personnel Vehicles Total Tons
4 CIC Det		64	68
2 OOB Tm		6	6
4 Photo Tmt Tm		28	28
ORDNANCE			
2 Hq & Hc Det Ord Bn		66	52
4 M Co		648	872
2 Hvy Maint Co (FA)		380	666
3 Amn Co		537	333
1 Deoot Co		180	234
1 MAM Co		116	166
3 Bomb Disp S-		21	36
2 Hvy Auto Maint Co		404	266
QUARTERMASTER			
5 Trk Co		670	1,690
1 Gas Sup Co		125	182
1 Rhd Co		177	113

~~SECRET~~

AFAPAC RESERVE "Y/39" ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT BATTALION		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
1 Dep Sup Co				186	8	116
1 Salv Coll Co				204	25	275
5 Serv Co				1,060	20	665
1 Ekry Co				160	16	112
1 CR Reg Co				265	43	280
1 Ldry Co				267	38	244
3 Salv Rep Co (SM)				603	48	672
TRANSPORTATION						
2 Amphib Trk Co				360	108	800
10 Port Co				-2,190	40	1,130
TOTAL AFAPAC RESERVE GROUND SERVICE						
(Less 20% vehicles delayed for "Y/60" lift)						
TOTAL LIFT AFAPAC RESERVE						
				17,389	3,258	24,377
				17,389	652	1,956
				17,389	10,084	85,906

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

"SHORT TURN-AROUND" (KYUSHU)

("Y / 15") TO ("Y / 60") LIFTS

GROUND SERVICE	22,657	6,527	51,577
EASTERN AIR COMBAT	17,802	3,342	21,270
EASTERN AIR SERVICE	26,416	8,049	46,410
WESTERN AIR COMBAT	3,489	771	4,391
WESTERN AIR SERVICE	<u>10,638</u>	<u>2,777</u>	<u>15,472</u>
TOTAL	81,002	21,466	139,120

PART VI

~~RESTRICTED~~

REF. CODE

SHORT TURN-AROUND "Y/60" TO "Y/60" ASSAULT	TOTALS		ASSAULT ECHELON		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons	Personnel	Total Tons
EASTERN GROUND SERVICE						
1 Naval CE (M)	1,115	230	230	2,500		
1 Serv Co (RCM)	179	100	100	500		
3 Rad Maint Unit	15	12	12	30		
2 Hq & Hq Co Cons Co	188	48	48	220		
3 Gen Serv Regt (-3 Rns)	3,723	678	678	7,200		
6 Avn Bns	4,662	1,620	1,620	12,690		
1 Base Equip Co	173	151	151	1,126		
3 Dp Trk Co (w/dr)	393	171	171	1,251		
1 Maint Co	191	72	72	440		
2 Pet Dist Co	432	110	110	700		
1 Hvy Const Bn	437	187	187	1,050		
2 Hvy Const Co	386	148	148	940		
2 Serv Co (Port.)	300	34	34	170		
2 Depot Co	286	42	42	320		
SUB-TOTAL EASTERN GROUND SERVICE		12,480	3,603	29,137		

~~SECRET~~

"SHORT TURN-AROUND" ASSAULT
(Y/16) to (Y/60) Units

WESTERN GROUND SERVICE

- 1 Hq & Hq Co Const Cp
- 1 Hq & Hq Co PC&R Cp
- 3 Gen Serv Re-rt
- 3 Avn Bn
- 1 Base Equip Co
- 2 Dp Trk Co
- 1 Maint Co
- 1 Pet Dist Co
- 1 Surv Co
- 2 Hvy Const Bn
- 2 Hvy Const Co
- 2 Serv Co (Port)
- 2 Depot Co
- 1 Repair Co
- 1 Oper Bn
- 1 Serv Co (RCM)

SUB-TOTAL WESTERN GROUND SERVICE

TOTAL GROUND SERVICE "SHORT TURN-AROUND"
ASSAULT LIFE (Y/16) to (Y/60)

	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
			94	24		110
			272	68		960
			3,723	678		7,200
			2,331	810		6,345
			173	151		1,126
			262	114		834
			191	72		440
			216	55		350
			179	50		135
			874	374		2,100
			386	148		940
			300	34		170
			286	42		320
			159	55		260
			552	149		650
			179	100		500
			10,177	2,924		22,440
			22,657	6,527		51,577

TOTAL GROUND SERVICE
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"SHORT TURN-AROUND" ASSAULT (Y/16) to (Y/60) Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
WESTERN AIR COMBAT									
1 Light Bomb Gp				1,324	363	1,933			
1 Medium Bomb Gp				1,827	363	2,142			
1 Photo Recon Sqdn				338	45	316			
TOTAL ASSAULT LIFE WESTERN AIR COMBAT									
				3,489	771	4,391			
WESTERN AIR SERVICE									
1 Engin Co (A.)				134	43	274			
1 Med Air Evac Co				87	9	96			
1 Med Disp (Avn)				28	7	53			
1 Port Surg Hosp				37	4	43			
1 Vet Det				19	6	26			
1 Cent Med Est				35	3	18			
2 Med Supply Plat				38	4	52			
2 Malaria Surv Det				26	4	24			
3 Malaria Cont Det				36	9	42			
2 Eng Avn Co (Sep)				220	100	550			
2 Ord Bomb Disp Squad				14	6	24			

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"SHORT-TURN-AROUND" ASSAULT (Y-16) to (Y-60) Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Total tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
WESTERN AIR SERVICE (continued)							
1 Ord Ammo Co			179	66			282
4 Ord MAM Plats			312	120			632
1 Ord Maint Co LT			215	69			422
4 Ord En Fq & Hq Det			132	32			200
3 Ord Depct Cos			640	135			675
3 QM Cos (SG)			243	48			321
6 QM Truck Cos			612	420			1,632
3 QM Supply Plats			75	9			96
3 Hq & Base Serv Sq			861	336			2,109
3 Engineering Sq			789	231			1,920
3 Materiel Sq			426	120			1,209
1 Air Cargo Contl Sq			246	34			301
1 Aircraft Repair Unit (Flt)			388				
1 Air Cargo Resuppl Sq			185	12			243
3 Aircraft Maint Unit (Flt)			153				
3 Aviation Sq			759	39			771
1 Aircraft Assembly Sq			253	54			325
1 Combat Camera Unit			32	9			49

SHORT TURN AROUND ASSAULT (Y46) to (Y60) Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Top Tons
WESTERN AIR SERVICE (continued)									
7 MP Cos				287		1,547			
2 Sig Const Bn (H)				360		564			
Sig Serv Aug Tms				225					
1 Radio Sq (Mob)				661	110	195			
2 Radio Secur Sect				76	16	90			
2 Sig Co (Avn)				350	52	300			
1 Sig Co Wings				89	14	92			
1 Emer Res Bcat Co				314	9	295			
TOTAL ASSAULT UNIT WESTERN AIR SERVICE									
				10,638	2,777	15,472			
EASTERN AIR COMMAND									
5 Fiter Gps				5,405	1,060	7,365			
1 Nite Fiter Sq				288	59	343			
1 Tac Ren Sq (F-6)				282	46	426			
2 Light Bomb Gp				2,648	726	3,866			
3 Med Bomb Gps				4,295	996	5,775			
3 Photo Ren Sq				1,014	135	948			

"SHORT TURN-AROUND" ASSAULT (Y-16) to (Y-60) Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
EASTERN AIR COMBAT (continued)						
1 Photo Recon Sq (M)				309	40	256
1 Troop Carrier Gp				1,985	183	1,642
1 Weather Strike Len Sqdn				576	97	649
TOTAL ASSAULT LIFT EASTERN AIR COMBAT						
				17,802	3,342	21,270
EASTERN AIR SERVICE						
1 AF Hq - 5th AF				769	160	2,904
1 Combat Air Comd Hq				340	50	115
1 AF Serv Comd Hq				530	80	820
1 Bomber Comd Hq				436	68	746
2 Bomb Wing Hq				600	130	700
1 Photo Wg Hq				233	27	297
1 Troop Carrier Wg Hq				169	25	223
1 Emerg Rescue Gp Hq				34	10	60
1 APO				12	1	12
1 AAF Band				29	0	12

RECORDED
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SHORT TERM - AIRCRAFT ASSAULT (16) to (Y-60) Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
1 PERM AIR SERVICE (continued)						
1 Spec Serv Co				114	28	143
1 SCU				117	6	118
6 Chemical Cos (AC)				804	258	1,644
1 Chemical Maint Co				100	16	90
1 Chemical Depot Co				77	22	302
2 Med Disp (Avn)				56	14	104
1 Vet Det				19	6	26
1 Cent Med Hst				48	5	30
3 Malaria Det				26	4	24
6 Malaria Cont Det				72	18	84
1 Eng AF Hq Co				184	54	274
1 Eng Topo Co				149	28	196
7 Eng Avn Utilities Co				812	238	1,008
2 Ord Bomb Disp Sq				14	6	24
3 Ord Ammo Cos				537	198	846
8 Ord S & M Cos				624	240	1,264
2 Ord Maint Co, AF				430	138	844
5 QA Co (SG)				405	80	535

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SHORT TURN-AROUND ASSAULT

(Y/16) to (Y/60) Units

EASTERN AIR SERVICE (continued)

1 QM Depot Co (SG)

14 QM Truck Cos

2 Serv Gp Hq

1 Hq & Base Serv Sqdn

1 Engineering Sqdn

1 Materiel Sqdn

1 Aircraft repair Unit (Flt)

3 Aircraft Maint Unit (Flt)

13 Air Serv Sqdn

4 Airdrome Sqdn

1 Air Serv Gp (6AMP & 2 QM Trk Co)

1 Air Frt Fwd Sqdn

2 Supply Sqdn w/int Depot

1 Combat Camera Unit

1 Photo Tech. Sq

1 Photo Intell Det

4 MP Cos

1 Sig Bn CAC (Sep)

	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
				32	3	119
				1,428	980	3,808
				410	108	482
				287	112	703
				243	77	640
				142	40	403
				388		
				153		
				3,185	1,235	8,021
				1,092	320	1,856
				780	502	2,318
				62	37	205
				302	80	200
				32	9	89
				285	43	469
				124	32	168
				500	164	884
				690	154	814

"SHORT TURN-AROUND" ASSAULT

(Y-16) to (Y-60) Units.

EASTERN AIR SERVICE (continued)

1 Combat Air Comm Sqdn

3 Sig Const Bn (H)

2 Sig Const Co (H)

1 Aircraft Cont & Warn Gp

2 Radar Cal Jets

Sig Serv Aug Teams

1 Sig Serv Pt

1 Sig Serv Co

1 Radio Sqdn (MOB)

2 Radio Security Loc

6 Sig Serv Co Wg

1 Sig Co, Avn

1 Sig Co, Troop Carrier Wg

6 Sig Cos (SG)

1 Hq & Hq Co, MAGS

1 MAG Hedrons

1 MAG Servons

	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
		Total Tons		Total Tons		Total Tons
	219	43	182			
	1,311	440	2,362			
	386	110	504			
	2,050	753	3,955			
	70	AIRCRAFT				
	100					
	938	120	424			
	175	45	144			
	661	110	495			
	76	16	90			
	750	196	979			
	175	26	150			
	134	26	164			
	600	114	804			
	216	52	250			
	267	27	447			
	413	65	936			

"SHORT TURN-AROUND" ASSAULT" (Y/16) to (Y/60) Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS		
	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
TOTAL ASSAULT LIFT EASTERN AIR SERVICE				26,416	8,049		
TOTAL AIR FORCE ASSAULT LIFT "SHORT TURN-AROUND" (Y/16) to (Y/60)				58,345	14,939		
							46,410
							87,543

SUMMARY

REAR ECHELONS

"Y 4 60"

EASTERN FORCE REAR ECHELON.....	30,826	14,724	68,208
WESTERN FORCE REAR ECHELON.....	35,821	19,241	86,247
AFPAC RESERVE REAR ECHELON.....	3,664	6,120	29,016
TOTAL.....	76,311	40,085	183,471

~~SECRET~~
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AIR ECHELONS	Units "Y" / 60	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS				
		Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons	Personnel	Vehicles	Total Tons
<u>EASTERN FORCES</u>										
<u>FROM "Y"-DAY LIFT</u>										
	Rear Ech Grnd Comb				21,215	4,316	36,526			
	Army Serv Vehicles (20%)					1,562	4,686			
	ASCOM Serv Vehicles (20%)					1,937	5,811			
	Air Combat Vehicles (20%)					121	363			
	Air Service Vehicles (20%)					602	1,806			
<u>FROM "Y" / 30 LIFT</u>										
	Rear Ech Grnd Comb				9,611	2,285	7,313			
	Army Serv Vehicles (20%)					392	1,176			
	ASCOM Serv Vehicles (20%)					3,219	9,657			
	Air Combat Vehicles (20%)					152	456			
	Air Service Vehicles (20%)					138	414			
<u>SUB-TOTAL EASTERN FORCE REAR ECHELONS</u>										
					30,826	14,724	68,208			
<u>WESTERN FORCES</u>										
<u>FROM "Y"-DAY LIFT</u>										
	Rear Ech Grnd Comb				26,210	7,047	49,287			
	Army Serv Vehicles (20%)					1,544	4,632			

Units	TOTALS		ASSAULT SHIPPING		FOLLOW-UP ECHELONS	
	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles	Personnel	Vehicles
ASCOM Serv Vehicles (20%)			1,872		5,616	
Air Combat Vehicles (20%)			80		160	
Air Service Vehicles (20%)			484		1,452	
<u>FROM "Y" / 30 LIFT</u>						
Rear Ech Grnd Comb	9,611		2,285		7,313	
Army Service Vehicles (20%)			406		1,218	
ASCOM Service Vehicles (20%)			4,797		14,391	
Air Combat Vehicles (20%)			258		774	
Air Service Vehicles (20%)			468		1,404	
SUB-TOTAL WESTERN FORCE REAR ECHELONS	35,821		19,241		86,247	
<u>AFRAC RESERVE</u>						
<u>FROM "Y" / 35 LIFT</u>						
Rear Ech Grnd Comb	9,664		5,468		27,060	
Service Vehicles			652		1,956	
SUB-TOTAL AFRAC RESERVE REAR ECHELONS	9,664		6,120		29,016	
TOTAL LIFT REAR ECHELONS	76,311		40,085		183,471	

RECAPITULATION OF TROOP COMMITMENT

	<u>GROUND COMBAT FORCES</u>		<u>SERVICE FORCES</u>		<u>AIR FORCES</u>	
"Y" DAY.. (EAST) ..	153,782	16,786	73,177	13,994	14,367	3,485
"Y" DAY.. (WEST) ..	203,434	23,141	88,656	13,661	8,914	2,248
"Y/30" .. (EAST) ..	72,698	17,498	89,385	14,440	6,955	1,157
"Y/30" .. (WEST) ..	74,528	20,761	141,145	20,809	13,106	2,899
AFPAC RESERVE.....	56,797	7,478	17,389	2,606	-	-
SHORT T/A-KYUSHU.	-	-	22,657	6,527	58,345	14,939
"Y/60 REAR ECH..."	76,311	21,401	-	16,381	-	2,303
TOTALS	637,550	107,065	432,409	88,418	101,687	27,031
		889,440	687,296	AIR LIFT	13,518	164,551
					<u>115,205</u>	

TOTAL COMMITMENT

GROUND COMBAT.....	637,550	107,065	889,440
SERVICE.....	432,409	88,418	687,296
AIR FORCES.....	115,205	27,031	164,551
TOTAL.....	1,171,646	222,514	1,741,023

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RECAPITULATION

RESERVE

WESTERN FORCE

EASTERN FORCE

"Y" 1/35

"Y" 308 "Y" 60 "Y" 16 to 60

"Y" 308 "Y" 60 "Y" 16 to 60

"Y"

GROUND COMBAT

	EASTERN FORCE "Y" 308 "Y" 60 "Y" 16 to 60	WESTERN FORCE "Y" 308 "Y" 60 "Y" 16 to 60	RESERVE "Y" 1/35
1 Advon, AFPAC, GHQ		1	
2 Army Hq & Hq Co, Sp Trps	1	1	
8 Ccrps Hq & Hq Co	2	3	1
2 Cav Gp Hq & Hq Co	1	1	
2 Td Gp Hq & Hq Co	1	1	
19 Inf Divisions	3	7	3
3 Marine Divisions	3		
2 Armd Divisions		2	
1 A/B Divisions			1
15 Tank Bn	3	6	3
3 Amphib Tank Bn	1	1	1
16 Amphib Trac Bn	7	6	1
1 Amphib Tank Bn (M)	2		
4 Amphib Trac Bn (M)	4		
15 TD Bn	6	7	1
15 Cml Mort Bn	6	7	1
7 Cav Ren Sq	3	4	

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TOP SECRET

RECAPITULATION

GROUND COMBAT
UNITS

EASTERN FORCE
"Y" / 30 & "Y" / 60 "Y" / (16 to 60)

WESTERN FORCE
"Y" / 30 & "Y" / 60 "Y" / (16 to 60)

RESERVE
"Y" / 35

AAA

- 2 Brig Hq
- 5 Gp Hq Btry
- 5 AAA Opns Det
- 3 Gun Bn SM
- 4 Gun Bn MOB
- 7 AW Bn SM
- 5 AW Bn SP
- 2 S/L Bn
- 1 Gp Hq (M)
- 4 AAA Bn (M)

ARTY

- 9 Gp Hq & Hq Btry
- 7 Corps Hq & Hq Btry
- 3 105 How Bn (SP)
- 6 105 How Bn
- 12 155 How Bn
- 6 155 Gun Bn
- 3 155 Gun Bn (SP)
- 7 240 How Bn

1	1	1
2	3	3
2	3	3
1	2	2
2	2	2
1	6	6
3	2	2
1	1	1
1	1	1
4	4	4
4	5	5
1	3	3
3	6	6
2	4	4
1	2	2
3	2	2
3	4	4

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~~SECRET~~

REGIMENTALIZATION

GROUND COMBAT UNITS	EASTERN FORCE		WESTERN FORCE		RESERVE
	"Y" 730& 760"	"Y" 760" (16tc60)	"Y" 730& 760"	"Y" 760" (16 tc60)	
<u>ARTY</u>					
3 8" Gun Bn	3				
8 8" How Bn	3				
2 4.5 Rocket Bn	1				
8 Obsn Bn	2	1	3	1	
1 Corps Hq & Hq Btry (M)	1				
2 155 How Bn (M)	2				
1 155 Gun Bn (M)	1				
<u>EMGR</u>					
17 Comb Gp Hq & Hq Co	5	1	7	3	
4 Comb Gp Hq & Hq Co (Shore)	2			2	
47 Comb Bn	14	3	20	7	
12 Comb Bn (Shore)	6			6	
3 Hq & Hq Co ESB	1			2	
3 ESB			3		
13 Light Equip Co	4	1	5	1	2
13 Maint Co	4	1	5	1	2
6 Water Sup Co	2		2		2
6 Depot Co	2		2		2

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RECAPITULATION

GROUND COMBAT UNITS	EASTERN FORCE		WESTERN FORCE		RESERVE
	"Y"	"Y"/30&"Y/60"	"Y"	"Y"/30&"Y/60"	
ENGR					
3 Camflge Co	1		1		1
16 Rigid Boat Co	6		6		4
8 Panel Bridge Co	3		3		2
10 Tread Bridge Co	2	1	5	1	1
2 Topo En Army	1		1		
6 Topo Co Corps	1	1	2	1	1
10 Tech Intell Team	3	1	4	1	1
SIGNAL					
2 Sig Cpnns Bn	1		1		
8 Sig Bn Corps	2	1	3	1	1
2 Sig Hvy Cons Bn	1		1		
2 Sig Serv Co	1		1		
2 Sig Photo Co	1		1		
2 Sig R. I. Co	1		1		
2 Sig Pign Co	1		1		
9 JASCOs	3		6		
2 JASCOs (M)	2				
77 FWD ARC FT Cortl Tm	20	9	30	9	9

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TOP SECRET

RECAPITULATION

GROUND SERVICES

EASTERN FORCE

RESERVE FORCE

RESERVE

UNITS

"Y" "Y"/308"Y/60" "Y"/(16to60)

"Y" "Y"/308"Y/60" Y/(16to60)

"Y" 55

ADJUTANT GENERAL

4 MRU (Type Y)

5 MRU (Type Z)

22 APU (Type F)

7 APU (Type J)

6 APU (Type M)

1 Base Post Office (Type G)

3 Post Reg Sta

5 Hq & Hq Co Repl Depot

20 Hq & Hq Co Repl Bn

80 Repl Co

3 Spec Serv Co

CHEMICAL

10 Proc Co

2 Lab Co

2 Base Depot Co

6 Decom Co

4 Maint Co

2 Depot Co

ENGINEERS

5 Hq & Hq Co Const Brig

17 Hq & Hq Co Const Gp

7 Hq & Hq Co P C & R

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GROUND SERVICES
UNITS

RECAPITULATION

WESTERN FORCE
RESERVE
"Y" "Y" "Y" 1755

UNITS	"Y"	"Y" 7302 HY 60" (16 to 60)			
2 Hq & Hq Co Forestry Bn	1			1	
4 Hq & Hq Co Base Depot	1			1	
2 Avn Regt (-3 Bn)	6	11	3	19	3
48 Gen Serv Regt	6	14	6	19	3
52 Avn Bn	6			7	3
16 Cons Bn			4	2	
6 Avn Co			1	3	
4 Base Depot Co		2	1	5	1
16 Base Equip Co	3			4	
12 Depot Co	2			6	
7 Depot Co (Avn)			3	4	
4 Dp Trk Co (w/dr)	7	9	3	13	2
8 Forestry Co			4	4	
10 Lt Equip Co	3	3		2	
22 Maint Co	3	5	1	7	1
8 Maint Co (Avn)	2	3		2	
9 Parts Supply Co	2	1		3	1
15 Pet Dist Co	4		2	2	1
8 Hvy Shop Co		2		6	
2 Serv Co		1		1	
1 Spec Cons Co				1	
2 Surv Co	1				1

105
(17)

RECAPITULATION

GROUND SERVICES Units	EASTERN FORCE		WESTERN FORCE		RESERVE
	"Y"	"Y"/50&"Y/60"	"Y"	"Y"/50&"Y/60"	
3 Crate & Pat Flat	1		2		
53 Crate & Pat Sec (Type 1)	23		30		
10 Crate & Pat Sec (Type 4)	4		6		
10 Crim Inves Tm	2		3		
1 MF Bn (M)	1				
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>					
34 CIV Det	9	3	3	4	4
7 AGF Bands	3	3	4		
48 Fin Disb Sec	6	14	20		
23 OOB Tm	7	2	2		2
46 Photo Interp Tm	14	4	4		4
2 Civ Censor Tm	1	1	1		
2 Mil Censor Tm	1	1			
<u>ORDNANCE</u>					
6 Hq & Eq Det Gp	1	1	3		
31 Hq & Hq Det Bn	4	8	12		2
32 MM Co	3	8	10		4
11 Hvy Maint Co (FA)	1	3	3		2
37 Amn Co	6	6	13		3
15 Hvy Maint Co (Trk)	2	4	5		
20 Depot Co	2	6	8		1
24 MAM Co	3	7	9		1

109

(115)

RECAPITULATION

GROUND SERVICES

EASTERN FORCE

WESTERN FORCE

RESERVE

"Y" / 35

"Y" / 30 & "Y" / 60 "Y" / (16 to 60)

"Y" / 30 & "Y" / 60 "Y" / (16 to 60)

"Y"

Units

- 6 AAA Maint Co
- 5 Evac Co
- 32 Bomb Disp Sq
- 18 Hvy auto Maint Co
- 2 Hq & Hq Base Gp
- 4 Motor Veh Dist Co
- 3 Tire Repl Co
- 10 Base Depot Co
- 2 Arm Renov Co
- 3 Tire Repl Det (Mbl)
- 1 Ammo Renov Plat (M)
- 3 Ammo Co (M)
- 1 Hq & Hq Co Base Depot
- 3 Motor Veh ass Co (Port)
- 1 Base arm Maint Bn
- 1 Ball and Calibre Tm
- 1 Base auto Maint Bn

QUARTERMASTER

- 28 Hq & Hq Det Bn (Mbl)
- 27 Hq & Hq Det Bn
- 110 Trk Co (w dr tm)
- 20 Gas Supply Co

2	1	2	1
1	1	2	1
5	7	12	5
	7		9
	1		1
	1		3
	1		2
	4		6
	1		1
1		2	
1			
3			
			1
			3
			1
			1
			8
7	6	7	8
7	5	7	8
25	25	25	30
3	5	3	8

5

1

110
(116)

██████████

RECAPITULATION

GROUND SERVICES
Units

EASTERN FORCE
NY# 1508 NY/60 NY# 1600

EASTERN FORCE
NY# 1508 NY/60 NY# 1600

RESERVE
NY# 1508 NY/60 NY# 1600

Units	NY#	EASTERN FORCE NY# 1508 NY/60 NY# 1600	NY#	EASTERN FORCE NY# 1508 NY/60 NY# 1600	RESERVE NY# 1508 NY/60 NY# 1600
5 Car Co		2		3	
18 Rhd Co	3		4		1
15 Dep Supply Co		5		5	1
7 Salv Coll Co	1	2	1	7	1
95 Serv Co	25	17	25	2	5
21 Bkry Co	3	6	4	7	1
6 GR Reg Co	1	1	3	2	1
12 Fur & Bath Co	2	3	2	5	
20 Laundry Co	2	6	3	8	
6 Pet Lab (Abl)	2	1	2	1	
2 Pet Lab (Base)		1		1	
3 Pet Trk Co	1		2		
9 Hq & Hq Det Gp	2	2	2	3	
2 Hq & Hq Base Depot		1		1	
3 Base Depot Co		1		2	
5 Refrig Co (Abl)	1	2			
4 Refrig Co (Fxd)			2	4	
1 Salv Rep Co (FXD)				1	
15 Salv Rep Co (SM)		5		7	3
2 Sales Co (Abl)	1		1		
14 Hvy Trk Co		6		8	
50 Lndry Sec (Ea/EB)		25		25	

~~SECRET~~

RECAPITULATION

GROUND SERVICES

EASTERN FORCE

WESTERN FORCE

RESERVE

140 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 4 2

1 1 1 1 6 1 1 4 2

1 1 1 1 6 1 1 4 2

- 40 Lndry Sec (EJ)
- 2 Depot Supply Co
- 1 Salv Rep Co (M)
- 1 Salv Coll Co (M)
- 1 Fun & Bath Co (M)
- 6 Depot Co (M)
- 1 MT Bn (M)
- 1 Serv Regt (M)
- 4 Lndry Plat (M)
- 2 Bkry Plat (M)

20 1

20

TRANSPORTATION

- 1 Hq & Hq Co Major Port
- 1 Hq & Hq Co Rlwy
- 3 Hq & Hq Det Amp Trk Bn
- 3 Rlwy Oper Bn
- 1 Rlwy Shop Bn
- 25 Amphib Trk Co
- 2 Marine Ship Rep Co
- 100 Port Co
- 5 Base Depot Co (TC)
- 5 Port Marine Maint Co
- 7 Harb Craft Serv Co

1 9 25 17 2 2 1

1 1 2 1 5 2 23 3 3 3

2 10

IN

(11)

RECAPITULATION

GROUND SERVICES

Units

EASTERN FORCE

"Y" "Y" 308 "Y" 60 "Y" 16 to 60

WESTERN FORCE

"Y" "Y" 308 "Y" 60 "Y" 16 to 60

RESERVE

"Y" 35

3 Photc Bn Det

20 Rad Maint Unit

2 Photc Co

1

6

1

1

3

2

9

1

114

(20)

RECAPITULATION

	AIR COMBAT		EASTERN FORCE "Y" "Y"/508 "Y/60" "Y"/(16to60)		WESTERN FORCE "Y" "Y"/508 "Y/60" "Y"/(16to60)		RESERVE "Y"/55
11 Fiter Gps	2		6		2		1
2 Fiter Gps (M)	2						
3 Nite Fiter Sq	1		1		1		
2 Nite Fiter Sq (M)	2						
6 Tac Ren Sq	3		1		1		3
4 Med Bomb Gps			2				2
5 Light Bomb Gps	2		1		1		1
5 Photo Ren Sq	2		1		1		1
1 Photo Ren Sq (M)			1				
1 Med Bomb Gp (M)	1						
2 Troop Carrier Gps			2				
1 Air Sea Rescue Sq	1						
2 Liaison Gp	1						1
1 Weather Strike Ren Sq			1				
<u>AIR SERVICE</u>							
1 AF Fg - 5th AF			1				
1 ADVON FEAF			1				
1 ADVON - 7th AF							1
3 Comb Air Comd Hq			1				
1 AF Serv Comd Hq			1				
1 Bomber Comd Hq			1				

RECAPTULATIO

AIR SERVICE (Cont'd)

RESERVE

WESTERN FORCE

EASTERN FORCE

"Y" #35

"Y" #30 & #460
"Y" #16000

"Y" #30 & #460
"Y" #16000

	Uy#	EASTERN FORCE "Y" #30 & #460 "Y" #16000	WESTERN FORCE "Y" #30 & #460 "Y" #16000	RESERVE "Y" #35
8 Ord Bomb Disp Sq	3	2	1	2
6 Ord Amm Co	1	3	1	1
15 Ord S&M Co	5	10		
3 Ord Maint Co AF		2		1
11 QM Co (SG)	2	5	1	3
1 QM Depot (SG)		1		
31 QM Trk Co	10	10	4	7
3 Serv Gp Hq	2	1		
11 Sq & Base Serv Sq		2	3	6
11 Engrg Sq		2	3	6
11 Materiel Sq		2	3	6
2 Air Cargo Contl Sq	1		1	
3 Air Cargo Resupply Sq	2		1	
2 Aircraft Repair Unit (Flt)		1		1
6 Aircraft Maint Unit (Flt)		3		3
15 Air Serv Sq	7	8		
7 Airdrome Serv Sq	3	4		
1 Air Serv Gp		1		
1 Air Frt Fwd Sq		1		
1 Air Comb Contl Sq (Amph)	1			
1 Depot Unit Army	1			

~~RESTRICTED~~

AIR SERVICE (Cont'd)

RECAPITULATION

EASTERN FORCE

WESTERN FORCE

RESERVE

1st Lt "A" 16to60

1st Lt "A" 16to60

1st Lt "A" 16to60

- 1 Cent Balo Office
- 2 Balo Team
- 5 Supply Sq w/Int Dep
- 2 Comb Camera Unit
- 2 Emerg Bt. Res Sq
- 2 Photo Tech Sq
- 2 Photo Intell Det
- 1-1/3 Weather Det
- 1-1/3 AACS Det
- 19 MP Co
- 1 FEAF Sig En Det
- 3 Sig Bn CAC (Sep)
- 3 Comb Air Comm Sq
- 6 Sig Const Bn (H)
- 3 Sig Const Co (H)
- 3 Aircraft Wrn & Contl Gp
- 6 Radar Cal Det
- Sig Serv Aug Tm
- 1 Sig Serv Bn
- 1 Sig Serv Co
- 2 Radio Sq (Mob)

1
1
1
1
1
1
1-1/3
1-1/3
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
(As Req'd)

1
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1
1
1
1
1-1/3
1-1/3
4
1
1
1
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2
2
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1
1
2

1
1
1
1
1-1/3
1-1/3
4
1
1
1
1
1
2

2
1
1
1-1/3
1-1/3
5
2

(TBL)

RECAPITULATION

AIR SERVICE (Cont'd)	EASTERN FORCE NY# 302 NY/60" NY# (16to60)	WESTERN FORCE NY# 302 NY/60" NY# (16to60)	RESERVE NY# 735
4 Radio Security Sec	2		
6 Sig Serv Co Wg	6		
3 Sig Co Avn	1		
2 Sig Co TC Wg	1		
8 Sig Co (SG)	6		
1 Hq & Hq Co AWS	1		
1 Hq Par Air Wg			
4 MAW Redrons	1		
4 MAW Servons	1		
1 Air Serv Area Comd			
2 Med Supply Plat			1
2 Engr Avn Co (Sep)			2
4 Ord MAW Flats			4
4 Ord Bn Hq & Hq Det			4
3 Ord Depot Co			3
3 OM Supply Flat			3
3 Airdrome Sq			1
3 Aviation Sq			3
1 Aircraft assem Sq			1
3 Hq & Hq Sq ADG			3
3 Repair Sq ADG			3

RECAPITULATION

AIR SERVICE (Cont'd)

EASTERN FORCE

"Y" "Y"/308"Y/60" "Y"/(16to60)

WESTERN FORCE

"Y" "Y"/308"Y/60" "Y"/(16to60)

RESERVE

"Y"/35

6 Supply Sq ADG

1 Pet Lab (Mob)

2 Sig Depot Co

1

6

2

170

(196)

SECRET

RECAPITULATION

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT VS ASSAULT SEIFFING

"Y" DAY

ASSAULT LIFT AVAILABLE.....589,230 68,500 639,200
 HVY CARGO ASSLT (21 Lib)..... - 4,410 79,800
 TOTAL LIFT AVAILABLE.....589,230 72,910 719,000
 EASTERN FORCE LIFT.....241,326 34,265 317,323
 WESTERN FORCE LIFT.....301,004 38,550 399,785
 TOTAL LIFT REQUIRED.....542,330 72,815 717,108

"Y / 30"

TOTAL LIFT AVAILABLE.....589,230 72,910 719,000
 ALLOCTD "SHORT T/A".....21,000 5,400 35,000
 LIFT AVAILABLE.....577,230 67,510 684,000
 EASTERN FORCE LIFT.....169,038 33,095 260,950
 WESTERN FORCE LIFT.....228,779 44,469 354,462
 SUB-TOTAL LIFT REQUIRED.....397,817 77,564 615,412
 AFPAC RES "Y/35".....74,186 10,084 85,906
 TOTAL LIFT REQUIRED.....472,003 87,648 701,318
 LESS SERV TRPS. FROM U.S.....-26,872 2,973 35,942
 TOTAL LIFT REQUIRED.....445,221 84,675 665,376

TOTAL LIFT AVAILABLE.....577,230 67,510 684,000
 TO BE DELAYED UNTIL "Y/60"..... - 17,165 -

"SHORT TURN-AROUND" (KVUSFU)

TOTAL LIFT REQUIRED..... 81,002 21,466 139,120
 LIFT ALLOCATED TO MAKE 4... 21,000 5,400 35,000
 TRIPS FROM (Y TO Y / 60) x4
 TOTAL LIFT AVAILABLE 82,000 21,600 140,000

"Y / 60"

TOTAL LIFT REQUIRED..... 76,311 40,085 183,471
 PLUS POSSIBLE "Y/30" DELAY... - 17,165 -
 MAXIMUM REQUIREMENT..... 76,311 57,245 183,471
 TOTAL LIFT AVAILABLE..... 577,230 67,510 684,000

121

RESTRICTED

ANNEX 3b(3)(d) 1


STAFF STUDY

"CORONET"

AIR GARRISON

"Y + 15"

(WITH ASSAULT ECHELON)



WEST ASSAULT AREA

EAST ASSAULT AREA

ARMY

MARINE

FTR 2 GP
 NI FTR 1 SQ
 TAG R 2 SQ
 LB 1 GP
 PHOTO 1 SQ
 ASR 2 FLTS
 EQUIV 4 1/8 GP

FTR 2 GP
 NI FTR 1 SQ
 TAG R 2 SQ
 LB 1 GP
 PHOTO 1 SQ
 ASR 2 FLTS
 EQUIV 4 1/8 GP


FTR 2 GP
 NI FTR 1 SQ
 TAG R 2 SQ
 LB 1 GP
 PHOTO 1 SQ
 ASR 2 FLTS
 EQUIV 4 1/8 GP

LEGEND

Road, 4th Class
 Road, 3rd Class
 Cities with population below 400,000
 Towns

TOKYO AREA

Scale 1:1,000,000



RESTRICTED

~~RESTRICTED~~

ANNEX 3b (5) (b)

STAFF STUDY

"CORONET"


THE OBJECTIVE AREA AND CO-ORDINATING LINE

NOTE:

FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, RESPONSIBILITY FOR CO-ORDINATION OF AIR OPERATIONS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA IS ASSIGNED TENTATIVELY AS FOLLOWS:

Y-8 TO Y-15: PACIFIC FLEET.

Y-15 ONWARD: FEAF.



CO-ORDINATING LINE

THE CO-ORDINATING LINE FOLLOWS THE RAIL LINE FROM NIGATA (37° 56' N, 139° 02' E) THROUGH KITIKATA, KORIYAMA, AND TAIRA, TO THE BEACH AT HIRAKATA (36° 52', 140° 48' E)

CO-ORDINATING LINE


THE OBJECTIVE AREA

THE OBJECTIVE AREA IS BOUNDED ON ITS SEAWARD SIDE BY THE ARC OF A CIRCLE OF APPROXIMATELY 120 NAUTICAL MILES RADIUS CENTERED AT TATEYAMA (34° 59' N, 139° 52' E) AND STRIKING HONSHU AT HIRAKATA (36° 52' N, 140° 48' E) ON THE WEST AND TOYOHASHI (34° 46' N, 137° 24' E) ON THE SOUTH.

THE LAND BOUNDARY BEGINS AT THE BEACH DUE SOUTH OF TOYOHASHI AND FOLLOWS THE RAIL LINE NORTH FROM TOYOHASHI THROUGH ONO, LIDA, MATSUMOTO, SHINONOI, UEDA, TAKASAKI, ASHIKAGA, IMAICHI, SHIRAKAWA, KORIYAMA, AND TAIRA, TO THE BEACH AT HIRAKATA.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

~~RESTRICTED~~



6-2 DRAFTING

~~RESTRICTED~~

ANNEX 4

STAFF STUDY

"CORONET"

OPERATION - "CORONET"

PREFACE TO
ANNEX 4

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATION
OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT GIVEN
TO CINCPAC 16 JULY 1945
AND CINCPAC 21 JULY 1945.

ANNEX 4

BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

APPENDIX

- A CORONET BASE DEVELOPMENT
- B AMPHIBIOUS AND HEAVY CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS ✓
- C AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT ✓
- D BULK PETROLEUM FACILITIES
- E PORT AND BASE DEVELOPMENT
- F CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS
- G CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION CHART
- H ARTIFICIAL HARBOR

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PREFACE TO ANNEX 4

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
GIVEN TO CINCPAC 16 JULY 1945
AND CINCPAC 21 JULY 1945

1. Considering necessary means to be available, an analysis of the logistic support required for CORONET OPERATION indicates that the critical controlling factors are:

- a. Discharge of cargo from resupply ships off the beaches.
- b. Unloading cargo at the beaches.
- c. Dispersal of cargo from the beaches.
- d. Distribution of supplies to troops forward of the dispersal areas.

2. It is noted that no ports are available initially for this operation. Inclosure No. 1 shows the beaches which have been under consideration and the logistic support capacities of each in terms of fully supported divisions at 1,000 deadweight tons (2240 lbs) per day per division, and without regard to planned employment. It also shows the percentage of the time off-shore conditions permit cargo handling operations at each beach. By utilizing all engineer special brigades and similar units available in the Pacific, sufficient service effort can be provided to organize the beaches for the peak loads required to compensate for the unfavorable off-shore conditions.

3. Until discharging of cargo shipping in TOKYO WAN is possible, cargo import will be limited by the deferral of all construction except that essential to the success of the operation.

4. At SAGAMI WAN there is a partially protected anchorage. Sea conditions permit resupply operations over the beach 75 percent of the time. Inland, there are suitable storage areas and access roads for the dispersal and storage of cargo and a suitable road

[REDACTED]

net for forward distribution of supplies to the combat troops. Considering all these factors, it is estimated that a maximum of 14 divisions can be supported over the beach at SACAMI WAN.

5. The KUJUKURI HAMA is an exposed beach. Off-shore conditions permit operations 50 percent of the time. Again, there are suitable storage areas inland and an adequate road net for the dispersal and storage of cargo and forward distribution of supplies to the using troops. It is estimated that a maximum of 12 divisions can be supported over the KUJUKURI HAMA.

6. The beach at KUJI is also an exposed beach. Sea conditions will permit operations 45 percent of the time. The storage areas inland and the road net are suitable for the dispersal, storage and forward distribution of supplies. It is estimated that a maximum of 6 divisions can be supported from the KUJI beach. (Note: It is not planned to use this beach).

7. It is planned to use the lower portion of TONE GAWA for unloading lighterage and for a small craft harbor in rough weather.

8. In addition to the small craft harbor on the TONE GAWA, an artificial harbor is to be installed on KUJUKURI HAMA to protect small craft in rough weather and to provide fixed facilities for unloading Liberty ships. This is an insurance measure, as the operation can be supported without the use of such a harbor, if necessary, under average weather conditions. Details and design of such an artificial harbor are given in Annex 4, Appendix H.

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ANNEX 4

CORONET

BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

CORONET

BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

I. GENERAL

1. This operation consists of a major amphibious assault by Task Forces under control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC with the objective of landing forces on the SAGAMI WAN and KUJUKURI beaches in the TOKYO (KANTO) plain area of Central HONSHU for the purpose of destroying hostile forces, occupying the TOKYO plain, and forcing the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.
2. Army, Marine and associated Naval, and United Nations forces under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, for these operations are mounted with accompanying supplies and equipment from bases and stations in WESTERN PACIFIC and MIDDLE PACIFIC Ocean Areas, and from the Zone of Interior. Following assault landings these forces are supported by resupply shipping from the Zone of Interior augmented as required from bases as indicated hereinafter.
3. Forces of the Naval Service not under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, are mounted and supported as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
4. U. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES are supported logistically in accordance with current and future arrangements and Joint Chiefs of Staff directives.
5. The beaches on SAGAMI WAN and at KUJUKURI, are developed as navigation heads only, until suitable ports in TOKYO WAN are

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~~TOP SECRET~~

captured and become operative. Construction of facilities on these beaches and inland is held to the minimum necessary for the support of the operations of the ground combat and air forces. An artificial harbor is established on the KUJUKURI beach,

by the Navy (Appendix G). Stockages of supplies at navigation heads will be limited to 30 D/S for the forces being supported therefrom.

6. After occupation of suitable areas in the TOKYO WAN, bases will be developed with minimum construction. Augmentation of naval and air facilities are developed as required. Additional railroad and highway nets are rehabilitated to the extent necessary for the logistic support of the forces employed, and for the control of civilian population.

7. Logistically the operation has three distinct phases or time periods.

a. From Y Day until TOKYO WAN is captured and ports thereon become operative: During this period logistic support will, because of limitations of beach and clearance capacities, be limited to providing support for combat operations of ground combat forces, minimum operating facilities for air forces, fixed-bed hospitalization prescribed for the beachhead areas, a minimum temporary-type navigation head, and operational, and administrative facilities essential to effective functioning for a limited period.

b. From the time ports on TOKYO WAN become capable of receiving and clearing the major proportion of tonnages necessary to support all forces in the objective area until Y + 150 days: During this period operations of ground combat and air forces will be supported, ports and bases on TOKYO WAN will be developed, air operating facilities and fixed bed hospitalization completed,

~~TOP SECRET~~

rail and highway nets rehabilitated, and prescribed installations and administrative facilities established. Except for hospitalization, the construction of personnel housing is deferred until the third phase.

c. From Y / 150 days forward: Following Y / 150 days, operations of ground combat and air forces will be supported, all authorized projects will be brought to a state of completion, and the construction of personnel housing in accordance with prescribed standards will be authorized for initiation and completion.

8. Forces to be employed in these operations under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, consist of U. S. Army Ground and Air Forces, Marine and associated Naval forces placed under his control by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and forces of the United Nations placed under his control by direction of higher authority. Where hereinafter the term "AFPAC Forces" is used or employed, it will be understood to refer to all elements, as indicated above, of the combined forces employed under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC.

II. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, is responsible for the logistic support of all Army, Marine and associated Naval, and United Nations forces, (AFPAC Forces) employed under his control in this operation. Where certain equipment and supplies for elements of these forces not organic to the United States Army are, by agreement, to be provided by responsible agencies or commanders not under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, such equipment and supplies are provided in amounts and at times, and by methods as determined and prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, continues the logistic support missions for which he is now responsible or as may be later required for all Naval services under his command, and in addition is, by agreement, to be responsible for the logistic missions specifically indicated herein, except for Marine and associated Naval forces under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC. For Marine and associated Naval forces, a part of AFPAC Forces, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, provides necessary equipment and accompanying supplies, and additionally makes available Class II, IV and V supplies and shipping therefor for the resupply of these forces while employed in these operations. This resupply shipping is moved to AFPAC regulating stations in accordance with schedules coordinated with this headquarters.

3. The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, continues the logistic support missions for which he is now responsible, or as may be later assigned, for all forces under his command, and in addition is responsible for logistic missions specifically indicated herein.

4. The Commanding Generals, U. S. ARMY FORCES, MIDDLE and WESTERN PACIFIC, continue the logistic support missions for which they are now responsible, or as may be later assigned, for all Army forces in their respective areas, and in addition for the logistic missions specifically indicated herein.

5. The Commanding Generals of Armies are responsible for the logistic support of their commands at all times, except as modified hereinafter. In addition, they are responsible for rendering direct logistic support to all AFPAC Forces, not attached to

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them, but employed within their respective Army areas in the objective, until such time as this responsibility is transferred by direction of this headquarters.

6. The U. S. ARMY SERVICE COMMAND C (short title USASCOM-C) is organized with headquarters, base, service, and construction troops sufficient to render logistic support to combat forces, and accomplish approved project construction in the objective areas. The Commanding General, USASCOM-C, is responsible for rendering direct logistic support to AFPAC Forces as follows:

a. Initially adequate service troops of USASCOM-C are attached to Armies to perform the functions of direct logistic support during the early phases of the operation in each Army objective area, during which period Army Commanders are responsible for direct logistic support of all AFPAC Forces within their respective areas.

b. Upon direction of this headquarters, the responsibility for rendering direct logistic support in each Army objective area is transferred from Army Commanders to the Commanding General, USASCOM-C, at which time the service troops of USASCOM-C attached to Armies, in accordance with paragraph a, above, will revert to the control of the Commanding General, USASCOM-C. The target date for the transfer of this responsibility for rendering direct logistic support in each area is the initial landing date in each area plus 20 days.

7. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for planning for and procurement of means to provide logistic support for AFPAC Forces employed in these operations, including the procurement, loading and sailing of cargo transportation required for the transport of equipment,

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supplies and materials to accomplish this objective, except Classes II, IV and V for Marine and associated Naval forces, Air force technical supplies and air ammunition and materiel peculiar to attached United Nations forces, but including transportation of Air Force technical supplies and air ammunition. The responsibility of the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, will terminate upon the arrival of cargo shipping transporting equipment, supplies, and materials at AFPAC Regulating Stations, or other ports in accordance with approved schedules and directives of this headquarters, where such shipping will upon arrival come under the control of the Commanding General, USASCOM-C. In executing the above responsibilities, he will exercise maximum coordination with Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, the Commanding Generals, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, ARMIES and USASCOM-C.

8. The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, is responsible for planning for and procurement of all materiel peculiar to the Air Forces required to provide logistic support for the U. S. ARMY AIR FORCES and attached air forces except for equipment and supplies used and provided exclusively by these attached forces, and loading of the heavy shipping in Zone of Interior provided and moved by the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC, to accomplish this objective. In executing the above responsibilities, he will exercise maximum coordination with Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, Commanding Generals, ARMIES, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, and USASCOM-C.

9. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY SERVICE COMMAND C is responsible for planning for and execution of direct logistic support of AFPAC Forces in the objective area, including the establishment of ports, bases, and installations, and construction

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of projects approved and directed by this headquarters. He is responsible for movement of cargo shipping transporting equipment, supplies, and materials as provided by the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC, in accordance with paragraph 7, above, from AFPAC Regulating Stations, or other points where it comes under his control, to the objective area following approved schedules and directives of this headquarters, and its receipt and discharge thereat. In planning for the execution of the above, he will exercise maximum coordination with the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC.

III. SUPPLY.

1. a. The Commanding Generals, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, U.S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, and U. S. ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC, stock at appropriate bases sufficient supplies to accompany all Army forces employed in the operation for which they are responsible for mounting, as indicated below. Additionally, planned levels of supply to be accumulated in objective area at a uniform rate starting at Y / 60 are as shown below.

<u>CLASSES</u>	<u>TROOPS LANDING Y / 29</u>	<u>TROOPS LANDING AFTER Y / 29</u>	<u>PLANNED ULTIMATE LEVELS OF SUPPLY IN OBJECTIVE</u>
Class I - B-type	10 D/S	20 D/S	} 45 D/S
Emergency types	20 D/S	10 D/S	
Water	Minimum of 2 gal per individual in unit transportation	As prescribed by unit	
Class II and IV (less construction materials)	30 D/S	30 D/S	45 D/S

Classes III and III A	15 D/S (Class IIIA, MT gas and ADF) 30 D/S (Class III less MT and ADF)	5 D/S (MT and ADF) 15 D/S (Class III less MT and ADF)	30 D/S 3 U/F
Class V (Combat troops)	5 U/F	5 U/F	10 U/F
Class V (Service troops)	3 U/F	3 U/F	3 U/F
Class VA	30 D/S	15 D/S	45 D/S
Class IV (Construction materials)	Sufficient quantities of materials and equipment required to initiate minimum construction and rehabilitation of airdromes, bulk petroleum installations, signal communications and port facilities will accompany combat echelons in assault shipping or specially loaded cargo shipping.		As required for approved base development.

b. All Army and attached personnel employed in this operation are equipped prior to embarkation with winter clothing as prescribed in letter, this headquarters, file AG 420 (24 June 45) GD, dated 25 June 1945, subject: "Individual Clothing and Equipment for Temperate Zone".

c. Chemical warfare protective equipment and clothing will be introduced into the objective area as follows:

- (1) All units are equipped with authorized TO & E organization equipment.
- (2) Troops arriving in the objective area in Y Day assault echelons will take:
 - (a) On the individual:
 - 1 suit protective underwear
 - 2 prs protective socks
 - 1 pr protective gloves

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(b) In unit equipment:

1 complete suit protective clothing
(2 layer).

(3) Troops arriving in the objective area subsequent
to the assault echelons:

No individual protective clothing accompanies units.

(4) Loaded on resupply shipping available for
immediate movement to the objective area on
or after Y Day for the entire force:

1 extra suit protective clothing (2 layer)

1 extra suit protective underwear

2 extra pairs protective socks

15,000 field impregnation sets M1

2. Resupply.

a. Resupply will be direct from the Zone of Interior and the utilization of maximum possible quantities of supplies from bases in the Middle Pacific and Western Pacific Areas. Determination of the loading of all ships indicated herein is under the general supervision of this headquarters. Complete data on the loadings of all pre-loaded ships, including those tailored ships loaded for selective discharge will be communicated to Army Commanders for their concurrence or recommended changes by Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC. Requisitions for additional Class II and IV supplies may be submitted by Army Commanders provided they are items which the Army Commanders feel are not included in adequate quantities in pre-loaded resupply ships. These latter supplies are delivered in special loaded ships. Resupply is accomplished as "AUTOMATIC SUPPLY" for the first 90 days by the employment of preloaded, balanced and solid loaded ships as follows:

(1) Type A - 30 D/S of Classes I, II, III and IV
supplies of all services for 25,000 strength

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- Contains 750,000 B rations, 125,000 emergency rations and 750,000 accessory packs; a balanced stockage of Class III (less motor gasoline and Diesel fuel); 3 medical maintenance units plus supplemental expendables; spare parts, cleaning and preserving materials, and miscellaneous expendable items of all services, including Information and Education and Red Cross supplies.
- (2) Type B - Solid loaded 18 D/S Quartermaster Class I supplies for 100,000.
 - (3) Type C - Solid loaded with 30 D/S of Class III supplies for 30,000 (this ship to be employed only during early phases or until bulk shore storage is in operation).
 - (4) Type D - Solid loaded with 30 D/S Class III supplies for 175,000. (This type ship to be employed after distribution from bulk shore storage is in operation. Contains petroleum products not stored in bulk installations).
 - (5) Type E - Balance loaded with 30 D/S of Class II and IV Quartermaster, Signal, Medical, Chemical Warfare, Information and Education, and Red Cross supplies for 100,000.
 - (6) Type F - Solid loaded with balanced load of ammunition for all calibers of weapons of U. S. Army combat elements of the force.
 - (7) Type G - Solid loaded with all types of ammunition required, based on estimated rates of expenditures, to maintain an adequate ammunition supply.

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- (8) Air Force Technical and Ammunition - Balance loaded ships containing Air Forces technical supplies and ammunition loaded to meet phased requirements for Air Forces to be established in the objective area.
- (9) Engineer, Ordnance (Classes II and IV) and Signal - In addition to the above specific type loads, engineer, ordnance (Classes II and IV) and signal supplies and materials will be lifted in ships with tailored loads to meet phased requirements for those services.
- (10) Marine and associated Naval Forces - Additional ships of similar type loads designed to support Marine forces are employed. These ships are designated with the appropriate type letter as above with the suffix "M" added to identify the ships designated for Marine and associated Naval forces.

b. Reserve Supplies.

- (1) Floating Reserves - The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC schedules ship sailings with sufficient lead time so that there is available at the AFPAC Regulating Station, in addition to current requirements, floating reserves during periods as follows:

	<u>Y / 5 to</u>	<u>Y / 45 to</u>
	<u>Y / 45 days</u>	<u>Y / 90 days</u>
Type A:	12 ships	6 ships
Type C:	4 ships	None
Type D:	None	2 ships

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Type G:	4 ships	2 ships
Air Forces TS and LMM:	3 ships	2 ships
Air Forces Solid Avgas:	3 ships	2 ships
Signal, Class IV:	1 ship	None
Engineer, Class IV:	5 days' estimated consumption	None

Toxic Chemicals for

Air Forces	2 ships	2 ships
Ground Forces	1 ship	1 ship

(a) The Commanding General, USASCOM C distributes to the objective area or to bases as directed by this headquarters the floating reserves on hand at Y / 90 days.

(2) Emergency reserves.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC OCEAN AREA, is to earmark supplies in the amounts and locations as indicated below, these supplies to be held available to meet emergency requirements as determined and directed by this headquarters:

1. At SAIPAN:

Army Supplies:

Class I	30 D/S for 200,000
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Class II and IV (Less construction and aviation):	30 D/S for:
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- 4 Divisions
- 1 8" How Bn
- 2 Med Tk Bns
- 2 JA.SCO's
- 2 Med Bns
- 5 Engr Bns (C)

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- 1 AAA Bn (G) (Mbl)
- 2 AAA Bns (G) (SM)
- 2 AAA Bns (AW) (SM)
- 2 155 mm Gun Bns (CA) (SM)
- 2 155 mm Gun Bns (FA)
- 2 155 mm How Bns

Class III (Less aviation): 30 D/S for 100,000

Class IIIA - 1,000,000 gals and associated lubricants, drummed and packaged.

Class V:

- 15 U/F for one Division
- 20 U/F for one 155 mm Gun Bn
- 15 U/F for one 155 mm How Bn
- 5 U/F for one Tank Bn
- 15 U/F for one AAA Gun Bn
- 10 U/F for one Chem Wpns Co

2. At GUAM:

For Marine Corps units:

Class II and IV (less construction and aviation) 30 D/S for:

- 2 Divisions
- 2 AAA Bns
- 2 155 mm Gun Bns
- 2 155 mm How Bns
- 2 JASCO's

Class V:

- 15 U/F for one Division
- 20 U/F for one 155 mm Gun Bn
- 15 U/F for one 155 mm How Bn
- 5 U/F for one AAA Bn
- 10 U/F for one Chem Wpns Co

Class III: 30 D/S for 100,000 men

Class IIIA: 1,000,000 gals with associated lubricants.

(b) The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, will provide emergency reserves, to be released only by direction

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of this headquarters, as follows:

1. Earmark from current stockages in PHILIPPINES, the following:

Class I: 30 D/S for:
200,000

Class II and IV (less construction materials) 30 D/S for:

1 240 How Bn
1 8" How Bn
1 TD Bn
1 Amphib Tk Bn
1 Amphib Tractor Bn
2 155 mm How Bns
1 Chem Mortar Bn
4 Engr Combat Bns
2 JASCO's

Class V: 5 U/F for one 240 How Bn
5 U/F for one 8" How Bn

2. Emergency reserves for air resupply from KYUSHU:

Thirty days supply for 40,000 strength (less petroleum products, artillery ammunition, and bombs) for emergency shipment by air and whole blood supply as later determined and as arranged with CINCPAC.

- (c) Resupply vessels are scheduled to arrive in objective area ports or beaches based upon the capacity of the ports and beaches of each area to discharge, and in sufficient number to meet the daily requirements for supplies for all classes. Partial discharge of ships to meet operational demands is permitted during the first 45 days of the operation.
- (d) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, is to procure, all Marine and Naval Class II, IV and V (ground ammunition) supplies and construction materials required

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exclusively for Marine and associated Naval forces and for facilities required for their support, and load in shipping provided by him. These supplies are moved in accordance with schedules approved by this headquarters and upon arrival at AFPAC Regulating Station will come under the control of the Commanding General, Field Armies or the Commanding General, USASCOM-C, as appropriate.

- (e) All resupply shipping will move to AFPAC Regulating Stations under the control of this headquarters. Movement forward of Regulating Stations is controlled by the Army Commanders until the responsibility for rendering logistic support is transferred from Army Commanders by direction of this headquarters; thereafter by the Commanding General, USASCOM-C insofar as determining the number and type of resupply ships to be moved into the objective area to meet operational demands are concerned.
- (f) The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC is responsible for the procurement of all supplies including supplies and materials required for the support of Military Government organizations functioning in the objective area including food, medical supplies and other items required for the relief of civilian population, liberated nationals and United Nations prisoners of war,

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and for transportation of the foregoing supplies to AFPAC Regulating Stations in accordance with schedules to be prescribed by this headquarters.

(g) The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC:

1. Provides water purification equipment in excess of organization T/O & Es and SLOEs as may be required by the Commanding Generals, Field Armies.
2. Arranges for replacement vehicles to arrive in the objective area after Y / 60 in single-unit pack (Sup) for assembly in the objective area by service forces there.

(h) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, is to:

1. Provide fresh water to Army forces in the objective area from water distillation ships to the extent available in quantities as required to meet the needs of such water requirements until adequate water supply is developed in the objective area.
2. Provides the services of the necessary YOG barges at OKINAWA for use of the Commanding Generals Field Armies or Commanding General, USA/SCOM-C, as appropriate, for transporting and

maintaining floating supplies of petroleum products in the objective area.

3. Provides materials for the construction of facilities required for the support of the Marine and associated Naval forces while these forces are under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC.
4. Provides the Army Commanders with pontoon string assemblies in the objective areas in quantities as subsequently specifically determined, within the limits of availability.

3. Bulk and packaged petroleum supplies are provided as follows:

a. Accompanying supplies of petroleum products are provided by the Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC FLEET, for U. S. Army Forces mounted from bases under the control of the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC, and for Marine and associated Naval forces mounting from bases under the control of Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC FLEET, and Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC OCEAN AREA, and for all elements of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET in accordance with existing procedures.

b. Accompanying supplies of petroleum products for forces mounting from the PHILIPPINES, KYUSHU and RYUKYUS are furnished by the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, in accordance with existing procedures.

c. Resupply.

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC, is responsible for the resupply of all petroleum products to and within

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the objective area for all forces, except FLEET forces (including elements of attached United Nations fleets), that are normally supplied by Naval service squadrons or divisions. During the amphibious phases of the operation, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC, loads shuttle tankers at KYUSHU or other areas as requested by COMPHIBSPAC to meet requirements of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC in the objective area. After the amphibious phases, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC (Sub-Area Petroleum Officer, CORONET) will call forward shuttle tankers as required. Resupply of packaged petroleum products to those forces for which Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC is responsible for supply is effected by Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC.

d. Supply of petroleum products in the objective area is accomplished as follows:

- (1) Initially by drums and packaged products accompanying troops in assault echelons followed by floating supply in petroleum barges containing Avgas, Mogas and automotive Diesel fuel.
- (2) Each barge is equipped with the necessary materials to establish pipelines ashore, surge tanks, and devices for delivering petroleum products to tank trucks and drums. Barges are refilled by tankers.
- (3) Prompt initiation of construction of shore storage installations with necessary tanker discharge lines permits early delivery of products direct from tankers. Existing facilities to be used to the maximum practicable extent.
- (4) By resupply ships from the U. S. carrying

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packaged products.

e. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC, and Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC FLEET, provide such tankers as are necessary for shuttle service and floating storage. Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC FLEET, is responsible for the operation and movement of these tankers as requested by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC, controls the movement of certain specified small tankers and barges in the objective area for the purpose of distributing products from shuttle tankers and from commercial tankers.

f. Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC:

- (1) Fabricates in advance and provides to Army Commanders assemblies for filling gasoline drums and cans in the field and/or roadside convoy refueling, together with necessary pipeline and booster pumps to permit the construction of bulk petroleum products distribution systems.

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IV. EVACUATION.

1. Evacuation from the objective areas, initially, is by suitably-equipped and surgically-staffed surface vessels. Hospital ships, APHs, converted APAs, and APAs are utilized; the more serious type of cases being evacuated in the hospital ships as practicable. In emergency, small naval assault craft or heavy cargo shipping are utilized, but due to the limited facilities aboard these vessels, patients are not carried further than the KYUSHU area on these types of vessel. Air evacuation is established from the objective area at the earliest practicable date. Evacuation is to ports and rear bases where bed credits have been established. Evacuation from the objective areas direct to the zone of interior is initiated as soon as practicable.

2. Responsibility for evacuation is as follows:

a. Army commanders are responsible for the initial treatment and evacuation of all casualties in their respective areas.

b. The Army commanders or Commanding General, USASCOM-C, as appropriate, are in their respective objective areas, responsible for the evacuation from Army installations to hospitals, beaches, or air strips, as appropriate.

c. Overwater evacuation by surface craft is by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, is responsible for air evacuation except by ATC as indicated in paragraph 7 below.

e. Secondary evacuation from rear bases to the zone of interior is the responsibility of the Commanding Generals,

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U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific and Western Pacific, within their respective areas. Full use is made of the available ATC air lift for secondary evacuation to the Zone of Interior. Hospital ships are also used for secondary evacuation to the Zone of Interior.

f. The respective commanders designated above are responsible that transportation facilities evacuating casualties have adequate medical equipment, personnel and supplies to care for patients enroute,

3. Commanding General, USASCOM-C, is responsible for the early establishment of fixed hospitals in the objective areas, and the reception and hospitalization of casualties evacuated thereto from mobile hospitals of the combat forces. Full use is made of existing buildings, in order to expedite this program.

4. Geneva-protected hospital ships in support of this operation are under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Initially, these ships evacuate patients to ports and bases in the Pacific where bed credits have been established. When direct evacuation to the Zone of Interior has been established, they may be utilized for such evacuation as determined by this headquarters.

5. The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, employs troop carrier planes for the evacuation of casualties from the objective areas to bases at KYUSHU, OKINAWA, and the PHILIPPINES. He also makes available for evacuation purposes, liaison squadrons supplemented by helicopter planes for use in the forward objective areas.

6. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, provides

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surgically-staffed LSTs for use off the landing beaches in the objective area during the assault phase of the operations. These vessels are equipped to provide emergency treatment and primary essential surgery. Patients are classified according to the seriousness of their injuries and transferred to other vessels for definitive treatment and for further evacuation.

7. This headquarters arranges with the Commanding General, Pacific Division, ATC, for evacuation of patients by air to the more distant hospitals and bases in the Pacific Ocean Area and to the Zone of Interior.

8. Salvageable material is not evacuated from the objective areas to bases in the rear. Repairable material is reconditioned in the objective areas with fourth and fifth echelon maintenance units provided for that purpose, and returned to combat organizations. Material which cannot be made combat serviceable is utilized to meet the requirements of military government or otherwise disposed of as directed by this headquarters. Captured material, surplus to the needs of combat forces and Military Government agencies, is assembled and held for later disposition as directed by this headquarters.

9. Prisoners of war are confined in the objective areas. Evacuation from the objective areas is by direction of this headquarters only.

10. Civilian casualties are not evacuated from the objective areas.

V. HOSPITALIZATION.

1. During the early phases of operations and prior to the establishment of fixed hospitals in the objective areas,

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minor casualties are hospitalized in mobile-type hospitals assigned to the Task Forces. Casualties requiring prolonged treatment within the period of Y to Y / 90 are hospitalized in fixed hospitals established in the WESTERN PACIFIC, MIDDLE PACIFIC and KYUSHU Areas and similar hospitals as they become established in the objective areas.

2. Reception and hospitalization of patients evacuated from objective areas to MIDDLE PACIFIC, WESTERN PACIFIC and KYUSHU Areas are the responsibility of the commanders of those areas.

3. a. The Commanding Generals, WESTERN and MIDDLE PACIFIC Areas, make available, by prior clearing of hospital beds in respective areas, the necessary bed credits to Y / 90, as follows:

WESTERN PACIFIC Area	Y-Day	10,000
	Y / 10	15,000 additional
MIDDLE PACIFIC Area	Y-Day	4,000
	Y / 7	6,000 additional
KYUSHU Area	Y-Day	10,000

4. In order to reduce evacuation from objective areas, fixed-type hospital units, station and general hospitals, designated for this operation, are established there in accordance with phases prescribed in Appendix "E", pages one and two. Initially, these units function in existing buildings or under canvas, with essential prefabricated buildings. The Commanding General, USASCOM-C, is responsible for establishing 45,000 fixed hospital beds in the objective areas. The Commanding General, USASCOM-C, provides complete prefabricated construction (temperate-climate type) for 100 percent of total

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hospital beds before 15 October 1946.

5. Calling forward of Military Government civilian hospital units to their respective areas is the responsibility of the Army commanders or the Commanding General, USASCOM-C, as appropriate.

6. The maximum use, consistent with the minimum needs of the civilian population, is made of existing civilian hospitals and other suitable buildings for hospitalization of casualties.

VI. TRANSPORTATION.

1. Naval assault shipping is employed for necessary concentration of troops and transportation of assault and follow-up elements, with accompanying supplies, forward from mounting areas to the objective areas, augmented by heavy shipping as required.

2. Estimate of troops, equipment, and cargo, including maintenance, construction materials, and supplies for the Military Government moved into the objective area, is included in Appendix B.

3. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is to be responsible for the following:

a. Provision of over-water transportation for troops and accompanying supplies employed in these operations, at times and to places as previously arranged with Army commanders and with this headquarters.

b. The control of movement incident to necessary security of all shipping operating in direct support of these operations, including Geneva-protected hospital ships.

c. Provisions of amphibious and other craft for lighterage purposes, including use for discharge of Army shipping in the objective areas.

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d. Movement of slow convoys of harbor craft barges and other slow moving vessels and tankers to objective area, prior to or coincident with planned first arrival of heavy shipping.

e. Harbor clearance and harbor development to the high water mark of all harbor areas in the target areas, including all dredging operations and construction of complete artificial harbor, but excluding construction of piers, wharves, jetties, and other harbor installations for Army ports except as part of artificial harbor.

f. Provision, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, of the necessary number of dredges required for development work in the objective area.

4. The loading of troops and equipment for movement by Naval assault shipping is the responsibility of Army commanders or the Commander-in-Chief, USASCOM-C. The loading of cargo shipping employed for the movement of troops and equipment is the responsibility of the Commanding Generals, U. S. Army Forces, Middle and Western Pacific, at all ports and bases under their respective control. The loading of troop units and equipment from Zone of Interior ports is arranged by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, with appropriate agencies.

5. The Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, is responsible for the following:

a. Coordination of loading of cargo ships with the appropriate commanders of all agencies responsible for loading support shipping to assure compliance with the general procedure outlined above and with detailed plans to be later perfected and provided to appropriate agencies.

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b. Loading shipping with type loads as indicated in paragraph 2 a of Section III, above, to provide support for the forces until Y / 90 days.

c. Provision of floating reserve ships as indicated in paragraph 2 b (1) of Section III above.

d. Arranging for all trans-Pacific shipping moving supplies and equipment in support of these operations to be sailed to the AFPAC Regulating Station, in accordance with schedules as approved by this headquarters.

e. Provision of lighterage facilities required in the objective area, taking into consideration lighterage furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

f. Arranging for the assembly, at a forward point to be designated later, of harbor craft required for later movement to the objective area and provision of necessary personnel to man and care for such craft.

g. Provision of additional cargo shipping, both small and heavy type, from that under his control, for special loadings and to meet unforeseen or emergency requirements for such shipping in support of this operation.

h. Providing and loading the following barges in appropriate numbers:

- (1) Reefer barges .
- (2) Spare part barges, specially stocked with Engineer, ordnance, signal and marine repair spare parts in such manner that stocks are readily accessible.
- (3) Barges (1) and (2) above are loaded in the United States and moved to the objective area via later determined barge assembly points.

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6. The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, is responsible for the following:

a. Operation of troop transport groups in the service of evacuating casualties from the objective area to KYUSHU or OKINAWA by air.

b. Transportation by air to the objective area of emergency supplies as required by Army Commanders and as directed by this headquarters.

c. Provision of L-5 ambulance evacuation planes for evacuation of casualties from forward areas and on forward flight for movement of light-weight spare parts or critically needed light-weight supplies to appropriate artillery liaison plane landing strips.

7. In order to regulate flow of shipping into the objective port areas, regulating and control stations are established at locations to be designated by this headquarters. Ships are called forward from the Regulating Station by the Commanding Generals, Armies or USASCOM-C as appropriate and as directed by this headquarters. Determination as to convoy sailings from the AFPAC Regulating Station are in accordance with schedules pre-arranged between this headquarters and the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

8. a. In those ports in the objective areas developed and operated exclusively by either the Army or the Navy, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, or the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for their respective ports exercise complete and independent control over shipping arriving therein.

b. Ports where facilities are established by both the Army and the Navy, each for its own use, but which are so located that there must be in common employment of roadsteads, harbor

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waters, and port clearance facilities are controlled as follows: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, exercises general control of the regulation and flow of Army and Navy shipping to avoid confusion in ports and of port clearance facilities. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, schedules arrivals of Naval shipping, based upon his ability to discharge and clear cargos through the Naval port facilities and the joint port clearance facilities coordinating such schedules with Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC.

c. Common ports where port and port clearance facilities as established or as may be established must be used jointly by both services are operated as follows: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, exercises control, determining in advance the overall amount of shipping for both the Army and Navy which can be received and cleared through the joint port and port clearance facilities. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, submits in advance his requirements for import tonnage in such ports to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC, who, based upon similar requirements for import tonnage to meet Army requirements, determines the amount of shipping that can be received for each service during each 15-day period for each port falling under this classification.

d. The classification of ports in b and c above is made at a later date, based upon final determination of facilities to be established and operated in the objective area by the Army and the Navy.

9. Shipping designators:

TOKYO	BULL
YOKOHAMA	EVIL
Others	To be announced later.

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10. To assist in port clearance by minimizing motor traffic on roads to the greatest extent possible, the maximum use is made of railways and rolling stock that is captured within the operation areas, and that which can be rapidly rehabilitated without the introduction of major railroad equipment tonnages.

VII. CONSTRUCTION

1. General information for facilities established in the objective area is shown in Appendix A. Detailed information of Air Field Construction, Petroleum Bulk Facilities, Port and Base Construction, and phased construction tonnages are shown in Appendices C, D, E and F respectively.

2. Construction is limited to the provision of minimum essential operational facilities. During the first 60 days of the operation, while combat forces are supported over the beaches, development of facilities thereat are limited to the establishment of airdromes, communications, navigation heads, temporary cargo unloading facilities, construction of essential roads, cargo disposal areas, and rehabilitation of vitally needed railroads.

3. When bases on TOKYO WAN become operative, minimum essential operative port and base facilities required for support of combat forces are provided. Personnel housing is deferred to Y / 150. Separate plans are made for the provision of personnel housing to be constructed subsequent to Y / 150.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, constructs in the objective area facilities determined by him as required for the support of Naval forces not under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC.

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5. The Commanding General, USASCOM "C" determines the requirements for each of the interested agencies, formulates tentative layout plans for the development of objective area sites for submission to this headquarters for approval. After review, coordination and approval of these layout plans, by this headquarters, the Commanding General, USASCOM-C, is responsible for the completion of detailed planning and construction of approved facilities initiated by the Army Commanders.

6. Army Commanders employing construction forces made available to them initiate construction of port, base and air facilities. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, or the Commanding General, USASCOM-C upon relieving Army Commanders of logistic responsibility, as appropriate, continues construction of approved projects. Emphasis is placed on restoration of port facilities to operative conditions at the earliest possible date.

7. Land areas required in the objective area for installations of port, base and operating facilities for Army, Navy and Air installations, are allocated by this headquarters as follows:

a. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET advises this headquarters at the earliest practical date of the areas desired for the installation of Naval facilities.

b. The Commanding Generals of each Army, the FAR EASTERN AIR FORCES and USASCOM-C advise this headquarters by Y - 150 of the areas desired for installation of required facilities in the objective area.

c. At the earliest practical date following receipt of stated requirements, information of tentative allocations

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will be disseminated to all interested commanders by this headquarters.

d. Army Commanders initiate allocation of areas in their respective areas conforming as closely as possible to the preliminary allocations made by this headquarters. Changes in allocation which may be necessary because of configuration of terrain or for other cogent reasons may be made by Army Commanders, and such adjustments are reported to this headquarters on appropriate maps.

e. Upon transfer of responsibility for rendering logistic support of areas by direction of this headquarters from Army Commanders to the Commanding General USASCOM-C, the latter commander allocates areas as indicated in paragraph c. above.

VIII. MAIL

1. Commanding Generals, U. S. ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC and WESTERN PACIFIC arrange for collection of mail from staging and mounting areas immediately following the embarkation of troops therefrom and for the prompt redirection of all mail for units enroute to the objective area and for forwarding to the objective area.

2. Distribution of mail in the objective area is initiated at the earliest possible date, and is accomplished in accordance with existing regulations. Mail distribution in the objective area is established by Y / 30 days.

IX. REPLACEMENTS

Army Air, Ground, Service, Marine and associated Naval, and United Nations forces replacements are established in the objective area.

X. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Maximum use is made of available local installations and civilian and prisoner of war labor.

2. The Commanding Generals, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC and USASCOM-C, submit to this headquarters not later than Y - 180, arrangements for accomplishment of the foregoing logistic missions including plans and specifications for base installations in the objective area required by them for support of the forces employed in this operation.

3. The Commanding Generals, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC and USASCOM-C, or their representatives, are prepared at any time after Y - 180 to brief representatives of this headquarters or headquarters of major forces employed in this operation concerning the proposed method of rendering logistic support and the current status of implementation thereof for any or all objective areas.

4. The Commanding Generals FAR EAST AIR FORCES, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, make available, upon call of the Commanding Generals, ~~ARMIES~~, staff representatives to assist in planning the initiation of construction for the objective areas.

a. This headquarters is responsible for coordination of logistic planning for this operation. It specifies the time and place representatives of the various supporting agencies report for this purpose.

OPERATION - CORNET

BASE DEVELOPMENT

TYPE FACILITY	SAGAMI-WAN (Western Area)	KUJUKURI-HAMA (Eastern Area)	TOKYO-YOKOHAMA	REMARKS
(a) <u>Joint Enterprises Common to All Forces</u>				
(1) Harbor	Beach Head Facilities Only	Beach Head Facilities CHOSHII Harbor, Artificial Harbor (Navy construction)	TOKYO YOKOHAMA	
(2) Port or Beach Capacity Required (DWT/Day)	20,000	20,000	40,000	Includes Lighterage
(3) Fixed Port Facilities	Liberty Berths: 7 Lighter Jetties: 10	Lighter Jetties (within artificial harbor) 62 Lighter Jetties: 32 (Tama River) Additional Facilities in Artificial Harbor to handle 8,000 DWT/Day to be constructed by Navy	Liberty Berths: 50 Lighter Jetties: 67	
(4) Petroleum Storage	Avgas: 61,000 bbls MT Gas: 200,000 bbls ADF: 75,000 bbls Range Fuel and Kerosene: 35,000 bbls	Avgas: 171,000 bbls MT Gas: 185,000 bbls ADF: 70,000 bbls Range Fuel and Kerosene: 35,000 bbls	Facilities included in those planned for SAGAMI-WAN	AVGAS Requirements based on 30 Air Group Garrison. For 53 Air Group Garrison and AVGAS Storage: SAGAMI-WAN - 70,000 bbls KUJUKURI-HAMA - 130,000 bbls
(5) Road Construction, Improvements and Maintenance	645 Miles (includes 150 miles new construction)	596 Miles (includes 160 miles new construction)	Included in requirements for SAGAMI-WAN and KUJUKURI-HAMA	
(6) Railroads	415 Miles (includes 20 miles new construction)	270 Miles (includes 30 miles new construction)	Included in requirements for SAGAMI-WAN and KUJUKURI-HAMA	Rehabilitation of existing railroad system to extent necessary to support operations without introduction of major equipment tonnages.
(7) Prisoner of War and Undesirable Persons Detention Camps for strength of:	140,000 Civilians 75,000 POW	60,000 Civilians 25,000 POW	Included in requirements for SAGAMI-WAN and KUJUKURI-HAMA	

OPERATION - CORGIET

BASE DEVELOPMENT (CONT'D)

TYPE FACILITY	SAGAMI-WAN (Western Area)	KUJUKUHI-HAMA (Eastern Area)	TOKYO-YOKOHAMA	REMARKS
(6) Water Supply for strength of:	559,000	500,000	1,000,000	Requirements for TOKYO-YOKOHAMA include those shown under SAGAMI-WAN and KUJUKUHI-HAMA.
(b) <u>GROUND FORCES:</u>				
(1) Supply Points	Temporary facilities to support 550,000 for 30 days.	Temporary facilities to support 500,000 for 30 days.	Major Base facilities to support 1,000,000 with 45 days of supply	
(2) Covered Storage: (Sq Ft)	550,000	500,000	6,750,000	Includes airforce requirements
(3) Covered Repair Shops: (Sq Ft)	None	None	3,000,000	Includes airforce requirements
(4) Open Storage: (Sq Ft)	8,250,000	7,500,000	22,500,000	Includes airforce requirements
(5) Motor Vehicle Assembly Shops	None	None	3 Shops	
(6) Salvage Segregation Depots	None	None	2 Depots	
(7) Rehabilitation Camps for strength of:	Included in requirements for TOKYO-YOKOHAMA	None	100,000	
(8) Replacement Camps for strength of:	-	50,000	-	
(9) Readjustment Camps for strength of:	Included in requirements for TOKYO-YOKOHAMA		25,000	
(10) Semi-permanent Cantonments, Unit camps, etc.	350,000	150,000	Included in requirements for SAGAMI-WAN	Includes airforce requirements

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OPERATION - CORONET

BASE DEVELOPMENT (CONT'D)

TYPE FACILITY	SAGAMI-MAE (Western Area)	KUJUKUHI-HAMA (Eastern Area)	TOKYO-YOKOHAMA	REMARKS
(11) Hospital Beds	24,500	18,250		Included in requirements for SAGAMI-MAE and KUJUKUHI-HAMA
(12) Headquarters	1 AF Headquarters 590,000 Sq ft Temporary facilities for: GHQ AFPC ASCCAC Base 1 ASCCA FELF FELSG Military Govt Hq	1 AF Headquarters 50,000 Sq ft Base 2 ASCCA (Temporary initially residual semi-permanent)	GHQ AFPC ASCCAC FELF Military Govt Hq	
(c) AIR FORCES.				
(1) Air Depots	1 - 3 Group	None	None	
(2) A.T.C.	None	None		Freight and Passenger terminal in vicinity of TOKYO
(3) Airfields	3 - 6,000 feet 1 - 6,000 ft (dirt crash strip) 444 Equip Hardstands	1 - 8000 Foot Marine 1 - 6000 Foot " 1 - 7000 Foot Army 5 - 6000 Foot " 169 Equip Hardstands (Marine) 865 Equip Hardstands (Army)		
(4) A.M.C.S.	As Required	As Required	As Required	

NOTE: All facilities for Marine Corps other than where otherwise stated are included under Ground and Air Forces.

OPERATION - "CORONET"

AMPHIBIOUS AND HEAVY CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS

For period ending:	Y / 15	Y / 30	Y / 45	Y / 60	Y / 75	Y / 90	Y / 120	Y / 150	Y / 180
PERSONNEL (Excl Navy Service but incl 4 NCB)									
Assault Craft	490330	42000	469003	18000	76311				
Replacements (Assault Craft)	52000		24000						
Airborne	4889		8633						
Cargo Craft					24112	81.88			
Total	547215	42000	501636	18000	100423	81.88			
Cumulative Total	547215	589215	1090851	1100851	1209274	1217462	1217462	1217462	1217462
TONNAGES (DWT) (Excl Naval Cons)									
Amph Lift									
Org Equip (incl 30 days maint)	639008	70000	701502	34120	183471				
Engr A & P stores (b)	10635	8432	15267	7717	6065				
Mil Gov't Supplies									
Sub-total	649643	78432	716769	41837	189536				
Cargo Lift									
Org Equip (incl 30 days maint)	37100(10)	41000(11)			25483(16)	9333(7)			
Maint (less arm)		117800(20)	214600(36)	218400(37)	318200(53)	320000(53)	640000(107)	640000(107)	480000(80)
Ammunition									
Ground Forces	67500(12)	67500(12)	117500(20)	117500(20)	117500(20)	117500(20)	310750(52)	310750(52)	
Air Forces		14709(3)	5984(1)	22688(4)	5984(1)	20243(4)	17093(3)	17093(3)	
Air Force Tech Supplies		6995(1)	3980(1)	6463(1)	3875(1)	1481(e)	1010(e)	700(a)	700(a)
Construction Material	50244(12)	97309(16)	114341(19)	105913(18)	82528(14)	78646(13)	227433(38)	218057(36)	126156(22)
Engr A & P Stores	31905(5)	24998(4)	45803(8)	23153(4)	18195(3)				
Mil Gov't Supplies		9450(2)	22900(4)	36200(6)	38350(6)	32350(5)	71600(12)	66000(11)	67600(11)
Sub-total	186749(39)	379761(69)	524508(89)	530317(90)	610115(116)	579553(102)	1267886(212)	1252600(209)	674656(113)
AGGREGATES									
Amph	649643	78432	716769	41837	189536				
Cargo (d)	186749(39)	379761(69)	524508(89)	530317(90)	610115(116)	579553(102)	1267886(212)	1252600(209)	674656(113)
Total	836392	458193	1241277	572154	798646	580558	1267886	1252600	674656
CUMULATIVE									
Amph	647938	726370	1443139	1484976	1674512	1674512	1674512	1674512	1674512
Cargo	186749(39)	568210(108)	1092718(197)	1623035(287)	2233150(403)	2812703(505)	4080589(717)	5333189(926)	6007845(1039)
Total	834687	1294580	2535857	3108011	3907662	4487215	5755101	7007701	7682357

NOTES: (a) Represents tonnage to be lifted but to be loaded on vessels carrying maintenance or other supplies.
 (b) Engineer A and P stores which must accompany combat troops in amphibious lift.
 (c) Figures in parenthesis () represent number of Liberty ships equivalents at 6000 DWT.
 (d) Fully stated requirement, not reduced to reflect over-the-beach cargo handling limitations.

OPERATION - "CONQUEST" (Cont'd)

EASTERN AREA

<u>E. D. C.</u>	<u>FACILITIES</u>	<u>RUNWAYS (Cumulative)</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Y / 15	Undispersed parking for 2 Fi Gps, 1 Hi Fi Sq, 3 Tac Ren Sq (F-6), 2 LB Gps, 2 Photo Ren Sqs, 1 Air Sea Rescue Sq, and 1 Ln Gp	1 - 6,000 ft (Army)	a. Of the three existing Jap fields at SOBAN (CH. 2), IYAKAWA, and KAWAI, first to be captured will be rehabilitated to 6,000 ft.
	Undispersed parking for 2 Fi Gps (.), 2 Hi Fi Sqs (.), and 1 LB Gp (.)	1 - 5,000 ft (Marine)	b. Existing Jap field at MARUTO rehabilitated to 5,000 ft.
Y / 30	Undispersed parking for 4 Fi Gps, 1 Hi Fi Sq, 3 Tac Ren Sqs (F-6), 2 LB Gps, 2 Photo Ren Sqs, 1 Air Sea Rescue Sq, and 1 Ln Gp	1 - 7,000 ft (Army)	c. First field rehabilitated extended to 7,000 ft. d. Additional field at same location as first field, or at one of other existing field locations given in REMARKS a. above rehabilitated to 6,000 ft.
	* Undispersed parking with 7 "Equivalent" Hardstands for 2 Fi Gps (.), 2 Hi Fi Sqs (.), 1 Photo Ren Sq (.) and 1 LB Gp (.)	1 - 6,000 ft (Marine) 1 - 5,000 ft (Marine)	e. MARUTO field extended to 6,000 ft. f. Additional Jap field at MARUTO rehabilitated to 5,000 ft.
Y / 45	Parking with 25 "Equivalent" Hardstands for 5 Fi Gps, 2 Hi Fi Sqs, 3 Tac Ren Sqs (F-6), 4 L/B Gps, 2 Photo Ren Sqs, 1 Air Sea Rescue Sq, and 1 Ln Gp	1 - 7,000 ft (Army) 4 - 6,000 ft (Army)	g. 2 existing Jap fields rehabilitated at SOBAN, 2 at IYAKAWA, and 1 at KAWAI; all 6,000 ft except initial field at 7,000 ft.
	Parking with 61 "Equivalent" Hardstands for same Marine units listed under Y / 30.	1 - 6,000 ft (Marine) 1 - 5,000 ft (Marine)	h. No change (2 fields at MARUTO)
Y / 60	Parking with 220 equivalent Hardstands for 9 Fi Gps, 2 Hi Fi Sqs, 4 Tac Ren Sqs (F-6), 3 LB Gps, 2 LB Gps, 3 Photo Ren Sqs, 2 TC Gps, 1 Air Sea Rescue Sq, and 1 Ln Gp	1 - 7,000 ft (Army) 5 - 6,000 ft (Army)	i. 2 runways each at SOBAN, IYAKAWA, and KAWAI; all 6,000 ft except initial field at 7,000 ft.
	Parking with 115 "Equivalent" Hardstands for same Marine units listed under Y / 30.	1 - 6,000 ft (Marine) 1 - 5,000 ft (Marine)	j. No change (2 fields at MARUTO)
Y / 90	Hardstands increased to 650	1 - 7,000 ft (Army) 5 - 6,000 ft (Army)	
	Hardstands increased to 169	1 - 6,000 ft (Marine) 1 - 5,000 ft (Marine)	
Y / 120	Hardstands increased to 865	1 - 7,000 ft (Army) 5 - 6,000 ft (Army) 1 - 6,000 ft (Marine) 1 - 5,000 ft (Marine)	

* "Equivalent" Hardstands include Standard Hardstands and Service aprons expressed in terms of Standard Hardstands

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APPENDIX D

ANNEX 4

"CORONET"

OPERATION - "CORONET"

WESTERN AREA

BULK PETROLEUM FACILITIES

Completion Date	Location	TANKAGE (Bbls)				PIPELINES				Remarks
		AVGAS	MOGAS	ADF	RANGE GAS	AVGAS	MOGAS	ADF	RANGE GAS	
Y to Y / 15	KATASE TERMINAL BEACH STRIP ATSUGI Airfield HARA-MACHIDA	5000 1000 1000	5000 1000	4000		4" 4"				4" Avgas pipeline from KATASE Terminal to ATSUGI airfield. 4" avgas pipeline from KATASE Terminal to Beach Strip. Start of 6" mogas pipeline to interior. Start of drum filling facilities at KATASE Terminal. 1-300' jetty completed at KATASE Terminal.
Y / 15 to Y / 30	KATASE TERMINAL BEACH STRIP ATSUGI Airfield HARA-MACHIDA FUCHU ODAWARA	10000 7000 7000	15000 5000 4000	14000		8" Transfer lines. 8" Unloading lines.	8" Transfer lines. 8" Unloading lines.	6" Transfer lines. 8" Unloading lines.	6" Transfer lines.	6" Mogas pipeline complete to HARA-MACHIDA. 4" mogas pipeline started to ODWARA, if necessary. Additional small tankage and drum filling points as required. Continuation of drum filling facilities at KATASE Terminal.
Y / 30 to Y / 45	KATASE TERMINAL &/or YOKOHAMA HARA-MACHIDA FUCHU KANAGOE ATSUGI Airfield ODAWARA	20000 14000	40000 5000 3000 2000 10000	24000 5000	5000			6" 6"	4"	6" Mogas pipeline complete to FUCHU. 4" Mogas pipeline complete to ODWARA, if necessary. Provisions for drum cleaning started. 1-400' jetty completed at KATASE Terminal.
Y / 45 to Y / 60	KATASE TERMINAL &/or YOKOHAMA FUCHU KANAGOE ODAWARA		70000 5000 5000	35000	15000			6"		6" Mogas pipeline complete to KANAGOE. Construction of lateral 4" Mogas pipelines and drum fill points as required.
Y / 60 to Y / 75	KATASE TERMINAL &/or YOKOHAMA & other inland points.	25000	100000	45000	20000					Construction of lateral 4" Mogas pipelines and drum fill points as required.

OPERATION - "CORONET"

WESTERN AREA (Cont'd)

Completion Date	Location	TANKAGE (Bbls)				PIPELINES				Remarks
		LOGS	LOGS	DF	RANGE GAS	LOGS	LOGS	DF	RANGE GAS	
Y / 75 to Y / 90	KATASE TERMINAL &/or YOKOHAMA and other inland points.	30000	135000	60000	30000					Construction of lateral 4" logas pipelines and drum fill points as required.
Y / 90 to Y / 105	KATASE TERMINAL &/or YOKOHAMA and other inland points.	40000	170000	75000	35000					Construction of lateral 4" logas pipelines and drum fill points as required.
	TOTAL	61000	200000	75000	35000					

NOTE: All tankage figures are cumulative.

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OPERATION - "CORONET"

EASTERN AREA

Completion Date	Location	TANKAGE (Bbls)				PIPELINES				Remarks
		AVGAS	MOGAS	ADF	RANGE GAS	AVGAS	MOGAS	ADF	RANGE GAS	
Y to Y / 15	CHOSHI TERMINAL	5000	5000	5000	2000					6" Avgas pipelines from CHOSHI Terminal to MIYAKAWA. 4" Avgas pipeline extension from main 6" Avgas line to KATORI Airfield. NARUTO Airfield served by tank truck from MIYAKAWA Airfield during early operation. 4" Avgas pipeline from MIYAKAWA to MIYAKAWA Airfield. Start of 6" Mogas pipelines. Tank truck and drum filling facilities started at CHOSHI Terminal.
	KATORI AIRFIELD	1000				4"				
	MIYAKAWA AIRFIELD	2000	1000			4"				
	NARUTO AIRFIELD	2000								
	NOBARA AIRFIELD	1000								
	HIKATA		1000							
	CHOSHI TO MIYAKAWA					6"				
Y / 15 to Y / 30	CHOSHI TERMINAL	20000	15000	15000	7000	8" submarine line	8" submarine line	8" submarine line	6" submarine line	6" Mogas pipeline from CHOSHI Terminal to MIYAKAWA. Continuation of construction on tank truck and drum filling facilities. 1-1500' jetty completed at CHOSHI Terminal.
	KATORI AIRFIELD	3000				8" transfer line.	8" transfer line.	6" transfer line.	6" transfer line.	
	MIYAKAWA AIRFIELD	4000	6000							
	NARUTO AIRFIELD	4000								
	NOBARA AIRFIELD	3000	2000							
	HIKATA		3000							
	MIYAKAWA								6"	
Y / 30 to Y / 45	CHOSHI TERMINAL	26000	30000	25000	12000					Completion of 6" Avgas pipeline from CHOSHI Terminal to NOBARA Airfield. 4" Avgas pipeline from main 6" Avgas pipeline to NARUTO Airfield. 6" Mogas pipeline from MIYAKAWA to NARUTA. Start constructing drum cleaning facilities.
	KATORI AIRFIELD	14000								
	MIYAKAWA AIRFIELD	14000	10000							
	NARUTO AIRFIELD	14000				4"				
	NOBARA AIRFIELD	14000	6000			6"				
	HIKATA		5000							
	NARUTA		5000						6"	
Y / 45 to Y / 60	CHOSHI TERMINAL	30000	45000	35000	15000					6" Mogas pipeline from NARUTA to KIYOSHI. Continue construction of drum cleaning facilities.
	MIYAKAWA AIRFIELD		20000							
	KIYOSHI		5000						6"	
	NOBARA AIRFIELD		10000							

OPERATION - "CORONET"

EASTERN AREA (Cont'd)

Completion Date	Location	TANKAGE (Bbls)				PIPELINES				Remarks
		AVGAS	MOGAS	ADF	RANGE GAS	AVGAS	MOGAS	ADF	RANGE GAS	
Y / 60 to Y / 75	CHOSHI TERMINAL & inland points. KASHIMA	55000	85000	45000	20000		6"			6" Mogas pipeline from KIOROSHI to KASHIMA. Construction of 4" lateral Mogas pipelines, drum fill points, and small tanks as required.
Y / 75 to Y / 90	CHOSHI TERMINAL & inland points.	85000	110000	55000	25000					Construction of 4" lateral Mogas pipelines, drum fill points, and small tanks as required.
Y / 90 to Y / 105	CHOSHI TERMINAL & inland points.	115000	140000	70000	35000					Construction of 4" lateral Mogas pipelines, drum fill points, and small tanks as required.
	TOTAL	171000	185000	70000	35000					
	GRAND TOTAL	232000	385000	145000	70000					

NOTE: All tankage figures are cumulative.

OPERATION - CORONET

WESTERN AREA

APPENDIX E

ANNEX 4

"CORONET"

PORT AND BASE DEVELOPMENT

Airfields
Bulk POL Facilities

Appendix C

Appendix D

PORT CONSTRUCTION				BASE DEVELOPMENT							
Objective	Liberty Ship Berths	Lighter Piers	LST & LCT Landings	Temporary Storage (in Sq Ft) for 500,000 men		Hospital		Camps % Completed	Headquarters in Sq Ft	Roads % Completed	Railroads % Completed
				Open	Covered	Stage II	Stage III				
Objective	7	10	As Required	8250	550	24,500		285,000 F. and Civilian Internees, 475,000 Garrison	590	495 mi improved 150 mi new	395 mi improved 20 mi new
Y / 15	1	4	As Required	250	-	-	-			3	-
Y / 30	3	6	As Required	750	50	-	-			7	2
Y / 45	7	10	As Required	3050	150	1,500	-			16	9
Y / 60	7	10	As Required	5250	300	3,000	-			26	19
Y / 75	7	10	As Required	8250	550	5,000	-	1	145	37	30
Y / 90	7	10	As Required	8250	550	7,000	-	2	280	50	40
Y / 120	7	10	As Required	8250	550	14,000	-	34	590	72	64
Y / 150	7	10	As Required	8250	550	24,500	4,000	79	590	85	86
Y / 180	7	10	As Required	8250	550	-	18,000	100	590	100	100
Y / 195	7	10	As Required	8250	550	-	24,500	100	590	100	100

NOTE: Figures do not include rehabilitation of existing structures and facilities except where so stated.

APPENDIX E

ANNEX 4

~~SECRET~~
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

~~RESTRICTED~~

Airfields
Bulk POL Facilities

Appendix C
Appendix D

	PORT CONSTRUCTION (a)				BASE DEVELOPMENT					
	Lighter Piers (Tonga River)	Lighter Piers Within Artificial Harbor	Temporary Storage (in Sq Ft) for 500,000 men		Hospital Beds		Camps	Headquarters	Roads	Railroads
Objective			Open	Covered	Stage II	Stage III	% Completed	in Sq Ft	% Completed	% Completed
	32	62	7,500	500	18,250		85,000 PW and Civilian Internees, 200,000 Garrison	50	430 mi improved 100 mi new	240 mi repaired 50 mi new
Y # 15	5	1	500	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
Y # 30	9	27	1,000	50	-	-	-	-	6	1
Y # 45	27	44	2,800	150	1,250	-	-	-	16	9
Y # 60	32	62	4,500	300	2,500	-	-	-	26	18
Y # 75	32	62	7,500	500	4,250	-	0.5	10	39	35
Y # 90	32	62	7,500	500	7,500	-	1.5	20	52	48
Y # 105	32	62	7,500	500	11,250	-	8.5	35	67	63
Y # 120	32	62	7,500	500	15,000	500	16	50	79	74
Y # 150	32	62	7,500	500	18,250	6,500	57	50	90	89
Y # 180	32	62	7,500	500	-	14,250	100	50	100	100
Y # 195	32	62	7,500	500	-	18,250	100	50	100	100

NOTE: (a) Does not include facilities within artificial harbor to be constructed by Navy, except as noted.

Figures do not include rehabilitation of existing structures of facilities except where specifically indicated.

APPENDIX B

ANNEX 4

~~SECRET~~
OPERATION CORAL

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YOKOHAMA TOKYO Area

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Airfields
Hulk POL Facilities

Appendix C
Appendix D

PORT CONSTRUCTION

BASE DEVELOPMENT*

	Liberty Ship Berths	Lighter Piers	IST & LCT Landings	Storage (M Sq Ft) for 1,000,000 men		Shops (M Sq Ft) for 1,000,000 men
				Oper.	Covered	
Objective	50	67	As Required	22,500	6,750	3,000
Y / 75	4	8	As Required	500	250	100
Y / 90	10	16	As Required	2,500	750	300
Y / 105	16	24	As Required	4,500	1,250	500
Y / 120	22	32	As Required	6,500	1,750	700
Y / 150	36	48	As Required	14,500	4,150	1,800
Y / 180	50	67	As Required	22,500	6,750	3,000

NOTES: All objective dates based upon assumption TOKYO-YOKOHAMA Area will be available for base development by Y / 60. In the event of later capture all dates to be set back accordingly.

Figures shown represent total requirement. Existing facilities captured intact or repairable will be used to maximum to meet the requirement.

* Other facilities included in Western and Eastern Area developments.

APPENDIX B

ANNEX 4

OPERATION - "CORONET"SUMMARY OF
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS

	(DWT)		
	<u>ENGINEER</u>	<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
WESTERN AREA	669115	29930	699045
EASTERN AREA	<u>347056</u>	<u>20373</u>	<u>367429</u>
TOTAL	1016171	50303	1066474 ✓

PHASES REQUIREMENTS

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ENGINEER</u>	<u>SIGNAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Y / 15	36577	9660	46237
Y / 15 - Y / 30	81516	7233	88749
Y / 30 - Y / 45	88862	12639	101501
Y / 45 - Y / 60	84552	12795	97347
Y / 60 - Y / 75	73162	7226	80388
Y / 75 - Y / 90	75816	750	76566
Y / 90 - Y / 105	93256		93256
Y / 105 - Y / 120	129897		129897
Y / 120 - Y / 150	218057		218057
Y / 150 - Y / 180	126046		126046
Y / 180 - Y / 195	<u>8430</u>	<u> </u>	<u>8430</u>
TOTAL	1016171	50303	1066474 ✓

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APPENDIX "H"

ANNEX 4

"CORONET"

ARTIFICIAL HARBOR

I. RESPONSIBILITY:

The preparation, construction, transportation to the objective area, installation and maintenance is the responsibility of the Navy.

II. CONCEPT:

1. Purpose. Protected harbors are required where major forces must be supported and supplied for considerable period over beaches subject to severe storms. Such storms interfere with or interrupt unloading operations, and may cause so much damage to landing craft and installations as to cripple operations for long periods after the storm has ended, possibly endangering the beachhead. Artificial Harbors are designed to permit complete construction in advance of the component units, so that installation at the beachhead can be made in a few days.

2. Effect of Waves on unloading. Experience on other beachheads has demonstrated that the rate of cargo discharge to shore over unprotected beaches varies with sea and swell conditions approximately as shown in Table 1. This table neglects any subsequent delay due to storm damage.

Table 1

<u>Height of Wave</u>	<u>Relative unloading rate</u>
3 feet or under	100
3 - 4 feet	75
4 - 5 feet	50
5 - 6 feet	25
6 feet and over	0

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3. Facilities. Basic requirements include piers or wharves for unloading, directly to motor transport, cargo from Liberty ships, AK's and comparable cargo vessels, and troops with equipment from assault shipping; moorings for anchorage of additional vessels of these categories, from which cargo can be unloaded to LCT's, lighters, rhino ferries, DUKW's, and other amphibious vehicles; landing stages at which LCT's and barges can discharge; landing hards, pier-heads or causeways at which LST's can discharge directly to the beach; and tanker moorings with submarine discharge lines to shore. Clear lanes should be assigned for passage of DUKW's and other amphibious vehicles from ship to shore.

4. Operation. It is envisioned that the facilities within the protected harbor can be utilized at 90 percent of capacity and that the facilities outside the harbor can be utilized at 60 percent of capacity. On a basis of equal division of capacity, this assumption would require provision of facilities within the harbor based on capacity for handling two-thirds volume, which at 90 percent efficiency would actually handle 60 percent of the traffic. Facilities for transferring cargo from ships at anchor outside the harbor to the beach and for landing cargo and motor transport from LST's would have a capacity of two-thirds total requirements, and at 60 percent effectiveness would handle 40 percent of the traffic. Such a division is based on the fact that facilities provided on the exposed beach are continued in service during favorable weather after the harbor is completed, using the harbor as a shelter for LCT's, LCM's, barges and other craft during unfavorable weather.

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III. REQUIREMENTS:

1. a. Eastern Forces (KUJUKURI HAMA)

Y	4 Infantry Divisions
Y / 5	2 Infantry Divisions
Y / 30	3 Infantry Divisions
Total	9 Infantry Divisions

b. AFPAC Reserve to be landed where required:

Y / 35	3 Infantry Divisions
	1 Airborne Division
Total	4 Divisions

c. Strategic Reserve - on call.

	4 Infantry Divisions
--	----------------------

2. Cargo Volume - Eastern Forces Daily Av. by periods

Y to Y / 15	10,268 DWT)	} Limited to 12,000 DWT per day by deferral of construc- tion ashore.
Y / 15 to Y / 30	11,450	
Y / 30 to Y / 45	15,290	
Y / 45 to Y / 60	15,060	
Y / 60 to Y / 75	16,145	
Y / 75 to Y / 90	15,335	

3. Protected Harbor Requirements. It is envisioned that a considerable proportion of total cargo in-put can be handled during periods of good weather over assault causeways and over the beach outside the protected harbor, provided the harbor could be used as a refuge for small craft during storms. In addition, it is apparent that during periods of unfavorable weather, when unloading operations are stopped outside the harbor, unloading can be carried on within the harbor and cargo vital to the

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success of the combat forces ashore can be landed without interruption.

It is determined, therefore, that the capacity of the harbor can be about 60 percent of the total operational requirements for the whole area and be entirely feasible with respect to the construction and installation effort involved. In terms of tonnage and shipping this means that facilities will be provided within the harbor to unload 8 - 9,000 DWT per day, and moorings and berths for not less than 18 Liberty ships.

4. Inland Clearances. A major consideration in the selection of the site for the Artificial Harbor is the adequacy of inland clearances. Tables showing the inland clearances of the two sites under consideration, IIOKA and KATAKAI, are presented under Section IV Paragraph 4.

IV. SITE CONDITIONS:

1. Location. The Artificial Harbor will be located on KUJUKURI HAMA. The exact location has not been determined pending more accurate information on hydrographic, beach and inshore terrain conditions. For planning purposes, studies have been carried out in connection with the two sites considered to possess the greatest advantages:

- a. IIOKA at the northeast extremity of KUJUKURI HAMA and
- b. KATAKAI, 22 miles southwest of IIOKA near the center of KUJUKURI HAMA.

For whatever site as may be selected, the number of components and the general arrangement of the artificial harbor will remain substantially the same.

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2. Hydrography. KUJUKURI HAMA is a crescent shaped beach 34 miles long between TOTO--SAKI and IIOKA. Except at the ends the beach is apparently free of rocks and runnels. However, 2 sand bars, which will restrict lighterage to high water periods, appear to extend the entire length of the beach. Soundings are shown on H.O. chart Misc. 10010-31. The bottom is indicated as fine sand and the beach gradient as varying between one in 150 and one in 300. The tidal range is about 5 feet during spring tides. Littoral currents are believed to be moderate, approximately 1 knot, normally toward the southwest.

3. Meteorology.

a. Winds are generally offshore from December to February, with Northwest winds prevailing; variable in March, April, October and November, with North and Northeast winds prevailing; and onshore from May to September. Wind velocities are at a maximum from November to March, with monthly means from 12 to 16 knots. Gales (54 knots) are recorded in 3 to 8 percent of observations.

b. Typhoons occur with mean frequency in days per month as follows:

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Less than	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1

c. Waves. Including off shore waves and defining favorable conditions for unloading on unprotected beaches as waves 6 feet or less, the percentage of observations indicating conditions favorable and unfavorable for unloading is:

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Favorable	90	85	81	87	90	92	91	89	91	90	87	93
Unfavorable	10	15	19	13	10	8	9	11	9	10	13	7

[REDACTED]

Observations indicate that waves over 3 feet, which will at least impede operations, will occur about 49 percent of the time in March and 51 percent in April.

d. During the months of December, January, February, March and April, the worst surf conditions prevail but typhoon risk and fog are at a minimum.

e. In addition to the sea and swell which will approach normal to the beach the greater part of the time, swells 6 feet high will occur from 3 to 5 percent of the time from the southwest, from 3 to 6 percent from the south and from 2 to 7 percent of the time from the southeast between March and August inclusive, and seas 5 feet high will occur 5 to 9 percent of the time from the southeast during these months. Due to refraction, sea and swell in the open ocean approaching from the southwest or south will be swung so as to approach the harbor locations from the south or southeast. Similarly waves approaching from the north or northeast will be swung to approach the beach from an easterly and, even, southeasterly direction.

4. Site Potentialities and Inland Clearances. Two sites on KUJUKURI HAMA are under consideration as having the best potentialities: IIOKA and KATAKAI.

a. IIOKA is located at the northeast extremity of KUJUKURI HAMA. It is situated on a bight formed by the Eastward projection of the CHOSHI promontory. It is sheltered by highland from the north and northeasterly winds which prevail during March and April. It has the disadvantages of a flat gradient between the beach and the 6 fathom line, about one to 275, and limited inland clearance from the beach, due to the escarpments to the north and east which force all

traffic over a single highway leading westward.

b. KATAKAI is located near the center of KUJUKURI HAMA, 22 miles south of IIOKA. It is exposed to the full sweep of the Pacific Ocean from the northeast to the southwest. However, the beach gradient appears to be steeper and the 6 fathom line closer to the shore than at any other point along the beach. This site has the advantage of good lateral and inland distribution of inbound traffic.

c. Inland Clearance. The estimated maximum clearance of the two alternate sites is compared as follows:

	<u>IIOKA</u>	<u>KATAKAI</u>
Y / 15	2000 DWT	2000 DWT
Y / 16 to Y / 30	5500	*8500
Y / 31 to Y / 45	6500	9500
Y / 46 to Y / 60	10500	12000
Y / 61 to Y / 75	12000	13500
Y / 76 to Y / 90	13500	13500

* Immediate rehabilitation of existing railroad spur from main line to KATAKAI will provide a distinct advantage for this area.

V. LAYOUT OF THE HARBOR:

1. General. Basic requirements for the harbor were set forth in Section III. The layout shown on Inclosure 1 is considered the maximum feasible with respect to the construction and logistic requirements involved, particularly the towing and time implications. The scope and arrangements of the facilities are tentative and subject to modifications as may later be imposed by operational requirements, determination of the final site, and additional study.

2. Breakwaters.

a. An outer breakwater, parallel to the beach and 6500 feet distant therefrom in 40 feet depth of water at high tide, is indicated as 10,500²⁰ feet long overall. It will be composed of 50 steel caissons, ballasted with concrete, sunk, then filled with water and eventually filled with sand for increased stability.

b. Side breakwaters are provided to protect the piers from waves oblique to the beach. These breakwaters will be composed of sunken ships. Closure to the beach is not considered necessary. If found desirable, it is believed that it can be built up with hulks, damaged landing craft, wrecked tanks and other heavy items, or built up as a mole. Model studies now underway are expected to give reliable data on the need for closures to the beach and for possible improvements in form or alignment.

3. Openings. Side openings have been provided as the principal ship adits and exits. These openings have been made 600 feet wide and have been located in about 34 feet of water at low tide. Center opening has been omitted as unnecessary and undesirable.

4. Mooring Trots. A trot of twelve bow and stern moorings has been indicated inside and parallel to the outer breakwater. These trots are located 250 feet from the inner face of the breakwater to provide ready access to both sides of the ships and to provide clearance for possible displacement of the caissons toward the beach.

5. Pierheads. Four pierheads are indicated, each containing four berths. These pierheads with their interconnections and approaches, are of Navy pontoon type, floating,

[REDACTED]

with moorings independent of the ships' moorings. The latter are laid out so that each ship is secured to four buoys and can be held off the piers under gale conditions. Floating camels are provided as fenders between ship and pier. Each pair of berths is a 12 x 72 pontoon structure. This size has been adopted at the request of the office of the Chief of Engineers, after a detailed study of unloading and truck operations.

6. Pier Approaches. Pontoon causeways four pontoons wide have been indicated. This provides a liberal two-lane access. Consideration was given to making these causeways five pontoons wide, to minimize traffic blocks due to breakdowns and dropped cargo. This alternative was rejected as unessential and to reduce pontoon requirements.

7. LCT Blisters. Eight blisters of navy pontoons, 5 x 12, are indicated on one side of each approach pier. LCT's and smaller landing craft come alongside the causeway and head on to the blister, for discharge of cargo. LCVP's can come alongside the blister for discharge of personnel.

8. LST Berths. Three pontoon wharves have been indicated for multiple LST landings. It has been contemplated that standard 2 x 30 assault causeways would be side-carried, launched and used in the initial phases of the landings and that they would be reassembled, to the extent necessary, to form these wharves. Pending more accurate determination of inshore beach gradients, it is impossible to predict the probable length of the approach causeways. Indications are that they may have to be about 1,000 feet long. These wharves can also be used for discharging pontoon barges.

[REDACTED]

9. Lighter Piers. Sixty-two lighter piers are to be constructed by the Army within the Artificial Harbor.

VI. INSTALLATION:

Approximately 10 days of favorable weather will be required to install the Artificial Harbor as shown on Inclosure 1. After reconnaissance of the site, operations can probably commence on Y / 2 day, and provided weather held should be completed by Y / 12 day, by filling caissons with water. Filling with sand would require 5 - 24 inch dredges, and take about 30 additional days. It is estimated that this type of caisson breakwater would withstand seas as follows:

Caissons - open to the sea - waves up to 12 feet

Caissons - filled with water - waves up to 20 feet

Caissons - filled with sand - waves up to 30 feet.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

A N N E X 5a
Communications Plan
Staff Study
"CORONET"

1. DIRECTIVE:

This plan covers the signal communications for the operations of United States Army and correlated Naval Forces in the Pacific to occupy the TOKYO - YOKOHAMA, and KANTO PLAINS AREA, and to effect the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. (1) That normal command, administrative, and liaison communications will be functioning between the communications zones of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, and to headquarters of theaters and major supporting forces not directly participating in "CORONET".
- (2) That normal signal communication systems required for cooperative action between CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, and the STRATEGIC AIR FORCES will be functioning throughout "CORONET".
- b. That in the initial stages of the operation the following headquarters will be established and operating as follows:

CINCAFPAC - MANILA

ADVON GHQ AFPAC - SAGAMI WAN area, HONSHU

UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE - GUAM

EIGHTH U. S. ARMY - SAGAMI WAN area, HONSHU

Rear Echelon - LEYTE

FIRST U. S. ARMY - KOJIKURI BEACH area, HONSHU

Rear Echelon - LUZON

ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "C" - SAGAMI WAN area, HONSHU

Rear Echelon - LUZON

FAR EAST AIR FORCES - LUZON

14TH AIR FORCE - KUNMING

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC - OAHU

ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC - LUZON

68TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM GROUP - MANILA

- c. (1) That Naval Forces will install, operate, and maintain all naval communication facilities unless otherwise directed; this will include installation, operation, and maintenance of all wire facilities within Naval and Marine establishments, including airfields.
- (2) CINCPAC will install, operate, and maintain at ADVON GHQ AFPAC in the objective area the signal communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between ADVON GHQ AFPAC in the objective area, and the appropriate headquarters and elements of CINCPAC.
- (3) That CINCPAC will provide such signal communication facilities and personnel at ADVON GHQ AFPAC in the objective area, as may be required to keep CINCAFPAC promptly informed of all matters affecting the progress of the naval phases of the operation.
- (4) That CINCPAC will provide such surface craft as may be required for a safehand courier boat service between the respective Army Headquarters ashore and ADVON GHQ AFPAC afloat and/or ashore.

d. That the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE will install, operate, and maintain at ADVON GHQ AFPAC in the objective area, the signal communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of information and intelligence, and for liaison purposes for coordinated action between ADVON GHQ AFPAC in the objective area, and the appropriate headquarters and elements of UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE.

e. That JAPANESE military and civil communications will be completely destroyed prior to or during the landing and subsequent operations.

f. That plans will be completed under the provisions of paragraph 3b (5) of the Staff Study to which this is an Annex whereby adequate communications for cooperative action between all forces will be assured.

g. That the 68TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM GROUP will establish such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radio and radar navigational aids as may be required in the objective area.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. See Charts.

- (1) Appendix 5a, Principal Channels of Signal Communication.
- (2) Appendix 5b, Principal Tactical Channels of Radio Communication.
- (3) Appendix 5c, Wire Facilities for AFPAC

b. General:

- (1) In general, signal communication facilities for "CORONET" will provide channels of communication between Headquarters, CINCPAC, ADVON GHQ AFPAC, CINCPAC, UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE, FIRST U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "C", USAFWESPAC, USAFMIDPAC, GHQ RESERVE, and the designated elements of the initial occupational forces.
- (2) The FIRST U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, and ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "C" will install, operate, and maintain the signal communications required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between their respective headquarters and ADVON GHQ AFPAC in the SAGAMI WAN area, HONSHU, and GHQ AFPAC at MANILA.
- (3) Safehand air courier service will be provided to areas as designated.

c. Tasks:

- (1) ADVON GHQ AFPAC will insure the provision of signal communication facilities required to accomplish the tasks assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an Annex, and in addition, will insure the provision of integrated inter-communication system between Air, Ground, and Naval Forces in the objective area for intelligence, supply point, liaison, line of communi-

cation, defense, fighter control, and aircraft warning purposes as may be necessary.

- (2) The FIRST U. S. ARMY and EIGHTH U. S. ARMY will insure the provision of signal communication facilities required to accomplish the Tasks assigned to them in the Staff Study to which this is an Annex, and in addition, will within their respective zones of action:
- (a) Insure an integrated communication system between Air, Ground, and Naval Forces for such aircraft warning, air support, fighter control, intelligence, liaison, supply point, line of communication, railway and military government purposes as may be necessary.
 - (b) Assist the Commanding Officer, 68TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM GROUP in the establishment of such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radio and radar navigational aids as may be required by the FAR EAST AIR FORCES.
 - (c) Be prepared to render the Naval Forces necessary assistance in the initial establishment of naval communications.
- (3) THE FAR EAST AIR FORCES:
- (a) Provides the signal communications, aircraft warning services, and air navigational facilities required to accomplish the tasks assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an Annex, and in addition, will insure the provision of signal communication facilities required for:
 - 1. Air operational intelligence, air command, and liaison purposes with the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE, 14TH AIR FORCE, and Air Units of CINCPAC.
 - 2. Air Force purposes in the cooperative action between land-based and carrier-based aircraft and with other appropriate elements of the Air Forces of CINCPAC

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and Air and Naval Forces of CINCPAC.

(b) Provides maximum possible assistance to the several Army Commanders, in their respective areas of control, in the construction of the communication facilities required by paragraphs 3b (4)(a) 2i and 3 i of the Staff Study to which this is an Annex.

(4) THE ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "C":

Provides the signal communication facilities required to accomplish the tasks assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an Annex, and in addition:

(a) Will be prepared to take over from the Armies the installation, operation, and maintenance of rear area communication facilities including those required under the provisions of paragraphs 3b (4)(a) 2 i and 3 i of the Staff Study to which this is an Annex.

(b) Those communication facilities required by ADVON GHQ AFPAC for communications with:

1. AFWESPAC.
2. AFMIDPAC.
- 3 WAR DEPARTMENT.
4. Other theater headquarters as may be operating at the time.

(c) Those communication facilities required for:

1. The operation of so much of the railway system as may be passed to its control by ADVON GHQ AFPAC for operational, administrative, and supply purposes, both civil and military.
2. Rehabilitation of such civil communication systems in the area as may be required for Military Government purposes.
3. Press purposes.

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4. Such ship-shore communications in the objective area as may be required, and not provided by the Navy.

5. Friendly intercept purposes.

(5) THE U. S. ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC:

Will insure the provision of signal communication facilities required to accomplish the tasks assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an Annex, and for communication between its headquarters and GHQ AFPAC in MANILA.

(6) THE U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC:

Will insure the provision of signal communication facilities required to accomplish the tasks assigned in the Staff Study to which this is an Annex, and will maintain the signal communication facilities required by CINCAFPAC for communications between MANILA, the RYUKYUS, the objective area, and the GHQ Reserve.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. Signal supply, in general, will be from the UNITED STATES, supply establishments in the objective area, and by WESPAC.

b. FAR EAST AIR FORCES provides the signal supplies and equipment for FAR EAST AIR FORCES technical purposes in accordance with existing directives. (See letter dated 18 September 1943 from Commanding General, Army Forces in the Far East to Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, Subject: "Signal Corps Supplies".)

5. PLANS:

a. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES PACIFIC will prepare and issue the following:

(1) Necessary Signal Operation Instructions and Standing Signal Instructions.

(2) A Signal Communications Order which will allocate tasks for the provision of an integrated signal communications system in the objective area, and in the bases to be established therein.

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b. FIRST U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, and ARMY SERVICE COMMAND "C" will prepare and submit to this headquarters communications plans and requests for signal supplies, equipment, and personnel to accomplish the tasks enumerated in paragraph 3c above, on or prior to dates specified in relevant instructions from this headquarters.


c. Central Bureau and Section 22 will submit their respective plans for radio intelligence, and radio and radar countermeasures to this headquarters by dates to be specified by the Chief Signal Officer.

d. Plans and directives for coordination of radio frequencies and call signs among forces concerned will be issued by this headquarters at an appropriate time.

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
PRINCIPAL TACTICAL CHANNELS OF RADIO COMMUNICATION

APPENDIX 5b
TO ANNEX 5a, STAFF STUDY
"CORONET"



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APPENDIX 5c
TO ANNEX 5a, STAFF STUDY
"CORONET"



NOTE:

SURFACE GRAF PROVIDED
OPERATED UNDER DIRECT
GHQ AFPAC.

LEGEND

- VOICE
- - - - - TELETYPE
- ——— COURIER BOAT